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FROM PICK AND SHOVEL TO MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL:
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
IN THE APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS
By
PATRICK C. MCGINLEY"

In this Essay, ProfessorMcGinley examines a century of conflicts
between the coal mining industry and the people of the "billion dollar
coalfield" communities of southern West Virginia whose labors
proidedfuel for the industrialrevolution, two world wars, and the
energy demands of the nation. The Essayidentifies a troublingparadox
Iighly efficient new mining technologies, including so-called
"mountaintopremoval"st'p mining,have resultedin the loss of tens of
thousands of well paying jobs while coal production has reached
record levels and many coalfield communities remain mired in
economic stagnationandpoverty.
The Essayidentifiesprovisions of the Surface Mining Controland
commercial,
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) that require
residential,and industrialdevelopment as a prerequisite to permitting
the radicalalteration of the environment occasioned by mountaintop
removal mining ProfessorMcGirdey makes the case that government
regulators missed the opportunity to bring permanent economic
benefits to coalfield communities by refusing to enforce this economic
development mandate of SMCRA. Instead, the Essay contends,
regulatorsoften choose to align themselves with coalindustryinterests
while turning a blind eye to the adverse environmental impacts and
property damage visited by mountaintop removal and other modern
mining methods on those who still lve in the old company towns or
"coalcamps"ofthe region.
The Essay exposes the plan and motive ofsome coal companies to
target for extinction some communities located near modern largescale mining operations. The plan was simple-conduct high intensity
mining operationsin close proximity to remote communities. When the

© Patrick C. McGinley, 2004. Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, 19752004. J.D., Duke University School of Law; A.B., Dickinson College. The author served as
plaintiffs' counsel in the Bragg v. Robertson and Moore v. HobetMLning, Inc. cases discussed in
the Essay, and regularly represents coalfield plaintiffs in litigation against state regulatory
agencies and coal companies. The author expresses his appreciation to West Virginia University
College of Law's Arthur Hodges Fund for the assistance given to support the completion of this
Essay.
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nuisance conditions createdby the mining became difficult to bear,the
belief was that those affected would choose to sell out to the coal
companies and move away from communities that had been family
homeplaces for decades. In at least one area, a major national coal
company conditioned its purchase of such homes on the sellers'
agreement to move away and never return to the area for the rest of
theirlives.
The Essay concludes by identifying a movement among some
influential West Virginia interests "tolet naturalselection play out" In
synch with the coal companies' desire to eliminate rural coalfield
communities near mountaintop removal mines, this Darwinian view
envisions nonviable communities becoming 'ghost towns." The
conclusion observes that the century-long struggle of coalfield
communities for environmental, economic, and socialjustice is likely
to continue and that those who would destroy these communities in the
name of eliminating "ruralsprawl" or maximizing profits may be
surpoised at their resilience. Steeled by a century of oppression, the
Essay suggests that the people of coalfield communities are likely to
fight back.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Travelers entering Williamson, the county seat of Mingo County, West
Virginia, pass a faded roadsign that reads: "Welcome to the Billion Dollar
Coalfields." The irony of the greeting is hard to escape. Driving into the town
which lies in the heart of central Appalachia's coal-producing region, one
sees boarded-up stores and vacant and dilapidated buildings. Discouraging
economic data and high unemployment in Mingo and other coal counties of
southern West Virginia confirm what the eye sees: The billions of dollars of
coal reserves mined from the region have only marginally benefited local
people. After a century of mining in the "billion dollar coalfields," local
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communities lack funds to upgrade aging schools; tens of thousands live
below the federal "poverty line"; and public services such as fire, police,
sewage treatment, and libraries struggle to survive on "bare-bones" budgets.
While the economic stagnation of coalfield communities continues,
highly efficient coal mines have revolutionized coal mining in Appalachia.
Coal production largely from giant "mountaintop removal"' strip mines and
highly mechanized underground "longwall"2 mines approaches record levels.
How does one account for the pervasive dismal economic condition in a
region which could aptly be called the "Saudi Arabia of coal"?
The answer lies in an understanding of the various forces that have
shaped the history of the region. For better or worse, those forces-the coal
industry and those who directly profit from mining, state and local
politicians, and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)-led the
coalfields to its present condition. Those same players continue to exert
enormous influence, which promises to extend the economic statusqua The
paucity of attention given by historians and legal scholars to the legal regime
that provided the framework for economic development in the "billion dollar
coalfields" provided the impetus for this Essay. The hope is that the
following will initiate a scholarly discussion of environmental, economic,
and social justice in a region that for a century has given much more to the
nation than its citizens have received in return.
This Essay begins in Section II with a presentation of the historical
context in which today's continuing environmental injustice in the coalfields
developed. Next, the Essay turns in Section III to a brief discussion of the
emergence of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),3
describing its theoretical promise to protect the coalfield communities, and
setting the stage for the breaking of that promise in application. Section IV
presents a description of the lawlessness in southern West Virginia with
regard to the application of SMCRA to mountaintop removal. Section V, truly
the heart of the Essay, describes the coal companies' calculated efforts to
remove not only mountain tops, but whole communities. Finally, the Essay
concludes that regulatory failures and corporate plans to maximize profits
by eliminating coalfield communities have combined to continue the historic
deprivation of environmental, economic, and social justice long experienced
by coalfield citizens.
II. COAL MINING

AND APPALACHIAN COMMUNITIES:
MINES THEMSELVES

A HISTORY AS DARK

AS THE

Historian Ronald Eller describes the solitude of the mountains of
southern Appalachia in the last decade of the nineteenth century:

1 In "mountaintop removal" strip mining, coal companies blast the tops off mountains to
reveal the coal seams beneath them. Mining wastes are then deposited in nearby valleys,
burying headwater streams. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 179-80 for a discussion of this mining technique.
3 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202, 1211, 12311240a, 1242-1243, 1251-1279, 1281, 1291-1309b, 1311-1316, 1321-1328 (2000).
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Great forests of oak, ash, and poplar, covered the hillsides with a rich blanket
of deep hues, and clear, sparkling streams rushed along the valley floors. No
railroad had yet penetrated the hollows. The mountain people lived in small
settlements scattered here and there in the valleys and coves. 4Life on the whole
was simple, quiet, and devoted chiefly to agricultural pursuits.

Thirty years later a "new industrial order" had arisen in Appalachia.' People
of the region left their farms, moving to communities with names like Blair,
Sharples, Five Block, and Monclo-people there call them "company towns"
or "coal camps."6 Countless similar small coal camps were built during the
early decades of the twentieth century by coal operators to house families of
men who worked in nearby underground mines.7
Professor Eller describes in graphic detail the transformation of
Appalachian communities that had occurred by 1920:
[E]vidence of change was to be found on every hand. Coal-mining village after
coal-mining village dotted the hollows along every creek and stream. The
weathered houses of those who worked in the mines lined the creeks and steep
slopes, and the black holes themselves gaped from the hillsides like great open
wounds. Mine tipples, headhouses, and other buildings straddled the slopes of

4 RONALD D. ELLER, MINERS, MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE
APPALACHIAN SOUTH,1880-1930, at 161 (1982).
5 Id.
6 Blair, Sharples, Five Block, and Monclo are located in close proximity to each other along
West Virginia Route 17 in Logan County. For a century, these and other former Appalachian

coal camps have experienced the periodic boom and bust impacts of the coal-based economy.
In the last decade, these communities and other coal towns have been pushed to the brink of
extinction as their residents have struggled to survive in the midst of large-scale mountaintop
removal coal strip mining. Even as mountaintop removal mining has increased coal production
and enabled coal companies to compete with coal mined in the Great Plains, the residents of
these communities have suffered a broad range of adverse social, economic, and environmental
impacts while sharing few of the benefits. See Sections IV-V, iL/ra
7 The "outside world" has been largely ignorant of the history of the coal mining
communities of the region. Perhaps the broadest exposure to the meaning of life in a coal camp
came from Sixteen Tons, a popular song of the 1950s. Tennessee Ernie Ford, Sixteen Tons, on
16 TONS (Capitol Records 1956). The lyrics of the song were written by Merle Travis and
popularized by singer "Tennessee Ernie" Ford. SIXTEEN TONS-THE STORY BEHIND THE LEGEND
(2001), available at http://www.emieford.com/Sixteen%2OTons.htm. The song became the
fastest selling single in Capitol Records Company's history. Id It tells of the difficult lives of
coal miners who lived in company towns. The lyrics include:
I was born one mornin' and the sun didn't shine
I picked up my shovel and I walked to the mine
I loaded sixteen tons of number nine coal
And the straw boss said, "Well bless my soul!
You loaded sixteen tons and what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt."
St. Peter, don't you call me cause I can't go
I owe my soul to the company store.
Id. For more on the history of this classic song, visit
http://www, ernieford.comSixteen%2OTons.htm.

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 34:21

of
the mountains. Railroads sent their tracks in all directions, and long lines
8
coal cars sat on the sidings and disappeared around the curves of the hills.

Professor Eller also describes how coal mining altered the Appalachian
landscape:
The once majestic earth was scarred and ugly, and the streams ran brown with
garbage and acid runoff from the mines. A black dust covered everything. Huge
mounds of coal and "gob" piles of discarded mine waste lay about. The peaceful
before had been replaced by a cacophony of voices and
quiet of three decades
9
industrial sounds.

"'Civilization'" writes Eller, "had come into the mountains and had caught up
the mountain people in the wellspring of progress."10
The coal camp symbolized this new Appalachian industrial order. Life
and work in the coal camps in the early decades of the twentieth century
were violent, oppressive, and exploitive. 12 The company town lay at the
heart of an authoritative system. 3 Historian David Alan Corbin observed:
s ELLER, supra note 4, at 161-62.
9 Id at 162.
10 Id

11 Id Professor Eller dedicates an entire chapter of his book to an examination of life in
coal company towns. Id. at 161-98. He describes the context in which coal camp residents lived
and worked:
[Clompany town[s] became for thousands of mountaineers the dominant institution of
community life-a vital social center around which the miners' world revolved. Not only
was the coal camp the site of one's work, the source of one's income, and the location of
one's residence, but for many it also provided an introduction to organized community
life and the setting in which new attitudes, values, and social institutions evolved.
Completely owned and tightly dominated by the coal companies, the mining towns also
reflected the underlying transition in land ownership and social power which had swept
the region with the coming of the industrial age.
Id. at 162. U.S. Senate Reports and Bureau of the Census information indicate that at the zenith
of the early twentieth century coal boom, almost four-fifths of southern West Virginia mine
workers and more than two-thirds of mining families in southwestern Virginia and eastern
Kentucky lived in nearly 500 company towns. Id. at 162-63. In contrast, less than 100
independent incorporated towns existed in the same region. Id. at 163.
12 THE WEST VIRGINIA MINE

WARS: AN ANTHOLOGY 1 (David Alan Corbin ed., 1990)

[hereinafter W. VA. MINE WARS]. Health conditions were often deplorable. Professor Eller
describes what families faced:
With the movement into crowded and unsanitary coal camps, mountaineers increasingly
fell victim to epidemics of smallpox, typhoid fever and intestinal diseases. Cases of
tuberculosis and venereal disease, which were rare in preindustrial days, rose sharply in
the congested mining towns, and many children suffered from pellagra and other dietary
deficiencies.
ELLER, supranote 4, at 233.
13 W. VA. MINE WARS, supranote 12, at 1. See generallyDAVID ALAN CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND

REBELLION INTHE COALFIELDS: THE SOUTHERN WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880-1922, at 61-86 (1981)
(describing the racial unity in West Virginia coal camps that resulted from the common
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Ownership of the land and resources gave coal companies enormous social
control over the miners. "You didn't even own your own soul in those damnable
places," recalled one elderly miner. "The company owned everything, the
houses, the schools, churches, the stores-everything."
The coal company town was a complete system. In addition to owning and
controlling all of the institutions in the town, coal company rule in southern
West Virginia included the company doctor who delivered the babies, the mines
in which children went to work, and the cemeteries where they were eventually
buried.
It was a complete and ruthless rule. 14

Among the insults stemming from King Coal's tyranny were the
environmental conditions in the coal camps. As the coal companies owned
the towns, they were responsible for the existence-or lack thereof-of
public utilities such as sewer systems. 5 However, only two percent of coal
towns possessed such a system; the vast majority of the towns simply
dumped their waste into nearby creeks. 6 The combination of this discharge
of raw sewage with acid mine runoff completely eliminated all animal life in
many streams.17 The impact of water pollution on human health was also
evident. Hot summers caused the polluted waters to emit an unbearable
stench, and diseases such as typhoid ran rampant among the children of the
coal camps.'" The coal companies' response to the situation then is much the
same as it is now: They "argu[ed] that coal could not be mined economically
if they concerned themselves with ecology."'"

discontent felt by all miners); ELLER, supra note 4, at 161-98 (describing coal camp life in great
detail); CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT, COAL TowNs: LIFE, WORK, AND CULTURE IN COMPANY TOWNS OF
SOUTHERN APPALAcHIA, 1880-1960 (1991) (asserting that coal camp life was better than the life
residents had known before they came to the region); Ronald L. Lewis, Beyond Isolation and
Homogeneity Diversity and the History of Appalachia in BACKTALK FROM APPALACHIA:
CONFRONTING STEREOTYPES 21, 34 (Dwight B. Billings et al. eds., 1999) ("[Tlhere were great
differences among company towns, ranging from crude coal camps erected on 'gob piles' to
model towns with all the modem conveniences and a benevolent owner-operator. All of them,
however, were privately owned entities, not sovereign political jurisdictions.").
14 W. VA. MINE WARS, supra note 12, at 1. In the coal camps, "company nile included the
company police in the form of mine guards, who would toss the miners in jail when they got

disruptive, or administer the company beating when they attempted to unionize." Id.
15 WINTHROP D. LANE, THE DENIAL OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE COAL FIELDS 2 (1924).
16 ELLER, supranote 4, at 184.
17 Id. at 186.
18 Id.

19 Id (citing Jerry Bruce Thomas, Coal Country: The Rise of the Southern Smokeless Coal
Industry and Its Effect on Area Development, 1872-1910 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)).
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A. Union Battlefields in Appalachia
1. The Mine Wars: 1900-1932
Unionization was central in coal camp residents' struggle against the
oppression of the company masters. "[W]hen miners did go on strike for
their union," Corbin writes, "they did so not for simple wage increases, but
for their dignity and freedom."2" From the last decade of the nineteenth
century until the beginning of the New Deal Administration of President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, miners battled nonunion coal operators who
controlled the southern West Virginia coalfields with an iron fist. Actual
warfare between coal company forces and miners broke out there during the
decade from 1912 to 1921.21
These West Virginia "mine wars" involved skirmishes between private
armies. On one side were the hired guns of the coal operators and on the
other stood thousands of armed miners rebelling against coal company rule
of the nonunion coal camps.22 On several occasions martial law was
declared and the state militia was summoned by West Virginia Governors
whose sympathies lay with coal companies rather than the miners. Miners
were arrested and tried by military tribunals.23
Once, in September 1921, President Warren G. Harding sent federal
troops to intervene in the conflict.24 When federal troops arrived, the miners'
"army" dispersed, but an unarmed political struggle continued as miners
sought to win the right to unionize.25 Ten years later, Russell Briney,
reporting for the Courier-Journalin Louisville, Kentucky, observed that the
coal industry's domination and oppression of Kentucky miners and their
communities had not abated:
In 1931, for all practical purposes, the only law for the miners .

.

. was the

mining companies' law as interpreted by deputies sheriff selected and paid
directly by the companies ....

The system was simply law enforcement

stripped of any pretense of impartiality, and it is difficult to imagine a more

20

Id.

21 See generallyW. VA. MINE WARS, supranote 12.
22 Id
23 Arthur Warner, flighting Unionism with MartialLaw, THE NATION, Oct. 12, 1921, at 395,
396. Arthur Warner, writing for The Nation, recounted how local newspapers referred to this
strife as an "'industrial controversy.'" Id at 395. Warner noted that "the home folks resent the
words 'civil war' as describing the situation, but they seem to forget that the phrase is that of
their own Governor, who in proclaiming martial law in Mingo County on May 19 [1921], said
that 'a state of war, insurrection, and riot and bloodshed is and has been for some time in
existence' ...... Id.
24 The War in West Virginia, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 17, 1921, reprintedin W. VA. MINE WARS,
supranote 12, at 106.
25 James M. Cain, writing for The Atlantic Monthly, reported that at the end of the final Mine
War in the fall of 1921, "The union faces the most persistent fight against it that it has ever
known .... The union is literally on the defensive for its very existence." James M. Cain, The
Battle Ground of Coal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1922, reprintedin W. VA. MINE WARS, supra note
12, at 151, 157.
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effective device for promoting violence and engendering
resentful hatred
26
among a people bred in the free air of the Kentucky hills.
This decades-long imbalance of power was soon to be readjusted.
By 1930 the Appalachian coal industry "was sliding toward bankruptcy
as the national economy caved in on top of an already depressed [coal]
market."27 Cutthroat competition and "a vicious price-cutting spiral led ever
downward until at last, in 1932, at some pits... coal was offered for sale at
the incredibly low price of ten cents per ton."2 Bank and coal operator
bankruptcies swept through the coal fields.29 Companies, straining to keep
their heads above water, first cut miners' already-low daily wages and then
put their pay on a piecework basisa Miners were allowed to stay
underground for as long as they wished, resulting in ten- to twelve-hour
workdays.3 1 Given this economic chaos, it was not surprising that attempts
to unionize the coal camps were beaten back. Membership in the UMWA in
1930 had slipped to "a few hundred diehard members in West Virginia, even
32
fewer in Kentucky and Alabama"
The affects of the Depression, as bad as they were for most American
workers, were even more devastating to Appalachian coal miners and their
families:
People who have never lived in mining communities cannot comprehend the
feeling of captivity and helplessness that lay so heavy in the coal camps through
these years. In times of prosperity the miner had been little better than a serf in
his masters' mine, and the Depression was far advanced before union

A BIOGRAPHY OF A DEPRESSED
195-96 (1962) (quoting Russell Briney of the CouierJournal(Louisville, Kentucky)).
27 JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, APPALAcHIA: A HISTORY 272 (2002).
28 CAUDILL,supranote 26, at 169. Harry Caudill is quoted extensively in this Essay. His best
selling Night Comes to the Cumberlands:A Biographyof a DepressedAreaexposed for the first
time to a national audience the impoverished conditions of coalfield communities in his native
eastern Kentucky. Caudill's work and Michael Harrington's The OtherAmerica are said to have
provided the intellectual ammunition used in maldng the case for the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations' "War on Poverty," which has channeled billions of dollars to Appalachia in an
effort to alleviate the impoverished conditions there and promote sustainable development.
While Caudill is lauded by many, some historians properly criticize him for a condescending
attitude toward Appalachia's mountain culture and his factually unsupportable theory of genetic
deficiency of the region's inhabitants as a source of their plight. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note
27, at 333-34 (criticizing Caudill for "tending to define [Appalachia] and its people negatively,"
though with the "best of intentions"); RONALD ELLER, HARRY CAUDILL AND THE BURDEN OF
MOUNTAIN LIBERALISM (1983), available at http://www.uky.edu/RGS/AppalCenter/ellerl.htm
(criticizing aspects of Caudill's work, and speculating that the condescension stemmed from
Caudill's status as a middle class mountain resident, and an inherent tension between such
residents and "the rest of the mountain population").
29 Id at 171-74.
30 Id.at 170.
31 Id.at 170-71.
32 WILLIAMS, supranote 27, at 272.
26 HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS:

AREA
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membership and the apparent sympathy of a great national administration
33
brought relief to a situation which by then had become highly explosive.
2. The New Dealand the Rise of the UMWA: 1932-1941
When President Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated in March 1933 to
serve his first term, the battle-fatigued UMWA was invigorated. John L.
Lewis, the UMWA's legendary leader, "owed his opportunity during the
1930s to friendly federal legislation sponsored by Roosevelt and his liberal
allies."' Union organizers told miners: "The President wants you to join the
union."35

Within a few months after the union-friendly Roosevelt Administration
assumed office, the UMWA held a massive union meeting in Charleston,
West Virginia's capital. More than 2,500 delegates showed up in what the
UMWJoumalcharacterized as "the very citadel of the non-union bituminous
coal industry."36 It was reported that within the short span of two months,
the union had established 728 local union offices in four southern states
"with members in virtually every non-union coal camp in this territory."37
Enactment of the National Labor Relations Act38 in 1935 facilitated
39
unionization of Appalachian coal mines.
The coming of the New Deal did not immediately end coalfield violence
nor the terrible poverty of the coal camps. Labor unrest and strikes
continued to pit miners against nonunion coal operators during the 1930s.
The combined impacts of the Great Depression and accelerated union
organizing insured that coalfield communities would continue as a
battleground of labor and industry.
Unionization during the Depression came to the coal camps in diverse
ways. Some coal operators gave in quickly, while others "resolved to fight
the menace so long as they had a shot to fire."4" Appalachian historian and
lawyer Harry Caudill captured the attitude of those coal operators who
swam against the rising UMWA tide in the 1930s:
[TIhey proceeded step by step along the road to intimidation and coercion.
Miners suspected of joining the union, harboring its agents or spreading its
propaganda were summarily ordered out of company houses and off company
property. The detailed leases covering the camp residences, as interpreted by
33 CAUDiLL, supra note 26, at 174-75.
34 WILLIAMS, supranote 27, at 279.
35 Id.

36 Historic Convention Held, UMW JOURNAL, Aug. 1, 1922, reprintedin W. VA. MINE WARS,
supra note 12, at 163.
37 Id. The UMWJoumalreported: "Among those present at the convention were veterans of
the 1921 pitched battle in Logan, Mingo and 'Bloody McDowell' counties in this state. Many who
took part in the 'aimed march'... notified Mine Workers' officers that the hitherto solid nonunion strongholds were practically 100 per cent union." Id.
38 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
39 See id. § 157 (guaranteeing employees "the right . . . to form, join, or assist labor
organizations").
40 CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 195.
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the docile courts, authorized such summary evictions. Many unfortunate coal
diggers found their possessions and families thrust out of doors when they
were practically without funds and with no place to go. If another miner took
such a dangerous family
into his own house for even the shortest period he
41
risked the same fate.
Company-town owners contradicted these reports. One operator testified
before a federal commission charged with investigating coalfield labor strife
that owners of company coal camps were "'considerably more tolerant and
considerably slower . . . than the dictates of justice or as humanity
requires.... In all cases, regard has been paid to the health and comfort of
those persons whom it was found necessary to evict.... Evictions have
42
universally been carried out in a humane manner.'"
Other evidence calls into question operators' definition of "justice" and
"humane." David Corbin reports that notice rarely preceded evictions.43
Rather, companies routinely dispatched "mine guards" to a miner's home to
44
dump him, his family, and furniture onto the company-owned street.
Professor Corbin recounts an eviction during an early effort to unionize the
coal camps along Cabin and Paint Creeks in Kanawha County, West Virginia:
[M]ine guards arrived in the early morning and threw breakfasts out with the
furniture. During the process the mine guards destroyed over $40,000 worth of
furniture. In the town of Banner, the mine guards came to the house of Tony
41 Id. When a miner moved into a coal camp house he was required to sign a housing
contract, with which the company intended to create a "master and servant" rather than a
"landlord and tenant" relationship. RICHARD D. LuNT, LAw & ORDER VS THE MINERS: WV 19061933, at 100 (1992). The coal company could evict a miner at any time. See CORBIN, supranote
13, at 9 (describing the coal companies' practice of evicting miners who made the mistake of
allowing union organizers to stay with them); LANE, supra note 15, at 5-9 (same). There is only
one reported West Virginia case in which a miner challenged his family's eviction from a coal
camp house after he was discharged from his job for participating in a labor strike. Angel v.
Black Band Consol. Coal Co., 122 S.E. 274 (W. Va. 1924). The case provides an example of coal
company policy toward occupants of company town dwellings. The company took the position
that the miner was merely an "at will" employee and could be evicted without notice. Id. at 278.
The court held that "whether [the miner] was a trespasser, a tenant at will or a tenant at
sufferance" was "unimportant." Id at 277. Whatever rights the miner had to the dwelling were
terminated when he was notified to vacate on October 1, 1922, and when company guards
evicted him, "placing his household goods out in the open about fifty feet distant from the
dwelling house," they were within their legal rights. Id. at 275, 277. "The tenancy being
terminated, the company had the right to re-enter the premises and take possession, without
legal process, provided it did so peaceably and without violence or breach of the peace." Id at
278. The case is extraordinary in one sense: The miner plaintiff had the chutzpah to find his way
down the hollow to the state capital to seek legal counsel and then institute a suit in a hostile
forum against the predominant power in the state. One can only imagine how difficult that
struggle must have been. Practically speaking, the towns were run by the company-there was
no local magistrate to go to challenge an eviction. Moreover, the county circuit courts in the
billion dollar coalfields generally were presided over by judges hand-picked by the local power
structure-coal companies, banks, and railroads.
42 CORBIN, sup!a note 13, at 9 (quoting BITUMINOUS OPERATORS' SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE
COMPANY TOWN: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. COAL COMMISSION 36-37 (1923)).
43 Id. at 10.
44 Id
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Seviller, whose wife was pregnant. The head of the squadron shouted, "Get
out!" Mrs. Seviller, in bed and in labor when ordered out, responded, "My God!
Can't you see I am sick; just let me stay here until my baby is born." The guard
leader replied, "I don't give a damn, get out or I'll shoot you out." Mrs. Seviller
45
gave birth to her baby two hours later, in a tent furnished by the UMWA.

Coal Company reaction to union organizing was not limited to "legal"
tactics like eviction.46 According to Harry Caudill, "Suspected organizers and
miners who were believed to have joined the union were secretly slain and
47
their bodies cast out, gangster-fashion, on creek banks or in alleys." Caudill
adds, with more than a small measure of irony, that "[tihe companycontrolled sheriffs and state patrolmen were baffled by these mysterious
4
happenings and found no clues as to the identity of their perpetrators." '
However, as unionization rapidly proceeded in the 1930s, miners felt
empowered. 49 "[Tihe swarms of deputies-sheriff, state highway patrolmen,
private detectives and industrial policemen felt control of the situation
slipping through their fingers."50
3. The Second World War 1940-1945
By 1940, UMWA mines accounted for ninety percent of domestic coal
production. 5 1 The federal government nationalized and ran coal mines
during World War II; government negotiations with legendary UMWA
52
Caudill
President John L. Lewis resulted in generous miners' wages.
described the new coal boom sparked by the war:
On the whole the industry awakened with startling speed and performed
wartime production miracles. In a market in which heavy machinery of all
45 Id

46 This is not to suggest that miners and union organizers eschewed law breaking and
violence. The historical record of the Appalachian coal fields is replete with evidence that
violence was often used by both labor and management in the first forty years of the twentieth
century.
47 CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 195.
48 Id

49 Professor John Williams views unionization and union organizers as crucial to lifting the
yoke of oppression that hung heavily over coal camps. He notes:
The union organizers, venturing into the coal camps often at great personal risk, did not
create discontent. They tapped it, gave it voice, and shaped it into goals that related in
concrete ways to the miners' working and living conditions. With the union, men felt less
alone. Company recognition of the union was an important psychological breach in the
isolated and autocratic character of the mining towns.
WnLAMs, supranote 27, at 262-63.
50 CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 197.
51 Richard A. Couto, The Memory of Miners and the Conscience of Capital, in FIGHTING
BACK IN APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 165, 167 (Stephen L. Fisher ed.,
1993). Total UMWA membership grew from a few thousand in 1931 to almost 300,000 ten years
later. WuALAMS, supranote 27, at 280.
52 Couto, supra note 51, at 167.
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kinds was extremely difficult to obtain, in which competition for labor was
sometimes almost insane, the coal corporations managed to assemble labor
crews and find the essential equipment required .... And the creek and hollow
mountaineers, and the multitude of one-time miners employed on W.P.A.
projects, turned eagerly to their old calling.... Empty camps filled again and
the ghastly,
painted houses swarmed with new brigades of ragged irrepressible
53
children.
Wartime energy demands boosted coal production to new heights. The coal
camps had been rejuvenated by 1945, and union miners and their families
were enjoying unparalleled freedom and prosperity. These good times would
be short-lived.
4. PostwarEconomic Declinein the Appalachian Coalfields:1946-1960
Following the world war, the owners resumed control of the mines.5 4 At
the end of hostilities there was a glut of coal on the market created by the
high consumption needed to satisfy wartime needs and the reduced
demands of the peacetime economy.55 Moreover, coal was beginning to lose
its traditional markets. The fuel of choice for railroads and home furnaces
56
turned from coal to oil and natural gas.
A new era of labor-management hostility arose as the coalfield
economy declined. The UMWA and the Bituminous Coal Operators'
Association (BCOA) finally agreed on contract terms that would
revolutionize coalfield labor relations after a long and hostile strike in 1950
and 1951.17 In this rapprochement, operators agreed to increased wages and
benefits while the union did not object to mechanization of the mines.5 John
L. Lewis led the union team negotiating a deal whereby they traded mine
mechanization for "high wages and a health and welfare fund that promised
comfortable retirements and good medical care for both retirees and active
miners."59
Lewis and national UMWA leaders expected job losses due to
mechanization to increase slowly but steadily.'
These optimistic
expectations were overcome by the reality of a quick and significant
increase in coal production and a concomitant rapid and enormous loss of

53 CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 220-21.
54 Couto, supranote 51, at 167
55 CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 247.

56 Id; Couto, supranote 51, at 168.
57 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 318. BCOA was a trade association whose membership
included almost all of the major coal operators with operations east of the Mississippi River.
See Couto, supranote 51, at 168 (describing the formation of BCOA).
58 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 318; Couto, supra note 51, at 168-69.
59 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 318. Richard Couto notes that "Observers at the time
described the accord as consistent with the industrial finance theory of bargaining. It
established and imposed a uniformly high wage scale that both required capital investment in
mechanization and protected that investment. Mechanization encouraged higher wage rates and
higher wage rates encouraged still more mechanization." Couto, supranote 51, at 169.
60 WILLIAMS, supranote 27, at 318.

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 34:21

miners' jobs.6 1 Coal production per man-day increased from 5.57 tons in 1945
to 10.05 tons in 1957.62 In 1948, 117,104 miners were at work in West
Virginia.' In 1957, only 58,732 miners had jobs, and by 1961 employment of
miners had shrunk to only 42,557 in West Virginia and less than 200,000
nationwide.6'
B. The Coal Camps After World WarH
The discussion above addresses labor management relations and the
Appalachian coalfield economy in the decade and a half after the end of
World War II. But what of the company camps of Central Appalachia? Given
the history of exploitation, it is not surprising that the corporate owners of
the camps, either coal companies or successor land holding companies,
cynically continued to reap profit from those who remained.
As the 1960s began, a combination of coal industry consolidation, a
poor coal market, population exodus from coalfield communities, and the
attendant collapse of mining employment "made for a severe and chronic
economic predicament" for West Virginia's coalfield communities.6 5 West
Virginia's unemployment rate was the nation's highest, more than triple that
of the rest of the nation.6 6 As the coal-based economy continued to collapse,
tens of thousands left the coalfields in search of work in the industrial plants
of the Northeast and the nonunion textile and manufacturing plants of the
67
Sunbelt.

61 Id.; Couto, supra note 51, at 168-69; see CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 258-64 (describing the
mechanization of coal mining). See generally KEITH DIX, WHAT'S A COAL MINER TO DO? THE

MECHANIZATION OF COAL MINING (1988).

62 OTIS K. RICE & STEPHEN W. BROWN, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 280 (2d ed. 1993).
63 Id. In 1910, the industry employed 700,000 coal miners to satisfy the nation's need for
coal. CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 263. As coal employment collapsed, emigration from southern
West Virginia coalfield communities eclipsed the loss of farm population:
Thousands of young men, who normally would have entered the mines, and experienced
miners whose jobs vanished, were left without employment. Many of them left for
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Akron, Chicago, Detroit, and other cities. Between 1950 and 1960
the population of West Virginia declined from 2,005,552 to 1,860,421, a loss in excess of
seven percent at a time when nearly every other state gained population. More than
seventy percent of the loss occurred in the ten leading coal mining counties ....
RICE & BROWN, supra note 62, at 280.
64 RICE & BROWN, supranote 62, at 280; CAUDILL, supranote 26, at 263; see also JERRY BRUCE
THOMAS, AN APPALACHIAN NEW DEAL: WEST VIRGINIA IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 238 (1998) (noting

that mining employment in West Virginia dropped "[f]rom an all time high of 126,669 employees
in 1948... to 42,557 by 1961").
65 THOMAS, supra note 64, at 239. Farm population in West Virginia stood at 445,000 at the
end of World War II, but by the 1950s it had decreased by 246,000. Id. at 238.
66 Id. at 239.
67 See RICE & BROWN, supranote 62, at 280 ("Thousands of young men, who normally would
have entered the mines... left for Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Akron, Chicago, Detroit, and other
cities."); WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 394 (describing migration to the Sunbelt).
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1. The Coal Bust of the 1960s: New RelationshipsBetween Coal Camp
Residents and the Companies
Unwilling to be stuck with camp houses, commissaries, and other
facilities that the newly contracted industry did not need, some camp
owners altered the relationship between themselves and the miners living in
the company houses.' This relationship continued in many instances for
decades; even today there are former coal camps where the successors in
interest to the first coal company masters collect rents from descendants of
early miner occupants.6 9
The rent in most cases was and is consistent with the quality of the
premises involved. For example, a 1987 Charleston Gazette (the Gazette)
article related that coal camp houses were being rented then for $15 per
month. 71 While the rental amount seems incredibly low, one must consider
that the amount reflects what is said to be the first rule of real estate
valuation: location, location, location. Associated Press reporter Jules Loh
described the location of the old coal camp in Eureka Hollow:
The springs from Eureka Hollow flow into Elkhorn Creek. The village on its
trash-strewn banks at the mouth of the hollow is Eckman. You won't find it on
a road map. Eckman consists of a grocery store, filling station and a one-room
post office. Wooden planks thrown over a ditch at the uphill edge of town mark
the start of the road up Eureka Hollow.
Woebegone wooden houses, many of them falling down, dot the hillsides
along the road. Tree limbs, like crutches, prop up porches. Abandoned houses
crumble alongside inhabited mobile homes. Coal dust trodden into black gum
replaces grass. Red dog, a rust-colored mine waste turned into coarse gravel,
paves driveways. Automobile carcasses rot beneath clotheslines burdened with
patched jeans and faded shirts.
Roosters peck around lopsided sheds, providing a staccato
music.
71
Homemade pinwheels stuck in bare yards offer snatches of joy.
After closure of the mines connected to a company town, the landlord72
tenant relationship was most frequently a "month to month" agreement.
68 CAUDIL, supranote 26, at 263.
69 See Jules Loh, The Longstanding Paradoxof Eureka Hollow, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan.
4, 1987, at A4 (noting that in 1987, Eureka Hollow, W. Va. resident Roger Luster rented his home
from the successor of the coal company that owns the former coal camp house in which he
lives).
70 Id The article quoted the son of a miner whose family had lived in Eureka Hollow, West
Virginia for decades, renting from successor coal companies: "'This house of ours is an old coal
camp house,' Roger Luster said. 'I pay $15 a month rent to Pokey Fuel.' That would be the
Pocahontas Fuel Co. It has been taken over by Consolidation Coal Co. of Bluefield, about 40
miles away.... Roger pays his $15 rent... [in cash." Id.
71 Id. Loh's description should not be understood as a generalization of the appearance and
conditions of former coal camps. Some coal or land holding company lessors conducted
periodic maintenance and remodeled and improved the old company houses.
72 In property law, month to month tenancies give tenants no protection from the whim of
the landlord who may at any time raise the rent or abruptly terminate the tenancy at will
without cause and evict the occupants of the rented premises. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
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These month to month tenancies in many instances were honored by the
coal camp owners for decades. However, as explained below, in the last ten
years encroachment of large-scale mountaintop removal and longwall
mining operations has often resulted in abrupt termination of these long
relationships. With little notice, families whose history in an old coal camp
extends back for many decades have been unceremoniously forced to move
to make way for mining operations.73 In some instances, a whole community
has been evicted.74 Within weeks of notice, homes were torched and
bulldozed, leaving only empty lots where community and family roots had
been planted and nurtured for the better part of a century.7"
Renting coal camp houses was not the only way owners of coal camps
sought profit. In the 1950s many coal companies chose to sell the camp
houses to their occupants.76 Harry Caudill describes the sales "technique"
used to persuade coal camp occupants to buy the houses in which they
lived:
The first step in their program to "free" the camps lay in the making of blandly
optimistic statements to their employees and to the general public. They gave
the impression that the company anticipated twenty or thirty years of
uninterrupted mining with their employees drawing high wages. No mention
was made of mechanization or of reduced payrolls. While no specific promises
of the
were made, the miner and his wife were led to believe the inhabitants
77
camps could expect continued employment at union-scale wages.

The next step in the operators' disposition of coal camp houses was the
announcement that they were getting out of the real estate business so their
1465-67 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the different types of tenancy and tenants).
73 See, e.g., Ken Ward Jr., Scope of Massey Expansion Unlear,CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr.
15, 1993, at 6A [hereinafter Scope of Massey Expansion Unclear] (noting an instance where at
least four, and as many as eleven, families in a coal camp in Raleigh County, W. Va. were being
evicted to make way for a new mining complex). See also infM Sections V.B-V.C and
accompanying text (discussing current practices of coal companies toward coalfield renters
whose homes present an obstacle to modem mountaintop removal and longwall mining
operations).
74 See Rudy Abramson, New Coal Isn't Old Coal, 20 APF REPORTER 1 (2001) (noting that in
Dehue, a former mining camp in Logan County, W. Va., 200 families that had rented their camp
homes for decades from a land holding company were evicted to make way for a new
underground longwall mine), availableat
http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF2001/Abramson/Abramson.html.
75 See, e.g., PENNY LOEB, BLAIR (describing the loss of the community of Blair, W. Va.), at
http://www.wvcoalfield.conmnewpage2.htm (last visited Feb. 22,2004).
76 CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 263. Caudill notes:
Since constructing them more than thirty years before the company had recovered its
investments in its houses many times. A house's floors were worn thin by decades of
boots and the bare feet of multitudes of children. Its walls were scarred from the
inevitable batterings that gangs of children inflict. Nevertheless such houses carried all
the sentimental attachments of home to men and women who had known no other for
more than a quarter of a century.
Id. at 263-64.
77 Id at 263.
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executives could concentrate on mining.7 8 Writing with razor-sharp sarcasm,
Caudill describes the "con":
Besides, said the benevolent bosses, they wanted the miners and their families
to enjoy the feeling of independence and self-assurance that comes from home
ownership. It was undemocratic, the Big Bosses now declared, for the company
to dominate the affairs of the community. A new generation of stockholders
and*to
and officials wanted the people to live proudly in their own homes 79
govern their communities in conformity with the Great American Dream.
The company owners opened up offices for the purpose of facilitating the
sale of camp houses.80 Prices were not exorbitant and occupants were given
8
' Buyers could pay through monthly deductions from
purchasing priority.
82
wages.
their
The timing of these sales programs was excellent-for the company
owners. Most sales occurred as the winds of mechanization began to blow
through the industry.'m The timing was not so good for a miner who might
find "himself jobless before his home was cleared of debt, though most
purchasers pridefully held a deed 'free and clear of encumbrances' before
the discharge notices were slipped into their pay envelopes."' 4
Although nearby underground mines closed and production from the
remaining deep mining operations continued to decline, if the new home
owners could find work in other mines they tried to maintain and improve
what they had purchased.8 5 Moreover, a critical distinction existed between
78 Id

79 Id As Caudill describes it, coal camp residents reacted positively to this message:
The families who lived in the rows of company-owned houses on company-owned
streets, who bought their groceries at company-owned stores and endured sickness in
company-owned hospitals, felt their imaginations stirred. At war's end a majority of the
miners were close to sixty years of age, but a new generation of younger men had come
up among them. Old and young, they concluded that prudence dictated the purchase of a
house.
Id
80 Id.at 264.
81 Id.One half of a duplex sold for about $1,600 and a four-room cottage with front and back
porches sold for a similar amount. Id A small lot came with each dwelling. Id.
82 Id
83 Id.at 265.
84 Id In essence, Caudill asserts that corporate owners of coal camps conned their
employees into buying these houses, knowing that it would not be long before company
managers would close nearby mines throwing the new homeowners onto the unemployment
roles with little promise of finding jobs at comparable wages nearby. Id.at 263-67. A miner who
had saved for years and invested this hard eamed nest egg would see the value of his
investment drastically reduced as there are few buyers interested in purchasing a home in
communities where there are few or no jobs to be found. Id.If Caudill's assertion is true, and
the historical record supports such a scenario, the cynicism of the corporate managers and their
complete disrespect for the human beings whose entire lives had been dedicated to their
company and community is stunning indeed.
85 Cf id.at 263-68 (describing the impact of mechanization of the mines on the miners who
had purchased their homes from the coal companies).
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coal camp rental properties, whose residents had no incentive to spend their
often meager income on property that they were merely renting and houses
purchased by camp residents from company owners." Families in the latter
category generally invested in the maintenance, repair, rehabilitation, and
remodeling of their homes to the extent that their income would enable
them to do so." Attorney Gerald Stem described how families worked to
improve the camp houses they bought from the company and the investment
they made to transform a camp house to a home of their own:
The miners took great pride in turning them into real homes, helping each
other, or even paying someone to do the work once they saved enough money.
An indoor bathroom, maybe new electrical wiring, electrical baseboard heating,
new floors, a new roof, new siding to keep out the cold, maybe a new porch or
even a new room. Roland [Staten] and his wife Gladys spent seven years
remodeling House No. 20-adding a cesspool, paneling, insulation, siding, a
new roof and furnace, and even a garage. This was no coal-camp house
8
anymore. 8

86 See id at 264-65 (contrasting the continued dilapidation of camp homes not sold with the
renovations made to those that were sold).
87 See id at 265 (describing the miners' investment of their life savings in the renovation of
their homes).
88 GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: HOW THE SURVIVORS OF ONE OF THE
WORST DISASTERS IN COAL-MINING HISTORY BROUGHT SUIT AGAINST THE COAL COMPANY-AND
WON 41-42 (Vintage Books 1977) (1976). Unfortunately, the Staten home and others Stem
describes were destroyed in a 1972 flood caused by the collapse of a coal waste impoundment

negligently maintained by a subsidiary of then coal industry giant, Pittston Company. See
generally id Charleston Gazette investigative reporter Paul J. Nyden wrote of the devastation
caused by the flood in his unpublished 1974 Columbia University doctoral dissertation entitled
Miners for Democracy Struggle in the Coalfields:
As a huge gash opened up in the 50-foot high dam, more than 120 million gallons of water
broke loose and smashed into the mountain opposite the dam, back up into the hollow a
few hundred feet toward the mines, and then went crashing down the narrow valley
which is only between 200 and 500 feet wide.

A wave of black water between 20 and 30 feet high, filled with thousands of tons of
sludge and coal waste, poured down over the 16 coal mining towns, moving at about 30
miles per hour. As the flood waters tore little homes and churches from their

foundations and wrenched steel rails from wooden railroad ties, it gained tremendously
in destructive force. About 45 minutes later, the flood reached the bottom of the hollow,
700 feet below the elevation of the dam which had collapsed.
By 11:00 am., the worst flood in West Virginia's history had spent its energy, but not
before it had destroyed five towns almost completely and damaged 11 more extensively.
One hundred twenty-five people lay dead beneath all the debris and about 4,000 were left
homeless. Over 1,100 people were injured or treated for illnesses. Five hundred seven
homes were demolished and 936 more were damaged, 273 seriously. Thirty house
trailers had been destroyed; 30 business establishments and 600 automobiles had been

washed away. People living down the hollow got about ten minutes warning of the
approaching flood, but many families living right below the dam had none.
Paul J. Nyden, Miners for Democracy: Struggle in the Coalfields (1974) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University), availableat

http://www.wvgazette.com/static/series/buffalocreek/NYDEN.html. Pittston Coal executives and
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In those communities where mining jobs could still be found, miners
receiving respectable middle-class wages often built modest new homes so
that they could continue to live near relatives in what had been their
homeplace for many decades.
Of course, when a camp house was purchased and the family
breadwinner lost his mining job and could not find another that paid a living
wage, purchasing food and fuel for heating and cooking took precedence
over home maintenance and repair. During the 1960s bust, and again in the
last decade and a half of the twentieth century, many residents of the former
coal camps found it increasingly difficult to maintain their homes as more
and more mines closed and mining jobs evaporated.
Thus, to the vicious cycle of coal industry boom and bust-long the
dominant impediment to sustained coalfield economic development-was
added the albatross of home ownership. Miners who purchased a coal camp
house and abruptly found themselves on the unemployment dole without
promise of finding work faced the horns of a dilemma. To provide for their
families, they would be forced to migrate to another region of the country
leaving behind their relatives, lifelong friends, and ancestral homeplace.
And, if they decided to leave, it would be difficult to sell their home. 9 If they
could find a seller at all, they were likely to sell at a significant loss. If they
stayed, there were no jobs and only the largess of government relief
programs was available to sustain them.
Faced with such a choice, many unemployed miners chose to seek
work in other states, abandoning their homes and the life savings they often
represented. 90 Some who left could not establish themselves in other places
and returned to their homeplace.91 Others chose to hang on, hoping against

lawyers claimed the impoundment collapse was an "Act of God." Id Government investigators
found otherwise. Jack McCarthy, Voices of Buffalo Creek: Families Cannot Forget the Day
Wben Their Worlds Were Turned Upside Down, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.),
Feb. 23, 1997, at 1A ("A federal Bureau of Mines report following the flood said, 'The dams were
not designed or engineered on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the engineering properties
of coal processing refuse.'"), available at 1997 WL 7087560. For an interesting and informative
discussion of the Buffalo Creek disaster including the above excerpt from Dr. Nyden's
dissertation, visit http://www.wvgazette.com/static/series/buffalocreekindex.html.
89 Not surprisingly, in areas of high unemployment where the local environment has been
degraded by an industry in decline, little or no real estate market exists. It is axiomatic that
rock-bottom property values are found after emigration from places like deteriorating inner-city
cores and central Appalachian coalfield communities.
90 Historians and sociologists have extensively studied the migration of coalfield residents
triggered by the decline of coal mine employment in the twentieth century. See, e.g., WILLIAMs,
supra note 27, at 312-26. See generally CHAD BERRY, SOUTHERN MIGRANTS, NORTHERN EXILES
(2000) (describing migration from Appalachia during economically challenging times); CARTER
GOODRICH ET AL., MIGRATION AND PLANES OF LIVING 1920-1934 (1935) (describing migration
HARRY K. SCHWARTZKELLER ET AL., MOUNTAIN
FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A CASE STUDY OF APPALACHIAN MIGRATION (1971) (describing the

trends in the United States during the depression);

"exodus" of residents from Beech Creek, Ky.).
91 In 1987, Roger Luster related to an Associated Press reporter his experience of leaving
home to seek a job, failure, and his life after returning. Loh, supra note 69. Roger and his wife
Doris had grown up in Eureka Hollow. Id He was 37 years old when interviewed; Doris was 23.
Id They had three children, all under the age of six. Id. When he left Eureka Hollow to find a
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hope that another coal boom would begin and "the mines" would start hiring
again. In the interim, unemployed miners would do whatever it took to
survive.9 2 Roger Luster, of Eureka Hollow explained the quandary he and
thousands of other coal camp families faced as coal mining jobs evaporated:
"It's rough, buddy.... This is home. This is where we were both born and
raised. We like it here. Until I can find work, we stay. If the program I'm on runs
out, well, then I guess we'll have to think about moving on. Where to? Where
can a man with a family go with no place to set out for and no
money to get
93
there? Hard as it is, we want to stay here. This hollow is home."
Unfortunately, new underground and strip mining technology and other
political and economic factors dashed dreams of a new boom and "the
mines," as 1960s coal camp residents knew them, ceased to exist. Professor
John Alexander Williams places the hopes of coalfield residents and four
decades of reality into perspective:
One measure of the social change induced by these trends was the number of
miners in West Virginia: more than 150,000 in 1945, but just over 17,000 in 1999,
by which time there were fewer miners in the state than there were nurses or
telephone solicitors. WalMart now has more employees in West Virginia than
any coal company, although coal industry apologists still insist that "five
" 94
thousand people working at WalMarts in this state don't equal 400 coal jobs.

job, almost one hundred families lived there; less than two dozen remained when he returned a
few years later. Id. Roger's mother still lived in the hollow, cared for by a married daughter. Id
The reporter explained Roger's story:
The gaunt and empty houses on the hillsides are reminders of others who felt they also
had no choice but to flee.... [Roger] dropped out of school at 16 to find work and
wound up making molds in a [sic] Union City, Ind., iron foundry. He had a regular
paycheck but also a failed marriage and returned to the hollow broke. He got a job
driving a truck and he and Doris Luster married. Profitless mines started closing down
around here rapidly in 1982, with the usual domino effect on other businesses. Roger
Luster got laid off and hasn't cashed a paycheck in four years.
Id
92 Proud, hard working men like Roger Luster of Eureka Hollow, West Virginia were forced
to rely on government benefits and programs to see them through. Id.
93 Id (quoting Roger Luster).
94 WILUAMS, supra note 27 at 345-46 (quoting David Akers, of Matewan, W. Va-, quoted in
Diana Nelson Jones, Looidngfor Life after Coalk Region is DiggingforAlternatives to Bring the
Abundance Promisedby LRJ PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al). In 1956, 68,318
miners were reported to be working in West Virginia; only four years later, in 1960, mine jobs
had declined by almost 20,000 to 48,696. WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF MINERS' HEALTH SAFETY &
TRAINING, PRODUCTION OF COAL AND COKE IN WEST VIRGINIA 1863-2002 [hereinafter PRODUCTION
OF COAL AND COKE IN WEST VIRGINIA], at http://www.wvminesafety.org/historicprod.htm (last

visited Jan. 28, 2004). State agency figures show that the number of miners in West Virginia had
declined from the 17,000 figure cited by Williams for 1999 to less than 14,500 in 2003. WEST
VIRGINIA OFFICE OF MINERS' HEALTH, SAFETY & TRAINING, 2003 COAL PRODUCTION BY COUNTY
[hereinafter 2003 COAL PRODUCTION BY COUNTY], at http://www.wvminesafety.org/cnty2003.htm
(last updated Feb. 6, 2004).
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Michael Harrington's widely acclaimed book, The Other America,95
captured the plight of the urban and rural poor at the beginning of the 1960s.
The book was a phenomenon, revealing for the first time to a broad national
audience that the nation's post-World War II economic prosperity had not
reached many Americans. Harrington observed, "The millions who are poor
in the United States tend to become increasingly invisible. Here is a great
mass of people, yet it takes an effort of the intellect and will even to see
96
them."
The dire circumstances of many who lived in the coal camps of central
Appalachia was not invisible to those who took the time to look. But, as
Harrington explained, "looking" took some effort:
Poverty is often off the beaten track. It always has been. The ordinary tourist
never left the main highway, and today he rides interstate turnpikes. He does
not go into the valleys of Pennsylvania where the towns look like movie sets of
Wales in the thirties. He does not see the company houses in rows, the rutted
roads (the poor always have bad roads whether they live in the city, in towns,
or on farms), and everything is black and dirty. And even if he were to pass
through such place by accident, the tourist would not meet the unemployed
97
men in the bar or the women coming home from a runaway sweatshop.
Two years before The Other America was published, one important
observer did take the time to visit West Virginia's coal camps. Then-Senator
John F. Kennedy was shocked by what he saw and learned there during the
state's 1960 presidential primary.9' That primary campaign was crucial to
Senator Kennedy's quest for the Democratic Party's nomination and his later
election to the presidency.9 9 As one West Virginia newspaper observed:
It was important to Kennedy .... He won the primary, showing that a Catholic
could win in a predominantly Protestant state, a key victory in his drive to the
nomination and the presidency.
It was important as well because of what he saw, and what the reporters
and TV cameramen with him saw, at the home of Burley Luster. Luster was a
disabled coal miner with a sickly wife and eight hungry children living in a four-

95 MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 3.
98 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 339. Historian John Alexander Williams observes that

"Kennedy later identified the West Virginia primary as the most important single milestone on
his road to the White House, and the same might be said of its importance in the emergence of
Appalachia's crisis as a national issue." Id. "Kennedy... was touched," wrote Williams, "by what
he saw in the state's farming and mining districts, while the television cameras that followed
him . . . through the state broadcast haunting images of regional poverty amid national
affluence...." Id.
99 See RICE & BROWN, supra note 62, at 281 ("Political analysts... agree[d] that Kennedy's
victory in West Virginia was the turning point on his road to the White House.... Kennedy
needed a victory in West Virginia to demonstrate that a Catholic could win in a strongly
Protestant and unionized state .... ."). Kennedy won the 1960 West Virginia primary by a wide
margin, garnering sixty percent of the total vote. DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES, at
http://www.jfldn6l.com/presidency/democraticprimaries.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
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room shanty. Kennedy talked with them for 45 minutes and then, shaken, stood
on the Luster's sagging front steps and promised, if elected, to press Congress
for federal help in Appalachia.
Kennedy's message from Eureka Hollow alerted America to the paradox of
10 0
wretched poverty in an area teeming with rich resources.

Professor John Alexander Williams relates that "Kennedy and his
entourage ... traveled through West Virginia by bus and car in the early
spring, when nature had not yet hidden the abuse of the land by mining ....
The politicians and reporters following the campaign were less impressed by
the state's scenic beauty than by its environmental scars and miserable
roads." I0 ' Despite the relief efforts at the federal level, life was as bleak as
ever in the coalfields of Appalachia as the 1960s drew to a close.
2. The 1970s CoalBoom
As the decade of the 1970s began, John Denver's song Take Me Home,
Country Roads portrayed West Virginia as "almost heaven." 0 2z Denver's song
put West Virginia residents in an upbeat mood, coming along "at just about
the right time" as "it reflected a growing feeling of satisfaction shared by
many, if not most, citizens, a feeling that one of the worst chapters in West
Virginia's history was closing at last."'0 3
The coalfield economy perked up again at the beginning of the 1970s as
the United States attempted to come to grips with an "energy crisis"
triggered by price fixing of petroleum supplies by a Middle-Eastern cartel. "
The cost per barrel of petroleum soared during the 1970s as the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ratcheted up prices in response
100 Loh, supra note 69. Kennedy's promise made from the porch of Burley Luster's Eureka
Hollow home came to fruition in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' creation of food
stamps, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and other 'federal programs that funneled
billions of dollars to the region over the last four decades. See generallyWILLtAMs, supranote
27, at 340-45 (describing the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to push
legislation aiding Appalachia through Congress).
101 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 339-40.

102 John Denver, Take Me Home, Country Roads, on POEMS, PRAYERS, AND PROMISES (RCA
Records 1971).
103 JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA. A HISTORY 187-88 (2d ed. 2001). Professor

Williams suggests that "[t]his feeling had a substantial basis in fact, for in the beginning of the
1970s there was an abundance of tangible evidence that things were not as bad as they had
been. Measurements that had once inspired gloomy prognoses now provided statistical
glimmers of hope." Id.at 188. Even West Virginia's coalfield counties were seeing a bit of light at
the end of the tunnel as the coal market stood at the threshold of a new boom era. Id.
104See generallyDAVID YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 60709 (1991) (discussing the energy crises and oil embargo). The cartel, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), acted in the midst of the so-called "Yom Kippur War,"
in which Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces occupying the Gaza Strip and the
Sinai Peninsula. Id.at 600-03. The price of gasoline at American gas stations rose 40% within
months. Id at 616; cf Abramson, supra note 74 ("The [oil]
crises fomented an extraordinary
burst of national resolve, and with expert assurances that America had enough coal to last into
the middle of the next millennium, energy independence became a national battle cry.... OPEC
had stepped on the tail of a dragon and the roar was music in the coal fields.").
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to the Yom Kippur War and the closing of the Iranian oil fields after the Shah
of Iran was overthrown in a 1978 Islamist coup. 10 5 The U.S. economy reeled
10 6
in the 1970s from the impact of the abrupt skyrocketing of energy prices.
The nation's gross domestic product fell by 6% and unemployment doubled
1

to 9%. 07

In the former company towns of southern West Virginia and other
Appalachian states, significant numbers of job postings for coal mines
appeared for the first time in decades as electric energy producers shifted
from petroleum to a more reliable and less costly product."° In West Virginia
alone, more than 17,000 new miners were placed on payrolls during the
period between 1973 and 1978.1'
Freelance journalist Rudy Abramson capsulized life in the Appalachian
coalfields during the short-lived boom:
During those fabulous days in the mid-seventies, thousands of men who had left
the mountains came home from distant cities to dig coal. In West Virginia,
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, small truck mines that had been abandoned
for years were reopened. Nearly anybody who had or could borrow money to
buy a dump truck and a road grader could become a strip mine operator.
Bootleggers mined without permits and got good money for gray mixtures of
coal, slate, and rock. Spot market prices soared to nearly $100 a ton and
luxury cars for
suddenly-rich independent operators lived in opulence, bought
110
their wives, and concluded business deals on the golf course.
Two and a half decades after the boom, Abramson interviewed people who
had lived in or near the Boone County, West Virginia, town of Whitesville.
They described life there during the boom:
Saturday nights in Whitesville were reminiscent of the good old days after
World War II when it was hard to get through the crowds on the sidewalks.
Miners' families from communities up and down the Big Coal River-Seth,
Comfort, Sylvester, and Sundial-and up from Marfork, High Coal, and Seng
news. You
Creek Hollows came to shop, take in a movie, and catch 1up
11 on the
could forget finding a parking place in the middle of town.
The good times did not last.
3. The Coal Camps: 1980 to Present
The boom of the 1970s was short. As oil prices increased in the 1980s,
and midwestern utility companies turned to cheaper western coal in the

105 YERGIN, supra note
106 Id at 635.

104, at 607-09, 685.

107 Id.
108 PRODUCTION OF COAL AND COKE IN WEST VIRGINIA,
109 Id
110 Abramson, supranote 74.

1M Id

supranote 94.
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1990s," 2 the economy of the Appalachian coalfields cycled again into a bust
phase." 3 Another factor responsible for this shift was the continuing loss of
mining jobs in Appalachian underground mines resulting from even further
mechanization." 4 In 1980, coal jobs had dropped by 7,000 from the boom
high of almost 63,000 in 1978; five years later only 35,813 miners were
working in West Virginia.11 Ten years later, in 1990, coal mine employment
had dipped further to less than 29,000.116 Today, less than 15,000 miners
11 7
work in the state.
The recession of the early 1980s further weakened West Virginia's
economy. By 1984, West Virginia had the nation's highest unemployment
rate and "economic indicators pointed to continuing difficulties, with
recovery trailing far behind that of the other states."'18
Another important factor in the economic plight of West Virginia from
the 1980s to the present has been the coal industry's continuing political
domination of state government. In 1985, the West Virginia Legislature
enacted the "super tax credit," a law supposedly intended to expand
economic development in the state. 9 In 1986, the legislature extended the
super tax credits, provided that existing state companies increased hiring
and modernized their operations. 120 Given the grip of King Coal on state
politicians, it is not surprising that coal companies received nearly ninety
percent of the total amount of these credits.' 2'
This coal lobbyist-generated windfall for industry harmed the state
economy rather than promoting economic development. One observer has
suggested that:
[I]n their long-range effect, they may have actually compounded the very
problem they were supposed to alleviate. The study of the super tax credits in
1990 revealed that the number of jobs in coal mining had fallen by 1,300 in spite
of an increase of 13.3 percent in coal production. The adverse effects of the
super tax credits on state revenues and on the general economy led in 1990 to
112 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), "reduced the marketability of high-sulfur coal." WILLIAMS, supra
note 27, at 345. That statute gave utility companies a choice of ways to reduce their emissions of
sulfur dioxide: They could either install expensive technology to "scrub" their emissions, or
solely burn low-sulfur coal. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1995).
Low-sulfur coal is abundant in both the West and in southern Appalachia. See ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 603 (3d ed. 2000)
("Coal mines in the West and in eastern Kentucky and southern West Virginia where low-sulfur
coal is found are thriving due to the shift in demand toward low-sulfur coal."). The difference
between coal from the two regions is cost-"western strip mines where giant seams can be strip
mined for as little as $3.50 per ton." Abramson, supra note 74.
113 WHIIAMS, supra note 27, at 345; RICE & BROWN, supra note 62, at 238.
114 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 345.
115 COAL AND COKE PRODUCTION IN WEST VIRGINIA, supranote 94.
116

Id.

117 2003 COAL PRODUCTION BY COUNTY, supra note 94.

118 RICE & BROWN, supranote 62, at 238.
119 Seeid at 288 (discussing the 1985 Business Investment and Jobs Expansion Act).
120 Id at 289.
121 Id
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legislation to prevent coal companies from using the super tax credits to avoid
20% of the
payments of severance taxes.... [T]ax officials estimated that about
122
coal mined in the state was produced free of any business taxes.
During his last term in office (1985-1989), Governor Arch A. Moore Jr.
led efforts to enrich coal companies at the expense of coalfield citizens.
Under the guise of stimulating new coal development, the state's Workers'
Compensation Fund (WCF) slashed premiums paid by coal companies by
thirty percent and awarded generous refunds to companies. 123 By the
beginning of the 1990s, the WCF faced a deficit of $1.2 billion.'24 Sadly, the
super tax credits, the reduction in worker's compensation premiums, and
other components of the Moore Administration's economic development
program furthered the Governor's corrupt self-enrichment scheme:
In return for tax favors, Moore and others in his administration received
hundreds of thousands of dollars from unscrupulous and compliant coal
operators and other businessmen for illegal "underground" political activities
and for their personal profit. These nefarious dealings [involved] government
officials, businessmen,
their intermediaries, lobbyists, and others seeking
25
favor .... 1

While West Virginia ended the 1970s in better economic shape than it
had been in for decades, state government corruption in the 1980s
eliminated the economic gains. Journalist Rudy Abramson interviewed
Randy Sprouse who had lived Whitesville, West Virginia during the 1970s
boom.126 Sprouse remembered the prosperity of the moment: "You had two
or three clothing stores, shoe stores, furniture stores, a whole bunch of
restaurants, taverns, a movie theater, and a bowling alley.... Anything you
wanted, you could get right there in Whitesville. You didn't have to leave
Whitesville for anything."'2 7 Whitesville today is depressingly different:

122 RICE & BROWN, supranote 62, at 289.
123 Id at 288-90; Paul J. Nyden, The Making of a Deficit: Moore's Actions PutFund on Brink

ofInsolvency, SUNDAY GAZErnrE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Dec. 21, 1997, at 5A, availableat 1997
WL 17424715.
124 RICE & BROWN, supranote 62, at 290.

125 Id. at 290-91. Governor Moore was eventually "convicted of various felonies... and
sentenced to five years ten months in prison." Id. at 291. The felonies for which Governor Moore
was convicted included a federal charge of accepting $500,000 from a coal company operator.
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Moore, 591 S.E.2d 338, 342 (W. Va. 2003). As reported by the federal
prosecutor at the hearing at which Moore pleaded guilty, "'Mr. Moore... while governor, did
assist [the coal company operator] in obtaining [a refund of more than $2,000,000 from the state
black lung fund] by intervening on [the operator's] behalf with the state Department of Natural
Resources to prevent environmental action from being taken against [the coal operator's]
companies ....
The refund was in fact granted,... and... Mr. Moore[] received personally
[$523,721.47]'" Id. (quoting federal prosecutor's factual basis for the charges). Governor Moore
told the federal judge presiding over his guilty plea that he believed the facts as presented by
the prosecutor wer6 substantially correct. Id at 343.
126 Abramson, supranote 74.
127 Id.
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Most of [what Randy Sprouse described] has been gone for years. The
sidewalks of Whitesville are usually empty. Vacant stores dot the town's main
drag and windows are covered with dust from coal trucks that rumble through
night and day. Traffic lights work intermittently. Parking meters were removed
long ago. 128

The economic plight of coalfield communities, perpetuated in the 1980s
by corrupt and ineffective state government, continued throughout the next
decade as new mining technologies replaced more labor-intensive methods.
While Appalachian coal production approached record levels in 2003, the
number of coal miners declined to its lowest level since the nineteenth
century. 129 The coalfield economy continues to stagnate with high levels of
130
unemployment in those areas which lead in coal production.
Unable to rely on state government for economic and environmental
protection, the communities looked to Washington for assistance. The
federal assistance that John F. Kennedy had promised from the front porch
of Burley Luster's Eureka Hollow home in 1960 materialized in a plethora of
federal programs such as food stamps and Medicaid, which continue to this

131
day to sustain many who remain in the old camps of central Appalachia.
One new federal program, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977, held out the promise of protecting coalfield communities and their
citizens from the environmental, economic, and social harm that unregulated
coal mining had caused. The following discussion examines how that
promise was effectuated.

128 Id
129 In 1892, 13,894 miners were employed in West Virginia mines. PRODUCTION OF COAL AND
COKE IN WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 94. Today, 14,498 people mine coal in West Virginia. 2003
COAL PRODUCTION BY COUNTY, supranote 94.
130 For example, the unemployment rate in Mingo County, West Virginia--one of the state's
leading coal producing counties-was 10.3% in 2003. WEST VIRGINIA BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT
PROGRAMS, MINGO COUNTY, CALENDAR YEAR 2003: MONTHLY REPORT OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR
FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, at

http://www.state.wv.us/bep/lmif/ABLE2/r203Ming.HTM (last updated Jan. 23, 2004). In
contrast, the 2003 unemployment rate for all of West Virginia was 6.1%. WEST VIRGINIA BUREAU
OF EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, STATEWIDE, CALENDAR YEAR 2003: MONTHLY REPORT OF THE CIVILIAN

LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, at
http://www.state.wv.us/bep/lmTABLE2/T203stat.HTM (last updated Jan. 23, 2004).
131 For a discussion of the genesis of such programs and their impacts on Appalachia, see
WILLIAMS, supra, note 27, at 339-52, 366-79; WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY, supra note 103,
at 189, 192-95. Harry Caudill, in The Watches of the Night expressed the concern that federal
relief from the Kennedy-Johnson "War on Poverty" had come to Appalachia in the form of
welfare entitlements that threatened to "turn Appalachia into a giant welfare reservation."
WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 369 (citing HARRY CAUDILL, THE WATCHES OF THE NIGHT (1976)).
Professor Williams's examination of the historic record of federal funding for Appalachia
revealed that West Virginia "led all other Appalachian states in per-capita transfer payments."
Id. Williams concluded that Caudill's point may have been well taken. Id
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III. REGULATION OF THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF COAL MINING
When historian John Williams completed West Virginia: A History,he
made predictions about the future of West Virginia and its coalfield
communities:
In terms of short-run market considerations, strip mining is the swiftest and
cheapest way to expand coal production ....Stripping is the most costly
method of producing coal, however, if social and environmental factors are
calculated.... The future of tourism and recreation depends to a significant
extent on what is done about surface mining and other environmental
issues ....Yet the political impact of recreation industries is diffuse, and the
aesthetic and human values that environmental degradation subverts are
difficult to measure. By contrast, the coal industry retains much of its old-time
political power in West Virginia and
can readily deploy it to defend immediate
32
and specific economic concerns.
It appears that Professor Williams was especially prescient when he
predicted that "environmental controversies promise to generate the most
lively and probably the most crucial debates that West Virginia faces in the
last quarter of the twentieth century."'Professor Williams's prediction that environmental controversies would
come to the fore as the twentieth century came to a close was not based on
gut instinct or crystal-ball gazing. Rather, as a historian, Williams based his
predictions on an appreciation of the policies, politics, and players that had
shaped West Virginia's past and his recognition of the old and new forces
that were then in motion vying for control of the extraction of Appalachia's
vast coal wealth. 13
As students of history are aware, most of the enterprises of the
1
Industrial Age created significant adverse externalities. m
For example,
effluent from steel and chemical manufacturing poisoned thousands of miles
of the nation's streams and air pollution from the same plants clouded urban
skies. For the better part of a century, the nation's polluting industries were
given a free pass by Americans who agreed with industry's plea-"where
there's smoke there's jobs."
It was not until the mid-1960s that people in the United States began to
appreciate the extent to which industrialization had externalized costs to
their own communities. Citizens' demand for pollution cleanup and
regulation of the adverse effects of industrial activities spurred Congress to
enact the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969136 and reached its
apogee in 1977 with passage of the federal Surface Mining Control and

132 WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA:

A HISTORY, supra note 103 at 201-02.

133 Id at 202.

134 Although Williams's predictions addressed West Virginia's future, they are arguably
equally relevant to other coalfield states as well.
135 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(discussing externalities).
136 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).
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Reclamation Act. No other federal environmental regulatory statute contains
as many opportunities for citizen involvement nor grants to citizens such a
broad array of statutory rights that may be used to influence the law's
administration and enforcement than does SMCRA.
To understand the current struggle of the people of the coalfields for
economic and environmental justice, one must understand how SMCRA
came to be law and the way in which its strict mandate has been
administered and enforced. The following discussion begins with an
examination of SMCRA's origins in the oppressed and poverty stricken
Appalachian coal camps in the 1960s. SMCRA's history is then traced from
enactment through criticism of state and federal enforcement to the current
extiaordinary controversy over enforcement of SMCRA's so-called
"mountaintop removal" regulatory regime.
A. HistoricalOverview of the Pre-SMCRA Period
Prior to the enactment of SMCRA in 1977, unregulated surface and
underground coal mining created enormous environmental harm throughout
the Appalachian coalfields.1 37 These externalities created disincentives for
local economic development as well as other adverse social and economic
consequences. Generally, local people experiencing these costs of mining
also enjoyed the benefits of jobs created by mining. The adverse
environmental impacts of mining received scant notice in the Appalachian
coal camp struggle for survival during the first half of the twentieth century.
Like the pervasive pollution that accompanied steel mills and chemical
plants, coal mining's adverse impacts were seen as part and parcel of the
industrialization.
The most visible adverse impacts of coal strip mining were the scars
gashed in Appalachian mountainsides. Surface mining strips away forest
vegetation, causing erosion and attendant stream sedimentation and
siltation, accompanied by negative impacts on aquatic life and drinking
water supplies. 138 In some coalfield regions, iron-laden sulphuric acid mine
drainage pollution from underground mining produces red-orange stained
stream beds and renders watercourses ecologically sterile. 131 Underground
137 See CHAD MONTRIE, To SAVE THE LAND AND PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO SURFACE
COAL MINING IN APPALACHIA 2 (2003) ("Surface coal mining has dramatically impacted
communities in the Appalachian coal fields. As the industry expanded in the years after World
War II, it exacerbated the poverty and chronic unemployment in the region, compounding the
impoverishment that was a legacy of other extractive economic activities, including deep
mining."). Montrie's book provides the first comprehensive documented chronicle of the history
of the coalfield citizens' movement in opposition to the excesses of unregulated coal mining in
Appalachia, the enactment by Congress of SMCRA, and the subsequent effect of the legislation
on Appalachian communities and lands. See generallyid.
138 MONTRIE, supra note 137, at 3.
139 Montrie describes these impacts:
Surface coal mining affected the environment of the Appalachian coalfields, too.
Stripping denuded millions of acres of steep slopes and rolling hills in the coalfields, and
this loss of vegetation caused soil erosion as well as increased surface runoff. Erosion
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and strip mining contaminated or depleted underground aquifers that
provide domestic and farm water supplies to many coalfield families. 140 Loud
noise and dust from blasting and earth-moving activities disturb nearby
communities and wildlife. 4 ' During mining, dust and debris often fill the air
as soil and underlying rock strata are blasted apart, earth is moved, and coal
extracted. 142 Landslides caused by indiscriminate dumping of mine spoil
downslope on steep Appalachian mountainsides buried cars, homes, and
sometimes killed people.'3
State legislatures made some early ineffective attempts to ameliorate
the harm caused by unregulated stripping. The first state to regulate surface
mining was West Virginia, which enacted legislation in 1939.1' A handful of
states followed West Virginia's lead, but the resulting state legislation has
been characterized as "mild" and merely an attempt by politicians and the
mining industry to make it appear to concerned communities that steps were
being taken to safeguard the environment and limit the effects of mining. 14 5

led to the siltation of streams, and this devastated aquatic life. Increased surface runoff
caused heavier flooding and floods where there had been none before. The bare hills also
deprived numerous animal and plant species of habitat. Acid mine drainage, produced
when sulfur-containing compounds... are exposed to air and water, polluted streams
and groundwater.... [T]he drainage and acid-laden soil made revegetation and postmining crop production nearly impossible.
Id. at 3. See generally Patrick C. McGinley & Thomas J. Sweet, Acid Coal Mine Drainage:Past
Pollution and Current Regulation, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 67 (1978) (discussing the environmental
impacts of acid-mine drainage).
140 Cf COMMITTEE ON GROUND WATER RECHARGE IN SURFACE-MINED AREAS, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, SURFACE COAL MINING EFFECTS ON GROUNDWATER RECHARGE 4 (1990) (describing

destruction of aquifers in Kentucky caused by surface mining); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
ET

AL.,

DRAFT

PROGRAMMATIC

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

STATEMENT

ON

MOUNTAINTOP

MININGNALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA Ill.E-6 (2003) ("[Coal mine drainage] can adversely affect
human populations by impuring surface and ground water used for drinking water .... ")
availableat
http://www.epa-gov/region3/mtntop/pdf/II.%2Affected%2OEnvironment%20and%2OConsequen
ces%20ot962OMTM%20VF.pdf.
141 See MONTRIE, supra note 137, at 3 ("[Bllasting at surface mines cracked the foundations
of people's homes, sunk their wells (which in some cases were already muddied or fouled by
acid runoff), and sent 'flyrock' hurtling dangerously into the air.").
142 Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-218, at 58-59 (1977) (detailing the devastating impacts of
surface mining which inspired Congress to pass SMCRA), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 539,
596-97.
143 MONTRIE, supranote 137, at 3.
144 1939 W. Va, Acts, ch. 84 (repealed 1965).
145 See John D. Edgcomb, Comment, CooperativeFederalismandEn vironmentalProtection:
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TUL. L. REV. 299, 305-08 (1983)
(describing state efforts in West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Ohio). Edgcomb relates
the story of the Virginia General Assembly's enactment in 1972 of a statute "essentially drafted
by the Virginia coal industry" which created a regulatory agency, the Division of Mined Land
Reclamation (DMLR). Id at 307. The DMLR was located within Virginia's existing Department
of Conservation and Economic Development. Id. The new agency was charged with the
authority to implement and enforce regulations promulgated by the Department. Id However,
the DMLR received no general revenue fund appropriations and was forced to survive on
meager permit fees which were insufficient for the agency to carry out its mission. Id
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From the beginning of these efforts to regulate strip mining, the coal
industry cooperated with local and state politicians to oppose meaningful
state regulation. Economic competition between coalfield states for jobs and
tax revenues fueled this opposition. 146 Instead of placing limits on the worst
of strip mining abuses, legislators chose to protect their own domestic
industry. Obviously, they reasoned, a state choosing to pass laws to reduce
the adverse consequences of coal mining would impose increased costs on
its own coal industry. Those costs would not be incurred by coal operators
in other states that chose to give carte blanche to their own coal operators.
State politicians recognized that the price of coal produced in a state
forbearing regulation would be cheaper and thus more competitive in the
market than coal produced in a state that imposed environmental regulatory
47
costs on its operators.1
By the end of the 1960s, public concern over the adverse impacts of
coal mining had grown to a crescendo of opposition. It was generally
recognized that the states could not and would not impose meaningful
regulation on coal companies operating within their own borders. Coalfield
citizens and other critics of strip mining realized that only a statute passed
by Congress could end the states' "race to the bottom." A federal law
imposing uniform national regulatory standards would nullify the strongest
argument raised against regulation-in-state coal operators' competitive
position vis-,-vis operators in other states. Operators in every state would be
required to play by the same federal rules. The race to the bottom pressures
would be eliminated by instituting a uniformly applicable federal regulatory
program.
Years of national media attention and unrelenting pressure from
coalfield residents made it impossible for Congress to ignore coal stripping.
Proponents of federal regulation accumulated massive documentation of the
enormous costs coal mining had externalized onto coalfield communities.
Furthermore, Congress faced a national outcry against irresponsible coal
mining when the totally avoidable collapse of a huge coal waste
impoundment at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia killed more than one hundred
people, injured thousands more, and wiped out whole communities. 48
Twice Congress passed legislation, and twice the coal industry and its
state political allies succeeded in persuading President Gerald Ford to

146 See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000) ("The Congress finds and declares that .. surface mining
and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the
ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining
operations within their borders."). This competition is often described as a "race to the bottom."
See, e.g, William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:SWANCC and
Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,741, 10,762 (July 2001) (discussing Congress's fear
of a "race to the bottom" as a motivating factor in the passage of SMCRA). However, there is
academic debate as to whether a "race to the bottom" actually exists. See generally Richard L.
Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethfnlng the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale
for FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
147 Edgcomb, supra note 145, at 308.
148 See generallySTERN, supra note 88 (detailing the Buffalo Creek flood and its aftermath).
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exercise his veto power. 149 But with the transition to the Carter
Administration came cooperation from the executive branch, and Congress
once again passed legislation regulating surface mining. 5 ° On August 3,
1977, President Jimmy Carter signed the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977. Finally, federal regulation was being imposed on
the coal industry in an effort to minimize the adverse impacts of
underground and strip mining.'
B. SMCRA 's CooperativeFederalismApproach to Regulabton
Paralleling other federal environmental regulatory laws, Congress
designed SMCRA as a "cooperative federalism" statute.'52 Congress found
that "the cooperative effort established by this chapter is necessary to
prevent or mitigate adverse environmental effects of present and future
surface coal mining operations." 53 However, as explained below, the
conflict spawned by SMCRA far exceeded that experienced in the
implementation and administration of other cooperative federalism statutes.
SMCRA's cooperative federalism scheme instituted an extensive and
permanent federal regulatory presence to deal with problems previously
within the sole domain of the states. Congress created a new Office of
Surface Mining (OSM) to oversee implementation, administration, and
enforcement of SMCRA. 15 4 Congress intended that states have the option to
assume "exclusive jurisdiction" to administer and enforce SMCRA, subject
to compliance with minimum statutory standards and compliance with
OSM's implementing regulations.155 Moreover, state assumption of
149 ENV'T & NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, STATE SURFACE MINING LAWS: A SURVEY, A COMPARISON WITH THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, S. Doc. NO. 95-25, at iii, 3-9 (1977).

150 See id.at iii
("[M]uch of the previous atmosphere of intense conflict [between Congress
and the executive branch] has vanished with President Carter's assurance that he supports a
strong surface mine bill.").
151Congressman Morris K Udall (D-Ariz.) described the moment: "[The] Act was passed
after years of struggle by people in the coal fields-people who have lived with the mutilated
mountainsides, spoiled streams, landslides and destruction of their homes. The voices of those
people were heard on that August day." Morris K. Udall, Foreword to MARK SQUILLACE, THE
STRIP MINING HANDBOOK: A COALFIELD CITIZENS' GUIDE TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST THE RAVAGES OF
STRIP MINING AND UNDERGROUND MINING 1, 1 (1990).

152 See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2000) (describing the statutory framework as a "cooperative
effort").
153 Id SMCRA also differs significantly from other federal environmental regulatory statutes
in that it is directed at a single industry: coal mining. Congress did identify and distinguish, to a
minor degree, differences within the coal industry itself. Congress found the presence of
significant regional differences in topographical, geological, and hydrological conditions
required that federal regulation be tailored to some degree to those diverse conditions. Id
§ 1201(f). SMCRA also recognized the differences between underground and strip mining. See,
e.g., id § 1266 (mandating that the Secretary of Interior, charged with implementation of the
statute, "consider the distinct difference between surface coal mining and underground coal
mining" when regulating the surface effects of underground mining).
154 Id § 1211.
155 Id § 1253. OSM's approval of a regulatory program allowing a state to assume primary
jurisdiction over SMCRA's administration and enforcement is made contingent upon OSM
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"exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and
reclamation operations" was made specifically subject to OSM's oversight
and enforcement power.156 If an OSM-approved state fails to implement,
enforce, or maintain its program in accordance with SMCRA, OSM must
enforce part or all of such program or assume exclusive federal jurisdiction
over all mining operations within the state.'57
SMCRA required an "interim" program of joint state and federal
enforcement in the period before state primacy programs were approved,
followed by a "permanent" regulatory program based on OSM-promulgated
regulations." 5 The interim regulatory program was required to be based
upon and to incorporate most of SMCRA's important permitting
requirements. 15 9 Nine months after SMCRA's August 3, 1977 effective date,
all surface mining operations regulated by a state were to be in compliance
with interim program requirements.16 Within six months of enactment of
SMCRA, OSM was required to implement a federal inspection and
enforcement program in the field that would remain until replaced by an
approved state primacy program or a federal regulatory program was
established. 6' Within one year of SMCRA's effective date, OSM was required
regulations defining the details of the "permanent regulatory
to promulgate
162
program."
Problems immediately arose pertaining to OSM's administration of
SMCRA's phased implementation. OSM's effort to promulgate permanent
program rules produced one of the most extensive rulemaking proceedings
in the history of administrative law. Two drafts were submitted for public
comment; 57 public meetings and 25 days of public hearings were held; 589
public comments were received by OSM; 22 different task forces, composed
of over 100 technical experts from more than 20 agencies, evaluated and
revised the draft rules into their final form."
SMCRA's tight implementation time schedule and Congress's failure to
fund OSM for the first seven months of its existence exacerbated tensions
between the interested parties and provoked litigation seeking to force OSM
to extend statutorily prescribed time schedules." 6 Congress had required
OSM to develop interim and permanent regulatory programs from scratch,
but failed to take into account the extensive technical, scientific, legislative,
and regulatory work involved. The unreasonable timeline imposed on OSM
also ignored the probability of continued coal industry and state political

making certain affirmative findings. The requirements are set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2000).
156 Id.§ 1253(a).
157 Id §§ 1254(a)(3), 1271(b); 30 C.F.R. part 733 (2004).
158 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b)-(e) (2000).
159 Id § 1252(b).
160 Id § 1252(c).
161 Id.§ 1252(e).
162 Id.§ 1251(b).
163 Edgcomb, supranote 145, at 318 n.5.
164Comment, The 1977 Surface Mlning Act Revisited National Regulatory Program
Surmounts Judicialand Legislative Challenges,9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,199, 10,200
(Nov. 1979).
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resistance to the strict federal regulation, oversight, and enforcement
demanded by the Act.165
C CoalIndustry andState Opposition to Implementation, Adrministration,
andEnforcement ofSMCRA
Not surprisingly, resistance to federal legislation by the coal industry
and many state political and regulatory interests carried over to OSM's
efforts during the implementation phase of the Act. Continuing conflict
occurred between those from whom the SMCRA demanded cooperation: the
states and the federal government. 16 The strident opposition of coal
industry and state forces present during Congressional consideration of
proposed legislation continued as OSM attempted 1) to carry on SMCRA
mandated concurrent enforcement and 2) to create a totally new, complex,
and comprehensive regulatory program. State, industry, and environmental
groups challenged in court numerous provisions of OSM's regulations and
the scope of OSM's regulatory authority.' 67 Challenges to interim regulations
included allegations that OSM arbitrarily failed to include a broad exemption
and variance procedure, and that, inter alia, strict water pollution control
and stringent detection and enforcement regulations exceeded the scope of
power delegated to OSM by Congress. 68 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia upheld OSM's rulemaking efforts, rejecting almost
all of these challenges. 6
Industry and states also attacked the constitutionality of SMCRA in five
lawsuits, alleging numerous constitutional defects including challenges
based on the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Contract
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Takings
Clause. 70 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld SMCRA as
constitutional. 7 '
165 See Edgcomb, supra note 145, at 311-26 (presenting a comprehensive review of the
challenges presented by the timeline).
166 A fluctuating coal market and SMCRA-imposed regulatory costs threatened bankruptcy
for many marginal, under-capitalized operators. These so-called "small operators" were at the
forefront of coal industry attacks on OSM and permanent program rules.
167 Twenty-four court actions challenging OSM's interim regulations were consolidated in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litig., 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction); In re Surface Mining
Regulation Litig., 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978) (motion for summary judgment). Nine
separate lawsuits were filed challenging OSM's permanent program regulations and these were
also consolidated for review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,720, 20,721
(D.D.C. 1979).
168 In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 452 F. Supp. at 538; In re Surface Mining
Regulation Litig., 456 F. Supp. at 1313-15, 1323-24.
169 In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 456 F. Supp. at 1326 (ordering judgment entered
for government, with some narrow exceptions).
170 See generally Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(evaluating the constitutionality of SMCRA's performance standards); Indiana v. Hodel, 452 U.S.
314 (1981) (evaluating the constitutionality of SMCRA's prime farmland provisions).
171 See Va Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 268 (upholding SMCRA's
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In the quarter century since enactment of SMCRA, the environmental
degradation and attendant adverse social and economic impacts on coalfield
communities continue, albeit not at the catastrophic levels that existed in
the pre-SMCRA years when coal mining was essentially unregulated. One of
the best examples of such continuing regulatory failure can be seen in the
failures of state and federal enforcement of SMCRA's requirements
pertaining to huge mountaintop removal strip mines that have proliferated in
the southern West Virginia coalfields. It is there, near the benighted former
coal camps, that a specific SMCRA promise of environmental protection and
local economic development was broken by coal operators and compliant
federal and state regulators.
IV. "ALMOST LEVEL, WEST VIRGINIA": 172 MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL STRIP MINING
A decade and a half after enactment of SMCRA, some believed the
statute was reducing abuses of coalfield lands and people caused by
conventional strip and underground mining. Notwithstanding a measure of
success, some coalfield communities continued to feel the effects of
inadequately regulated mining that had plagued them decades earlier.173
Many of these post-SMCRA impacts were produced by new surface and deep
mining techniques that had gained favor with the nation's biggest coal
producers.
A major transformation of the coal industry triggered this post-SMCRA
departure from conventional mining methods.'
Corporate mergers,
consolidations, and bankruptcies accompanied intense competition between
eastern and western coal mining operations.175 A combination of all of these
performance standards); Indiana v. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 317-18 (upholding SMCRA's prime
farmland provisions).
172 This play on John Denver's opening lyric ("Almost heaven, West Virginia") to his hit song
Take Me Home, Country Roads, has been attributed to former West Virginia Secretary of State
Ken Hechlier. DL4RY Take Me Home, Country Roads, DRILLBrrS & TAILINGS, Nov. 23, 1999,
available at http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drfllbits/4_19/diary.html.
173 MONTRIE, supra note 137, at 197. It is clear that SMCRA has eliminated many coaloperator abuses and has promoted significant improvement in environmental reclamation over
the "shoot and shove" mining practices which were the rule in pre-SMCRA days. See Udall,
supra note 151, at 1 ("Overall [SMCRAI has produced a vast improvement in mining methods
and reclamation compliance in much of the coalfields. Nevertheless, in some regions-too often
the very regions which compelled the passage of the law-abuses continue at an alarming
rate."). Notwithstanding these accomplishments, coal industry resistance to regulation after
SMCRA was enacted has continued to the present. SMCRA was intended to advance economic,
social, and environmental justice in coalfield communities. The means to that end was SMCRA's
strict regulatory regime that held coal operators accountable. However, as discussed herein, the
cutting edge of SMCRA's permanent regulatory program has been dulled by a coalition of
forces: coal industry lobbyists, coal-friendly state politicians inured to industry positions by
campaign contributions or fear of political reprisals, and government regulators whose
willingness to turn a blind eye to the law has been astonishing.
174 MONTRIE, supranote 137, at 197.
175 Freelance journalist Rudy Abramson points out that, notwithstanding new mining
methods, "the efficiency of Appalachia's most productive mines pales beside that of mines in
the West." Abramson, supra note 74. Companies mining in Wyoming's Powder River Basin, he
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events foreshadowed the growth of "mountaintop removal"-a strip mining
6
technique that existed only on a small scale before SMCRA. 17 One
commentator observed:
Because of [competition with] cheap western coal, mountaintop removal
suddenly boomed in central Appalachia in the 1990s. Trucks and power shovels
have grown to gargantuan sizes, and drag lines swing shovels holding up to 100
cubic yards of rock. Mountaintop mines that reduce ridges and peaks by
hundreds of feet now sprawl across more than 2,000 acres. An estimated 400
square miles of southern West Virginia mountains and ridges have been leveled
buried beneath debris blasted, shoved, and dumped
and 1,000 miles of streams
77
into narrow valleys. 1

The move to the use of large-scale mountaintop removal operations would
make mining in Appalachia more efficient, productive, and-most
importantly for coal operators-much less labor-intensive. 71 Mechanization
and concomitant massive job losses attendant stripping operators' embrace
of mountaintop removal were paralleled79 by the underground operators'
adoption of new deep mining technology.
reports, use 400-ton trucks; one bite of a western dragline can chew up 200 cubic yards. Id.

176 SMCRA recognized mountaintop removal as a legitimate mining technique, albeit one that
required stringent regulation. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(c) (2000). In 1970, only ten percent of West
Virginia's coal came from strip mining. Ken Ward Jr., As High As God Did: Law to Rebuild
Mountains Fails by Wayside, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va), May 3, 1998, at 1A
[hereinafter As High As God Dil, available at 1998 WL 5948792. In 1998, approximately one
third of the coal produced in West Virginia was strip mined. Id.Between 1981 and 1998, nearly
500 square miles of West Virginia was stripped. Id. During the 1980s, the state issued 44 permits

allowing coal companies to conduct mountaintop removal mining on 9,800 acres. Id From 1996
to 1998, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, charged with implementing
the state version of SMCRA, approved permits for 38 mountaintop removal mines, impacting an
area of over 27,000 acres. Id.
177 Abramson, supra note 74; see also Ken Ward Jr., Industry, Critics Look for Mountaintop
Removal Alternative: Is There Another Way?, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), June

6, 1999, at IA [hereinafter Is There Another Way.1 ("In the early 1980s, 85-ton trucks were the
largest used in West Virginia mining. Back then, strip mines and valley fills were much smaller.
Generally, fills contained less than 250,000 cubic yards of rock and dirt. [By the end of the
1990s,] mountaintop removal mines use 240-ton trucks. Valley fills sometimes measure 100
million cubic yards or more."), availableat 1999 WL 6730006.
178 See Abramson, supra note 74 ("In 1979, it took 58,565 miners to produce 112.3 million
tons [of coal in West Virginia]. Twenty years later, fewer than 15,000 miners produced nearly
170 millions tons.").
179 Longwall mining "uses a steel plow or a rotating drum with teeth, pulled back and forth
along the face of a coal seam, taking in several hundred feet in one pass, and taking many bites
into the seam." BARLow BURKE, JR. ET AL., MINERAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 316 (1994). This
highly mechanized underground mining method swept through the coalfields
contemporaneously with the expansion of mountaintop removal. Longwall mining displaced
small, conventional continuous mining machines and brought greater efficiency to underground
mining in Appalachia. However, its low labor-intensity allowed operators to slash payrolls and
thousands of underground miners lost jobs. See id.("[O]ne [longwall machine] operator can do
the work formerly performed by several persons.... [L]ongwalling means fewer... jobs for
miners."). Notwithstanding these economic advantages, eastern longwall mining continues to
struggle to compete with western coal. For example, in 1998, Arch Coal Company's huge "Black
Thunder" strip mine in Wyoming produced 42 million tons; in contrast, the largest mine in
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The coal industry's competition-driven movement to new mining
methods in central Appalachia adversely impacted coalfield communities
both above and below the earth's surface."' 0 On both fronts, coal production
and man-hour efficiency in Appalachian mines increased dramatically. 181
However, as mountain ridges were blasted apart and more miles of
headwater streams were buried under huge valley fills, mine jobs continued
to hemorrhage. Promises that mountaintop removal mining would spur jobcreating commercial, industrial, and residential development went
unfulfilled.
A. Descnption ofMountaintopRemoval MiningMethods
SMCRA regulations define mountaintop removal as "surface mining
activities, where the mining operation removes an entire coal seam or seams
running through the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge, or hill . .. by
removing substantially all of the overburden off the bench and creating a
level plateau or gently rolling contour, with no highwalls remaining." 18 2 As

Appalachia, Arch Coal's underground longwall "Mountaineer" mine produced "only" 7.4 million
tons. Abramson, supra note 74. In spite of the high cost of transcontinental rail haulage of
western coal, utilities in the east still find it cheaper to burn western coal. Id
180 Longwall mining removes huge chunks of a coal seam that lies horizontally hundreds of
feet beneath the earth's surface. See BURKE, supra note 179, at 316. A huge longwall shear cuts
coal from the seam; the coal drops on a conveyor belt and is transported by conveyor or belt to
the surface. Id The longwall shear and attendant equipment is protected by hydraulic roof jacks
("roof supports") that shield them as well as the miners operating the longwalling machine. Id
The longwall's hydraulic roof supports move forward as the shears bite into the coal seam. Id
As the supports move forward, the rock they had been supporting caves in behind the roof
supports causing overlying rock strata to break and subside. Id at 316-17. Overlying homes,
out-buildings, streams, wells, and springs are often damaged, sometimes irreparably. Longwall
mining under rural Appalachian homes and communities has caused widespread significant
subsidence damage to homes and other surface structures. Similarly longwall subsidence has
triggered pervasive loss or contamination of rural domestic well and spring water supplies. See
id. ("After the subsidence, water supplies may be affected...."). Nowhere has the "double
whammy" of longwall and mountaintop removal mining been felt more intensely than in Mingo
and Boone Counties in southern West Virginia. There, communities have experienced blastingcaused vibrations and damage to homes, pervasive dust, and mining-induced flooding from
mountaintop removal mines combined with damage to homes and loss of domestic spring and
well water supplies caused by longwall mining.
181 In 1996, West Virginia coal production jumped to 174 million tons, the most coal
produced since 1947. Peter Galuszka, Stnp-Mining On Steroids: It Now Levels Mountains and
ThreatensAppalachia'sLandscape,Bus. WK, Nov. 17, 1997, at 70.
182 30 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2004). SMCRA itself provides:
Where an applicant meets the requirements of paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection a
permit without regard to the requirement to restore to approximate original contour...
may be granted for the surface mining of coal where the mining operation will remove an
entire coal seam or seams running through the upperfraction of a mountain, rdge, or
hill... by removing all of the overburden and creatinga level plateauor a gently rolling
contour with no highwalls remaining, and capable of supportingpostminig uses in
accord with the requirementsof this subsection.
30 U.S.C. § 1265(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
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traditional contour and area mining rapidly declined during the 1980s and
1990s, growing numbers of mountaintop removal mines began clear-cutting
the steep-sloped hardwood forests and chopping off mountaintops in eastern
Kentucky and southern West Virginia.18 3 The underlying coal seams there lie
sandwiched in layers of rock and soil hundreds of feet thick. In mountaintop
removal operations, each layer of the rock above a 'coal seam is blasted and
removed, the coal is extracted, and then the next layer is removed until the
removal of rock and coal layers is no longer cost-effective.
Operators put some of the removed rock back on the flattened
mountaintop. Because rock blasted from its natural state "swells," coal
operators assert there is usually inadequate room available on the flattened
mountaintop to place this "swell" or "excess spoil." 'S The spoil is dumped in
adjacent valleys, often creating huge "valley fills." 1 85 A single valley fill may
be 1,000 feet wide and extend8 6 several miles at the upper reaches of
Appalachian headwater streams.
Over the course of more than two decades, the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and its predecessors
authorized the coal companies to bury at least 786 miles of West Virginia
7
streams under valley fills.1S Thousands of acres of hardwood forests were

leveled."8 3 The United States Fish and Wildlife Service found that "'the loss
of these streams and their associated forests may have ecosystem-wide
implications.'"1 9 Beginning in the late 1980s, the size and number of
mountaintop removal mines and their associated valley fills increased,
especially in southern West Virginia, which has enormous reserves of highenergy, low-sulfur coal coveted by electric utilities.19

183 MONTRIE, supra note 137, at 197. Business Weekreported that "[r]emoving a mountaintop
can cost up to $100 million ....Only the largest companies... can afford such undertakings."
Galuszka, supranote 181, at 70.
184See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (describing
mountaintop removal and the creation of valley fills), rev'dsub nom. Bragg v. W. Va Coal Ass'n,
248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001); see also W. Va.Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (S.D.W.
Va.1989) (discussing the construction of valley fills), affd,CA-87-834-2, 1991 WL 75217 (4th Cir.
May 13, 1991).
185 Bragg,72 F. Supp. 2d at 646; W. Va CoalAss'n, 728 F. Supp. at 1281.
186 Brief for the Federal Appellants at 7, Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir.
2001) (No. 99-2683), available at http://www.osmre.gov/news/041700mtbrief.txt; CITIZENS COAL
COUNCIL,
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REMOVAL
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OF

APPALACHIA,

at

http://www.citizenscoalcouncil.org/facts/mtntop.htm (Last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
187 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 2, Bragg v. W. Va Coal Ass'n (No. 99-2443) [hereinafter
Appellees Brief].
188 Id; see also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL., supranote 140, at ]LI.F-12 (noting that
"a single [mountaintop removal] permit involved changing thousands of acres of hardwood
forests into herbaceous cover").
189 Ken Ward Jr., Valley Flls Cover Hundreds of Miles, Report Says, SUNDAY GAZETrE-MAIL
(Charleston, W. Va.), Oct. 4, 1998, at IA (quoting U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Report to EPA
Region III dated September 23, 1998), availableat 1998 WL 5975717.
190 One commentator suggested that the growth of mountaintop removal mining stemmed
from public utilities' "insatiable demand for low-sulfur coal, the best of which is found in
eastern Kentucky and southern West Virginia." Galuszka, supra note 181, at 70. See supra note
112 (discussing Clean Air Act's impact on the market for low-sulfur coal).
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B. SMCRA 's StrictLimits on Mountaintop Removal Mining
Ordinarily, when a state grants a permit to conduct strip mining
operations, a coal operator is required to restore mined land to its
approximate original contour (AOC). 191 When Congress was debating
SMCRA, central Appalachian coal operators and coal-state congressional
representatives sought an exemption from the AOC requirement for
mountaintop removal mining. Mountaintop removal mining, they argued,
could produce flat land for development-a commodity in very short supply
in the mountainous coalfields of West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, and
Tennessee. 192 Congress accommodated these requests, but placed severe
limitations on those situations where mountaintop removal would be
allowed under a variance from the generally applicable AOC reclamation
requirement.
In order to qualify for a variance from the AOC requirement, SMCRA
requires that a mountaintop removal permit applicant propose a postmining
land use that falls in one of five specific categories: industrial, commercial,
agricultural, residential, or public facility (which includes recreational
facilities).'
In addition, the permit applicant must also prove that the
191 SMCRA provides in relevant part:
General performance standards shall be applicable to all surface coal mining and
reclamation operations and shall require the operation as a minimum to
except as provided in subsection (c) of this section with respect to all surface coal
mining operations backf'll, compact (where advisable to insure stability or to prevent
leaching of toxic materials), and grade in order to restore the approximate original
contour of the land with all highwalls, spoil piles, and depressions eliminated (unless
small depressions are needed in order to retain moisture to assist revegetation
or as otherwise authorized pursuant to this chapter) ....
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2000).
192 In 1973, then-Senator Jennings Randolph (D-W. Va.) argued that allowing operators to
flatten mountains would promote economic development: "In the state of West Virginia, we
have a need for level land.... We know that ofttimes surface mining can allow for the locations
of a school, an airport, or for housing-not one, but many homesites." As High As God Did,
supra note 176 (quoting Sen. Jennings Randolph (D-W. Va.)). Then-West Virginia Governor Jay
Rockefeller asserted in a 1977 congressional hearing that "[m]ountaintop removal should
certainly be encouraged, if not specifically dictated, by proposed legislation." Id (quoting Gov.
Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.)). However, other elected officials from West Virginia fought to ban
mountaintop removal mining. In 1974, then-Congressman Ken Hechler (D-W. Va.) said, "This is
not only aesthetically bad, as anyone can tell who flies over the state of West Virginia or any
places where the mountaintops are scalped off, but also it is devastating to those people who
live below the mountain." Id. (quoting Congressman Ken Hechler (D-W. Va.)).
193 Specifically, SMCRA provides:
In cases where an industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential or public facility
(including recreational facilities) use is proposed [for] the postmining use of the affected
land, the regulatory authority may grant a permit for a surface mining operation of the
nature described in subsection (c)(2) of this section ....
30 U.S.C. § 1265(c)(3) (2000).
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proposed postmining use constitutes an equal or better economic or public
use of the affected land as compared to the premining land use.194 An
applicant seeking an AOC variance must also provide specific plans for its
proposed postmining land use and accompanying assurances. 195 Finally,
SMCRA requires that the applicant demonstrate that the proposed use would
be consistent with adjacent land uses, existing state and local land-use plans
and programs, and that all other requirements of SMCRA will be met.'96 In
granting a mountaintop removal permit with an AOC variance, a state must
impose certain specific public safety and environmental protection
requirements on the permittee. 197
C. Media Expos6 ofMountaintop Removal Impacts

In a 1997 interview, longtime West Virginia coal industry lobbyist Ben
Green told Business Week, "With mountaintop removal, you get 100%
mineral recovery, you can't mine again, and you get better land use than you
ever had in its natural state." 9 ' If by "better land" Greene meant "flatter"
land then his statement was true. Mountaintop removal had created tens of
thousands of acres of flat land. Greene's claims echoed the arguments that
persuaded Congress to allow the practice only if the resulting flattened
mountaintop was to be used as part of a coal operator proposed
development that would create jobs for coalfield communities and promote
local economies.
Ben Greene was not alone in trumpeting the value of flat land. As they
have from SMCRA's inception, coal industry and government officials

194 Id § 1265(c)(3)(A).
195 Id § 1265(c)(3)(B). Specifically, the applicant must assure the Secretary of Interior that
postining land use will be:
(i) compatible with adjacent land uses;
(ii) obtainable according to data regarding expected need and market;
(iii) assured of investment in necessary public facilities;
(iv) supported by commitments from public agencies where appropriate;
(v) practicable with respect to private financial capability for completion of the proposed
use;
(vi) planned pursuant to a schedule attached to the reclamation plan so as to integrate
the mining operation and reclamation with the postmining land use; and
(vii) designed by a registered engineer in conformance with professional standards
established to assure the stability, drainage, and configuration necessary for the intended
use of the site.
Id
196 Id § 1265(c)(3)(C), (E). The permitting agency is required, under section 1265(c)(3)(D),
to provide "the governing body of the unit of general-purpose government in which the land is
located and any State or Federal agency which the regulatory agency, in its discretion,
determines to have an interest in the proposed use, an opportunity of not more than sixty days
to review and comment on the proposed use." Id § 1265(c)(3)(D).
197 See id § 1265(c)(4)-(6) (setting forth specific public safety and environmental
protections).
198 Galuszka, supra note 181, at 70.
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continue to tout flattening mountain ridges as a panacea for economic
development. There was, and is, one problem with the scenariomountaintop removal has played a significant role in the precipitous decline
in coal mine employment, and has flattened and deforested mountaintops
that now lay barren, generating weeds rather than jobs. As explained below,
a quarter century after enactment, SMCRA's promise to coalfield
communities of shopping centers, industrial plants, and new affordable
housing-all located on flattened mountaintops-has been broken.
In August 1997, Penny Loeb, a Senior Editor at US News & World
Report, broke the story of mountaintop removal's adverse impacts on
coalfield residents.' 99 Her article, "Shear Madness," exposed to a national
audience the social and environmental injustice attendant the large-scale
expansion of mountaintop removal in the coalfields. ° ° Loeb wrote:
[Cloal companies and some state officials note that strip mining provides highpaying jobs-weekly pay averages $922. And some contend that West
Virginians are better off with their mountains flattened-several dozen
buildings, including four schools and three jails, have been built on them so far.
... But the costs are indisputable, and the damage to the landscape is
startling to those who have never seen a mountain destroyed. Topographic and
landscaping changes leave some regions more vulnerable to floods.... And
state employment records suggest the jobs argument is not very compelling.
Mountaintop removal accounts for only 4,317 workers inthe state-less than 1
percent of its job force. Overall, mining employment in
the state has fallen from
20 1
130,000 in the 1940s and 1950s to just 22,000 last year.
Loeb catalogued multiple impacts on coalfield communities caused by the
proliferation of mountaintop removal mines:
Thirty floods have occurred in the past two years in areas where watersheds
were bared and redesigned, and several people have lost their lives in such
floods.

199Penny Loeb, ShearMadness,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997, at 28.

200 Id. Courts took note of Loeb's investigative reporting, observing that "the disruption to
the immediate environment created by mountain-top mining is considerable and has provoked
sharp differences of opinion between environmentalists and industry players." Bragg v.
Robertson, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Loeb, supra note 199). The Fourth Circuit's
opinion described its view of the plaintiffs' concerns underlying the suit before it:

As Loeb reported these differences of opinion, environmentalists decry the "startling"
change in the topography, which leaves the land more subject to floods, results in the
pollution of streams and rivers, and has an "incalculable" impact on wildlife. The
environmentalists also criticize the mining process itself, which cracks foundations of
nearby houses, causes fires, creates dust and noise, and disrupts private wells.
Id.
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit referred to the complaints of "environmentalists," failing to
recognize that the individual plaintiffs in the case were people who lived in southern West
Virginia and were personally impacted by nearby mountaintop removal mines.
201 Loeb, supra note 199, at 31.
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Whatever the role of mining in the state's overall economy, its impact on
nearby communities is devastating. Dynamite blasts needed to splinter rock
strata are so strong they crack the foundations and walls of houses:
Homeowners filed 287 blasting complaints with the state in the past year.
Trucks full of coal rumble past some people's front porches at the rate of 20 an
dries up an average of 100 wells a year and
hour, 24 hours a day. Mining
20 2
contaminates water in others.
Loeb's report was followed by a comprehensive, fact-packed series of
newspaper articles in the Charleston Gazette, beginning in 1998, which
examined mountaintop removal mining and its impacts on the economy and
people of the coalfields.2" The series, "Mining the Mountains," was written
by Ken Ward Jr., an award-winning investigative reporter. Ward's reporting
exposed the myth promoted by two decades of coal industry propaganda.
The claims of industry lobbyists, politicians, and regulators that
mountaintop removal would bring economic development and prosperity to
coalfield communities were shown to be false.
1. State MountaintopRemoval PermittingReceives Scrutiny
The first article in the series described a DEP hearing on the application
for the largest strip mine ever proposed in West Virginia. 2° 4 The hearing was
held in the gymnasium of an aging Logan County elementary school; more
than 125 people jammed the narrow bleachers. 25 Ward described the scene
as follows:
Just over the ridge from the school, Arch Coal Inc. had stripped 2,500 acres of
the Logan County hills around Blair Mountain. The company has applied for a
permit to mine 3,200 more.
If state regulators approve the new permit, giant shovels and bulldozers
will eventually lop off the mountaintops of an area as big as 4,500 football
fields.
Residents of the tiny communities along W.Va. 17 complained Arch Coal's
existing mine already makes their lives miserable. Why, they asked regulators
at the hearing, should the company get a permit to mine more?
Melvin Cook of Blair was the first to walk across the gym floor to a
microphone and speak up. He complained about the blasting.
Id.
That series, "Mining The Mountains," is ongoing and can be accessed on the Charleston
Gazettds website
at
http://www.wvgazette.com/section/Series/Mining+the+Mountains.
Investigative reporter Ken Ward Jr. utilized computer-assisted research tools and good oldfashioned "leg-work" to marshal the facts. The series is full of information derived largely from
the files of state and federal regulators and interviews with government officers, union
members, coal industry officials, miners, and coal camp residents. Ward's careful research
included field visits to mines and coalfield homes and months of examining hundreds of thick
permit files and voluminous records located in the offices of OSM and DEP.
204 Ken Ward Jr., Stri-lMiningBattle Resurfaces in State, SUNDAY GAZET-MAIL (Charleston,
W. Va), Mar. 22, 1998, at IA [hereinafter Stnp-Mining Battle Resurfaces], available at 1998 WL
5940942.
205 Id
202
203
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Residents of nearby communities were not the only people who
attended the public hearing. A solid block of the gym's bleachers was filled
with miners and their families who said that "they wanted jobs at the new
mine. But they agreed the company should make sure mining doesn't disturb
area residents. "27
The Gazette series told of giant machines that "towered over old-time
shovels and bulldozers" used in earlier coal stripping. 08 Those monster
machines "can literally move mountains," the newspaper related; only a few
skilled equipment operators stood at the controls."0 Gazette readers also
learned that in twenty years nearly 500 square miles of the state had been
strip mined; from 1994 to 1998, the average size of the new mines had
doubled each year; and, in 1997, DEP had issued new permits totaling 31
210
square miles, an area larger than Charleston, West Virginia.
2. State MountaintopRemoval PermittingDecisionsQuestionedby
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
The Gazette also closely examined specific mountaintop removal
permitting decisions by state and federal agencies. The series noted that
Arch Coal, Inc.'s subsidiaries had been seeking agency approval to permit
larger and larger mines which would bury long segments of mountain
headwater streams.2" Arch Coal's Hobet 21 mountaintop removal operation
had finished stripping almost 10,000 acres of Boone County mountains by
the end of 1995.212 In 1997, the company proposed a new 2,000 acre
mountaintop removal mine in neighboring Lincoln County, which would
produce more than 30 million tons of coal over a decade. 213 Arch Coal's
subsidiary, Hobet Mining, Inc., planned to dispose of "excess spoil" by
burying two miles of Connelly Branch, a mountain headwater stream. 14 The
206 Id Some of the other residents complained that blasting at the mine "toss[ed] rocks and
dust into [their] communities . . . [and shook] their homes, crack[ed] foundations and
damage[d] water wells." Id.
207 Id

208 Id. For example, the series described the a twenty-story tall "dragline, a cranelike
machine nicknamed 'Big John' [whose] bucket can hold 83 cubic yards of material, or about five
Jeep Cherokees." Lawrence Pierce, Flghtover Strip Mining Renewed in State, SUNDAY GAZETrE-

MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Mar. 22, 1998, at 5A, available at 1998 WL 5940922. That gigantic
machine had been used in stripping 10,000 acres of mountainous land at Arch Coal's Hobet 21
subsidiary located in Boone County, West Virginia. Strp-Mining Battle Resurfaces, supra note
204.
20 Stnp-Mlning BattleResurfaces, supra note 204.
210
211
212
213

Id
Id.
Id
Id

214 Id The article explained what would occur in ways the uninitiated reader could
understand: The stream would be buried "with enough spoil to fill 1.1 million railroad cars, a
train that would stretch from Charleston[, W. Va.] to Myrtle Beach, S.C., and back a dozen
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United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was the only
regulatory agency charged with monitoring surface mining that raised
questions about the enlarged scope of mountaintop removal permits being
issued in West Virginia. In September 1996, an EPA Region III official wrote
to DEP, observing that "'Connelly Branch is the longest stream in West
Virginia that has ever been proposed to be covered by a valley fill to our
knowledge"' and its loss "'could possibly affect aquatic life in the Mud River,
particularly in combination with other existing and proposed valley fills in
the watershed."'21 " EPA told DEP that it would object to issuance of the
216
permit unless Hobet Mining considered alternatives to burying the stream.
However, within a few months, EPA retreated from this stance.217
In June 1997, another valley fill permit caught EPA's attention. 2 8 A.T.
Massey, Inc. had filed an application proposing to bury two miles of James
Creek in Boone and Raleigh Counties.2 19 EPA suggested Massey should
consider altering its mining plans in order to reduce the amount of excess
spoil dumped into the creek.221 Within a few months, EPA once again
retreated.22 1 Officials of EPA's Region III Water Division indicated, however,
that it was "'still very concerned about the disturbing trend toward larger
fills and increased stream impacts by coal companies, and wish[ed] to work
222
closely with DEP to prevent these impacts where possible.'"
As its series progressed, the Gazette reported a third instance of EPA
questioning a mountaintop removal mine permit application. 2 1 Pittston Coal
had applied for a permit for a gigantic new mine in Logan County in late
1996.224 In January and February 1998, DEP's mining and water resources
offices issued permits for the Pittston mine, but EPA officials objected and
raised questions. 225 The Gazette reported that the company negotiated with

times." Id.
215 Id. (quoting then-EPA Region lI Water Division Director Al Morris).
216 Id

217 Id EPA apparently was satisfied when Hobet agreed to make a few minor changes in the
valley fill and agreed to perform periodic testing to see if the fill harmed the nearby Mud River.
Id.
218 Id.
219 Id
220 Id

221 Id The agency "'concluded that there do not appear to be options for further reducing the
fill length, other than significantly changing the amount and type of mining.'" Id.(quoting EPA).
222 Id. (quoting EPA).

223 Ken Ward Jr., Getting Tough on Valley FiM:FederalRegulatorsMay Rein in Strip Mines if
State Doesn't, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1998, at C1 [hereinafter Getting Tough on Valley
Fills], availableat 1998 WL 5942449.
224 Id.

225 Id EPA's Region II Water Division Director, Tom Maslany, wrote to the DEP, saying,
"'EPA is concerned about the proposed permanent elimination of at least two miles of
productive streams, possible fill reduction alternatives not considered, and the adequacy of the
agreed mitigation to compensate for elimination of these streams.'" Id. (quoting EPA Region DI
Water Division Director Tom Maslany).
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EPA and quickly agreed to reduce the size of the mine227from 1,350 acres to
930 acres. 226 EPA responded by dropping its objections.
3. CoalIndusty's InitialResponse to Media Investigationsof Mountaintop
Removal
At the beginning of the "Mining The Mountains" series, Ken Ward Jr.
explained the initial response of coal industry officials and state and federal
regulators: "Coal operators say all of this attention is unwarranted. Some
have hauled out standard jobs-vs.-the-environment arguments. Others
insisted the fight over stopping strip mining ended decades ago-and that
228
they won."
Arch Coal mine manager John McDaniel told Ward, "'I want everybody
to understand that we have been trying to work with the community[.]...
It's not as one-sided as everybody tries to make it appear.'" 229 John Ailes of
the DEP Office of Mining and Reclamation said, "'We think we're doing a
daggone good job, but we could always do better.'" 230 Dan Sweeney, an
environmental engineer in EPA's Region III told Ward: "'We are definitely
among
evaluating the overall issue[.] ...But at this point, we're just talking
'2 3
ourselves[.] ...It's a little early to say what EPA will do right now.'"
D. Lawlessness: RegulatorsIgnore SMCRA's 'Approximate Oiginal

Contours"Mandate
As discussed in Section IV.B, supra, SMCRA requires most strip mines
to be reclaimed to their approximate original contours (AOC). 232 SMCRA,

226 Id.The change reduced the spoil pushed into streams by two-thirds, from 94 million cubic
yards to 33 million cubic yards. Id.
227 Id.Subsequently, EPA's Region III Administrator wrote to then-West Virginia Governor
Cecil Underwood, saying:
This short-term gain of extracting coal by large-scale surface mining in mountainous
areas leaves a lasting legacy of valley fills where natural, productive streams once
We have concerns that even the current policy may not adequately address
existed ....
stream and other impacts from the increasing number of very large valley fills and, as a
result, we are assessing the overall valley fill situation, including mitigation, in the
Eastern U.S. with other federal agencies.
Id (quoting Letter from W. Michael McCabe, EPA Region IImAdministrator, to Governor Cecil
Underwood (R-W. Va.) (March 1998)).
228 Strp-Min Battle Resurfaces,supra note 204. Ward noted that "[o]fficials of a few stripmining companies welcomed a closer look. Arch Coal, for example, says scrutiny will show they
mine without permanently scarring the land." Id.
229 Id (quoting John McDaniel, engineer for Arch Coal).
230 Id (quoting John Ailes, DEP Office of Mining and Reclamation).
231 Id (quoting Dan Sweeney, EPA Region HI).
232 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2000). SMCRA defines "approximate original contour" as
that surface configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area so that
the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads, closely resembles the
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however, allows the AOC requirement to be waived for mountaintop
233
removal mining operations in certain narrowly circumscribed situations.
In order to qualify for an AOC waiver, a permit applicant is required by
SMCRA to propose commercial, industrial, residential, agricultural, and/or
public uses for the land after it has been stripped, leveled, and reclaimed.234
The obvious goal of waiving the AOC restoration mandate was economic
development that would bring new jobs and prime the pump for coalfield
community economies.
The Charleston Gazette investigation raised serious questions about
state and federal agency oversight of state decisions to waive AOC
restoration requirements for mountaintop removal mines. Ken Ward Jr.
described a visit to DEP's Logan County office and his discussions there
with officials in charge of permitting mountaintop removal mines:
Ken Stollings points to the maps and charts on his office wall to show how
Hobet Mining will turn the rugged peaks and valleys around Blair Mountain into
flat plains and a few rolling hills.
Stollings, a Division of Environmental Protection engineer, shows the
changes to his boss, agency permit supervisor Larry Alt. Asked if this proposal
meets the legal mandate that mined land be reclaimed to its "approximate
original contour," Alt and Stollings just laugh.
"We just can't stack it as high as God did," Alt says with a shrug.
Approximate original contour, or AOC, is the heart of the federal strip
235
mining law. But among many West Virginia regulators, it's becoming ajoke.

general surface configuration of the land prior to mining and blends into and
complements the drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil
piles eliminated; water impoundments may be permitted where the regulatory authority
determines that they are in compliance with [the rest of SMCRA].
Id § 1291(2).
233 Id § 1265(c).
234 Id. § 1265(c)(3).
235 As High As God Did, supra note 176. A year later Larry Alt was cross-examined in a
Federal court hearing on the way DEP defined AOC in making its permitting decisions. In his
opinion, U.S. District Court Judge Charles H. Haden, II, who presided at the hearing, described
Alt's testimony:
Relevant to the AOC issue, DEP Permit Supervisor, Larry Alt, explained how he educates
new permit reviewers about determining AOC. Besides using chalkboard drawings, Alt
draws contour lines around his knuckles. He then shows a closed fist as the original
mountain and a semi-open fist as the restored mine site. Although his lessons include
contour lines which, among other things, show elevation, Alt does not consider elevation
in determining whether a permit meets AOC. Instead, Alt considers whether the site will
have the same general contours as before and whether the site will be stable.
Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). In a deposition taken two months
before his federal court hearing testimony, at which the author was present, Alt revealed that
his "knuckle" explanation was "an old boy scout trick."
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The Gazette reported that the AOC waiver rules were "routinely skirted
by dozens of huge mountaintop-removal strip mines."2 6 After coal
companies blasted and ripped apart mountain ridgetops to reach multiple
coal seams, state regulators allowed them to avoid the expense of restoring
the land to AOC. Instead, DEP permitted coal operators to take the cheapest
path: shoving and dumping the remains of mountains-millions of23cubic
yards of rock and dirt-on top of headwater streams in nearby valleys.
Information contained in DEP's own files revealed a systemic failure on
the part of state regulators to apply SMCRA's AOC requirements to
mountaintop removal mines.' The Gazette's investigation found that in
1997 alone, DEP had authorized twenty permits for mountaintop removal
mines to level twenty square miles. 239 However, the newspaper's study
showed that the companies obtaining these permits, "including [national
coal production leaders) Arch Coal Inc., A.T. Massey Coal and Pittston Coal,
rarely ask for or received approximate original contour exemptions for
mountaintop removal."24 ° A West Virginia Freedom of Information Act
request revealed that only one-quarter of active mountaintop removal mines
had obtained the AOC exemption.241 Thus, 75% of active mountaintop
236 As High As God Did,supra note
237 Prior to enactment of SMCRA

176.
most coal companies operating on the steep mountain
slopes in central Appalachia used the simplest, most inexpensive approach to disposing of
.excess spoil"-after blasting a mountainside apart, dozers would push the fractured rock and
dirt over the mountainside onto the downslope. OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, PRE-SURFACE
MINING LAW PHOTOS, at http://www.osmre.gov/ocphotoz.htm (last updated Jan. 23, 2002). This
quick and dirty approach was referred to as "shoot and shove." Id.When SMCRA was enacted,
the goal was to eliminate the "shoot and shove" method, replacing it with the trucking of excess
spoil to disposal sites where fills would be constructed from the bottom up in compacted
layers. However, engineered construction of fills in this manner is more expensive than the
indiscriminate shoot and shove approach. In the early 1990s, OSM promulgated rules which
allowed operators of mountaintop removal mines to return to pre-SMCRA shoot and shove
mining, conveniently calling rock and dirt shoved or dumped onto steep hillsides below a mine
.controlled gravity transport" of spoil. See Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations;
Permanent Regulatory Program; Areas Unsuitable for Mining; Special Categories of Mining;
Surface Mining Activities; Underground Mining Activities, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,612, 65,622 (Dec. 17,
1991) (amending 30 C.F.R. § 816.81(a) to allow as an exception to the general rule that spoil be
"hauled or conveyed" the use of "controlled gravity transport," and stating, "OSM maintains...
that the controlled gravity transport of coal mine waste is consistent with [SMCRA]").
238 The Gazette reported that in January 1998, DEP officials, did not know how many West
Virginia strip mines had received exemptions from the AOC requirement for mountaintop
removal mines. As High As God Did,supra note 176. The Gazette was not satisfied and filed a
request under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), W. Va. CODE ANN.
§§ 29B-1-1 to 29B-1-7 (Michie 2002), which triggered agency staff to examine scores of mining
permit files. Id.
The agency revealed that 61 of 81 active mountaintop removal mines permitted
since 1978 did not possess an AOC exemption; only 20 mines received the waiver. Id Moreover,
the FOIA response showed that the biggest mines did not receive waivers. Id.
The 61 mines that
failed to obtain AOC exemptions accounted for 7096 of the total mine acreage. Id.
239 Id.From 1995 to 1998, even fewer AOC exemptions were sought for mountaintop removal
mines, although DEP continued to issue permits to flatten mountains and fill streams. In 1995,
the newspaper found that only one third of mountaintop removal mines obtained the required
exemption. Id.In 1997, only 25% obtained the exemption. Id.
240 Id
241 See id (noting that "three-quarters of the active mountaintop-removal mining permits in
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removal mines in West Virginia were being operated in violation of state and
federal law.
Additional digging into DEP fies led the Gazette to a memorandum
written in the early 1990s by OSM officials that, for the first time, resembled
an agency AOC policy. 24 2 Because the policy contained no guidance for
permit reviewers on how to define AOC, it served as the basis for state
officials' later defense that they had no idea what AOC meant when it came
to mountaintop removal mines.23 The upshot of this bureaucratic sleight of
hand was that operators could lop hundreds of feet off mountaintops, dump
.excess spoil" into valleys, and level off thousands of acres-all under the
guise of meeting SMCRA's AOC requirement.
By definition a mountaintop removal mine is one that removes entire
coal seams running beneath a mountaintop. Many of the mines permitted
without AOC variances reduced the elevation of mountain ridges by
hundreds of feet. A mountaintop removal mine that reclaims mined land to
its approximate original contours is obviously an oxymoron-but an
oxymoron that regulators were willing to embrace so that coal operators
could avoid SMCRA's strict economic development requirements applicable
to mountaintop removal mining. The most egregious impact of DEP's failure
to enforce the AOC requirement was the denial of jobs and permanent
economic development that should have accompanied mountaintop removal
mining operations.

West Virginia were not granted the required exemption"). The Gazettds review of DEP permit
files found that a significant amount of information relating to mountaintop removal mine
permitting was either incomplete or missing altogether. Id.
242 Id The memorandum stated: "'For mountaintop-removal mining, there is no minimum or
maximum elevation requirement to which the final contour must be restored after mining[.]...
There could be as much as 200 or 300 feet difference between the pre-mining and post-mining
elevations.'" Id. (quoting Memorandum from OSM Morgantown Office (Oct. 1992)).
243 In their defense, DEP officials claimed that a vague legal definition of AOC had tied their
hands. In an interview with the Gazettes Ken Ward Jr., a DEP Office of Mining and Reclamation
official asked: "'Closely resembles the general surface configuration-who the hell knows what
that means?... Nobody has ever defined it[.]... What's AOC to you might not be AOC to me.
That is truly difficult for the agency. We're forced to make these interpretations without any
guidance.'" Id (quoting John Ailes, DEP Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation (internal
quotation omitted)). A year later, in Bragg v. Robertson, the District Court showed little
patience for DEP's difficulties:
The AOC requirement and definition undeniably allow the use of some discretion in
determining whether a permit meets the standard. The agency must make a case-by-case
determination of whether the requirement is satisfied. This does not, however, give the
agency carteblanche in making the determination. "Approximate original contour" does
have an inherent meaning, more fully embodied in the definition requiring the postmining site to "closely resemble [I the general configuration" of the land prior to
mining.... As [the agency director] admits, DEP is under a nondiscretionary obligation
to require the operator to restore the land to AOC if a variance is not requested and
approved.
54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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1. The Response ofIndustryand Regulatorsto the Revelation thatAOC
RequirementsHadBeen Ignoredfor Two Decades
Upon learning the results of the Gazette's study of DEP's systemic
violation of AOC permitting requirements, coal lobbyists at first admitted
that problems might exist. However, they insisted that only technical
matters were involved. The president of the West Virginia Coal Association
told the Gazette: "'It sounds like to me [like DEP] needs to take a look to
see if they meet all the requirements[.] ... Apparently, there are some issues
to be addressed, but they have little [to] do with environmental
compliance.'"244
An A.T. Massey public relations officer asserted, "'Massey Coal
companies have complied with the reclamation regulations[.]... On any
permit that does not include an AOC variance, the plans for reclaiming the
mine site meet state guidelines for AOC standards.'"245 David Todd, an Arch
Coal executive asserted, "'We have been applying for mining permits and
they have been reviewed by and granted by DEP, with oversight by
OSM[.]... That's got to be pretty fair evidence that [mountaintop removal
approved and operated according to and in compliance
mines] are being
24 6
with the law."
Roger Calhoun, supervisor of the OSM Charleston field office was
questioned at a press conference where he appeared with visiting OSM
Director Kathy Karpan.247 Calhoun maintained that DEP was not issuing
mountaintop removal permits without AOC variances.2 4 When later
confronted with a list of such permits, Calhoun said OSM would look into
the allegations.2 49 "'Maybe we should put the burden on the state to come up
with some criteria,'" Calhoun said. "'It's something we might want to tighten
enough attention to AOC and
down on. I don't think the state has paid
25 0
postmining land uses and configurations."

244 As igh As God Did, supra note 176 (quoting Bill Raney, President of the West Virginia
Coal Association).
245 Id (quoting Bill Marcum, spokesperson for A.T. Massey Coal).
246 Id (quoting David Todd, Vice President of Arch Coal).
247 Id.
248 Id OSM's

lack of knowledge concerning DEP's mountaintop removal permitting record is
not surprising given the fact that the coal industry-friendly Congress had "gutted" OSM's
oversight and enforcement budget and had "slashed" the agency's staff by one-third. Galuszka,
supra note 181, at 70.
249 As Hjgh As God Did, supra note 176. Like DEP, federal officials also had their excuses.
The Gazettds examination of government records revealed that high-ranking OSM officials had
"declined requests by their own inspectors for more concrete guidance on what constitutes
approximate original contour" and later had initiated a policy that made the term more vague.
Id In more than twenty years of federal oversight of DEP, OSM had never fully reviewed the
state's administration of AOC and mountaintop removal requirements when permitting mines.
Id
250

Id (quoting Roger Calhoun, OSM Charleston, W.Va. Office).
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2. A Promise Broken: Systemic Waiver of MountaintopRemoval
RequirementsNegate SMCRA 'sEconomic Development Goal
a. NewspaperInvestigationDisclosesAgency Misfeasance
The Gazette continued its investigation during the summer of 1998.251 It
examined the long-standing claims of coal industry advocates, government
regulators, and politicians who had championed mountaintop removal as an
economic development engine. In early August, the Gazette published a
devastating article documenting how SMCRA's promise of economic
development had been perverted by the West Virginia coal industry with the
acquiescence of state and federal regulators. 2
The Gazette found that for more than two decades, SMCRA's
mountaintop removal requirements had been consistently ignored by
regulators and coal operators.253 Coal companies had been allowed to flatten
mountains and dump hundreds of millions of cubic yards of "excess spoil" in
valleys obliterating hundreds of miles of headwater streams. Reporting from
a ridge above the Kanawha River near Charleston, West Virginia, Ken Ward
Jr. wrote:
Bullpush Mountain isn't a mountain anymore. It's a flat, grassy meadow that
stands out among the wooded hills along the Fayette-Kanawha County line.
More than 25 years ago, Cannelton Industries Inc. chopped the top off
Bullpush to get at the coal underneath. The operation, started in 1970, was the
first mountaintop removal mine in West Virginia.
Cannelton officials promised that if they flattened out the land, they could
more easily develop it. The company drew up plans to turn Bullpush into a
brand-new town, complete with churches, schools, shops and a hospital.
None of that ever happened. No schools. No churches or shopping centers.
Cattle don't graze anymore on the pasture where Bulpush Mountain used to be.
Hay isn't grown there, either.
Bullpush Mountain isn't alone. Across the Southern West Virginia
coalfields, mountaintop removal mining is turning tens of thousands of acres of
rugged hills and hollows-nobody knows how many-into flat pastures and
rolling hayfields.254
The story of "development" of Bullpush Mountain, flattened by early
mountaintop removal mining, is the tale of hollow promises, inflated
251 The Gazette investigation included a review of court records and thousands of pages of
permit documents. "Many of the state's largest mountaintop removal complexes were visited,
and industry experts were interviewed" in the course of the newspaper's study. Ken Ward Jr.,
Flattened, Most Mountaintop Mines Left as Pasture Land in State, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL
(Charleston, W.Va.), Aug. 9, 1998, at 1A [hereinafter Flattened],availableat 1998 WL 5967127.

252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. The few times operators sought and received the required AOC variances for
mountaintop removal mines, they had proposed little or no postmining development. Thirtyfour active and reclaimed mines had received AOC variances. Id. Of those, only one included a
plan for future development-a prison built by the state on a small mountaintop removal site in
Fayette County. Id.
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expectations, and flat out ies. In 1970, Cannelton insisted that the
postmining use of Bullpush Mountain would be "land development" and
obtained a permit under the state law applicable prior to the enactment of
SMCRA.2 55 Hundreds of thousands of tons of coal were stripped and the area
graded and seeded with grass. For a decade there was no development. In
1979, the county planning commission issued a report that said development
on the site was simply not feasible because of the absence of services and
256
utilities.
Nevertheless, only a year later Greenlands, a coal industry trade
association magazine, bragged of Bullpush Mountain's potential for
development. 257 The magazine included a map of the area, depicting "future
locations of a light industrial zone, residential areas, a downtown business
district, schools and a sewage treatment plant. 258 The promoters bragged
that the 2,000 acre area could become the site of a city with a population of
10,000 to 12,000.259 But just two years later, the coal operator amended its
Bulpush Mountain permit, pulling the plug on development plans. 260 State
regulators quickly approved the new postmining land use for Bullpush
261
Mountain-"pasture and hay lands."
Almost twenty years later, mountaintop removal proponents again were
boosting Bullpush as a prime target for development. In June 1998, West
Virginia officials, economic developers, and coal industry officials on a tour
of mountaintop removal sites praised what they saw at Bullpush-a scene
which had not changed during the almost thirty years since the ridge had
been flattened.26 2 According to the Gazette, former State Senator Tracy
Hylton, whose company had originally stripped and flattened Bullpush,
"gave a rousing defense of mountaintop removal." 263 Hylton attacked the
Gazette, saying, "'I'm sick and tired of all this that goes on in the newspaper
today[.] ... There is a need for flat land for development in West Virginia.
26 4
With mountaintop removal, we can get it.'"
The Gazette investigation examined far more than the false claims
made about development potential of the flattened Bullpush Mountain. Its
study found that over two decades, DEP had permitted more than fifty
square miles for mountaintop removal mines; the plans for "economic
development" at those mines were limited exclusively to pastures, hayfields,
255 Id
256 Id

257 Id Greenlandswas published by the West Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association.
258 Id
259
260
261
262
263

Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id

264 Id (quoting Tracy Hylton). In relating this event, the Gazettds Ken Ward Jr. observed the
obvious: "What nobody said during the DEP-sponsored tour ...was that people.., have tossed
ideas for Bullpush Mountain developments around for nearly 30 years-and none have
materialized." Id Today, five years after mine tour participants predicted that Bullpush
Mountain would soon sprout with new development, the grassy, flattened ridgetop still lies

fallow.
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forests, or range lands.265 In the thirty years since Buipush Mountain had
been "removed," not one West Virginia mountaintop removal permit has
included plans for a manufacturing or industrial plant.266 On the contrary,
the Gazette's investigation showed that the most popular land use proposed
for mountaintop removal sites was "fish and wildlife habitat." 26 Incredibly,
while "fish and wildlife habitat" was not a postmining land use recognized by
SMCRA, it accounted for almost one third of the total mountaintop removal
acreage permitted by DEP.2 s
b. The Response of Industry and Regulatorsto the Lack of Economic
Development
When confronted with the results of the Gazette's postmining land-use
investigation, the West Virginia Coal Association's President agreed there
had not been much development, but claimed it was not the fault of coal
operators. "'Are you going to have a Toyota plant at Wharncliffe, West
Virginia?"' Bill Raney asked. 269 Answering his own question, he said,
"'Probably not. But I don't think the law obligates the mining industry to put
up bricks and mortar. Our responsibility is to make sure the opportunity is
there."'2 70
The President of the West Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association
told the Gazette that SMCRA's requirements were outdated and "'too
stringent for today's large mountaintop removal mines.'"27 ' An official with
DEP's Office of Mining and Reclamation said that all the involved parties
needed to look at postmining uses: "'There's not a lot of pre-planning done in
terms of development[.]... There is a need for some long-term land use
planning considerations. It's hard for us to say what's going to be out there
and who is going to develop what and what the future holds.'"272

265 Id.
266 Id

267 Id. Of course, the land subjected to mountaintop removal mining had been wildlife
habitat before it was mined. At a deposition attended by the author in December 1998, a DEP
official was asked what kind of "fish" habitat had been created on the flattened mountaintops
where mountaintop removal is conducted. The official did not answer the question; he just
laughed.
268 The designation of "fish and wildlife habitat" as a postmining land use was one of the
targets of a citizen suit filed against DEP in July 1998, which alleged the agency had "established
a pattern and practice" of issuing mountaintop removal permits without required postmining
land use plans. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, Bragg v.
Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (No. 2:98-0636).
269 Flattened,supra note 251 (quoting Bill Raney, President, West Virginia Coal Association).
Wharncliffe is located in the heart of southern West Virginia's mountainous coalfields.
270 Id (quoting Bill Raney, President, West Virginia Coal Association).
271 Id (quoting Bill Greene, President, West Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association).
Mountaintop removal mines of the 1970s operated for about five years, thus reclamation was
not that far down the road. Id.(citing statement of Ben Greene, President, West Virginia Mining
and Reclamation Association). In contrast, a mountaintop removal mine today might continue
operations for fifteen or more years. Id
272 Id.(quoting John Ailes, DEP Office of Mining and Reclamation).
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E. JudicialRepiew.CoalfieldResidents Turn to the Courts
Contemporaneously with the media expos6 of DEP's bogus permitting
of mountaintop removal mines, eight coalfield residents living near valley
fills and a statewide environmental organization filed a SMCRA citizen suit
against DEP seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.273 In Bragg v.
274
Robertson (Bragg),
the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the Director of
DEP was violating his nondiscretionary duties under SMCRA in issuing
permits for mountaintop removal mines.275 More particularly, they alleged
that the Director consistently issued permits to mining operations without
making requisite findings that assured the restoration of original mountain
contours or, alternatively, economic development on flattened mountain
tops. 276 They asserted the Director violated his federal- and state-law duties
to "withhold approval of permit applications that are not complete and
accurate and in compliance with all requirements of the state and federal
2 77
program.
In the course of a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunctive relief, the United States District Court Judge, Charles H. Haden, II,
accepted the coal company intervenors' invitation to visit mountaintop
removal mines to see for himself how well mountaintop removal mines had
been reclaimed. The judge visited and flew over most of the mountaintop
removal sites in southern West Virginia, observing in a subsequent opinion:
The Court's helicopter flyover of all mountaintop removal sites in southern
West Virginia revealed the extent and permanence of environmental
degradation this type of mining produces. On February 26, the ground was
273

SMCRA's citizen suit provision provides:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person having an interest which
is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action on his own behalf to
compel compliance with this chapter... against the Secretary or the appropriate State
regulatory authority to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary or the appropriate State
regulatory authority to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Secretary or with the appropriate State regulatory authority.
30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2) (2000).
274 Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). Judge Charles H. Haden U
presided over the case. Appointed to the federal bench by Republican President Gerald Ford,
Judge Haden had family ties to the coal industry. Rudy Abramson, A Judge in Coal Country 20
APF REPORTER (2002), availableat
http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF2003/Abramson/Abramson.html. Some in the coal industry
believed that his conservative political background would bode ill for the coalfield citizen
plaintiffs. Id. Judge Haden, however, did not meet those expectations. See id ("Not since the
late U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson desegregated Alabama buses and schools and opened
voting booths to Mrican Americans in the 1950s and '60s has a federal judge confronted the
political and economic powers of his native state more conspicuously.").
275 Id at 638.
276 Id.at 639.
277 Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 661 (S.D.W. Va. 1999), rev'dsub nom. Bragg v. W.
Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
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covered with light snow, and mined sites were visible from miles away. The
sites stood out among the natural wooded ridges as huge white plateaus, and
the valley fills appeared as massive, artificially landscaped stair steps. Some
mine sites were twenty years old, yet tree growth was stunted or non-existent.
Compared to the thick hardwoods of surrounding undisturbed hills, the mine
sites appeared stark and barren and enormously different from the original
topography.27
In a later opinion in the same case, the court discussed the impacts of
mountaintop removal valley fills on the streams they bury:
When valley fills are permitted in intermittent and perennial streams, they
destroy those stream segments. The normal flow and gradient of the stream is
now buried under millions of cubic yards of excess spoil waste material, an
extremely adverse effect. If there are fish, they cannot migrate. If there is any
life form that cannot acclimate to life deep in a rubble pile, it is eliminated. No
effect on related environmental values is more adverse than obliteration. Under
a valley fill, the water quantity of the stream becomes zero. Because there is no
stream, there is no water quality.279
Ultimately, after first granting preliminary injunctive relief enjoining an
Arch Coal subsidiary from initiating mountaintop removal mining on what
was planned as the largest strip mine ever permitted in West Virginia, the
280
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction.
The scope of the injunction was narrow; it "enjoin[ed] the Director from
further violations of the nondiscretionary duties... and from approving any
further surface mining permits under current law that would authorize
placement of excess spoil in intermittent and perennial streams for the
primary purpose of waste disposal."21 The court explained that this
prospective and had no impact on permits that had
injunction was purely
22
issued.
been
already

54 F. Supp. 2d at 646. Judge Haden also visited Pigeonroost Hollow in which an
278 Br,
Arch Coal subsidiary planned to dump millions of cubic yards of mine spoil if the requested
injunction were denied. Judge Haden's examination of the stream that ran down though the
Hollow prompted the following additional observation:
If the forest canopy of Pigeonroost Hollow is leveled, exposing the stream to extreme
temperatures, and aquatic life is destroyed, these harms cannot be undone. If the forest
wildlife are driven away by the blasting, the noise, and the lack of safe nesting and eating
areas, they cannot be coaxed back. If the mountaintop is removed, even Hobet's
engineers will affirm that it cannot be reclaimed to its exact original contour.
Destruction of the unique topography of southern West Virginia, and of Pigeonroost
Hollow in particular, cannot be regarded as anything but permanent and irreversible.
Such harms cannot be remedied through the availability of damages.
Id.
279 Bragg, 72

280 Id at 663.
281 Id
282 Id

F. Supp. 2d at 661-62.
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Immediately, West Virginia's Governor, its congressional delegation,
coal industry lobbyists, and the UMWA leadership attacked the court's
decision. 23' Exhuming the well-worn jobs versus environment conflict, they
argued that the decision would cripple West Virginia's economy and reduce
mine production and jobs.2 4 The director of DEP announced that no new
permits for mountaintop removal mines would be granted.2 5 Coal
companies using mountaintop removal mining shut down their mines and
286
laid off all of their miners.
West Virginia's senior senator, Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), unsuccessfully
attempted to legislatively reverse the court's ruling, trying to attach a rider to
a major appropriations bill. 2 ' The industry and the UMWA launched an
expensive television and newspaper advertising campaign throughout the
state forecasting doom for the state's economy and the loss of thousands of
jobs.2 8s

283 See, e.g., id (discussing the reaction of then-Governor Cecil Underwood (R-W. Va.), who
proclaimed the State faced an economic crisis, instituted a government-wide hiring freeze, and
required all state agencies to slash their budgets by ten percent).
284 Ken Ward Jr., Mining Rdes May Be Tosse, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al,
available at 1999 WL 6752064. The statement of then-Governor Cecil Underwood (R-W. Va.)
provides an example of the hyperbole: "'October 20, 1999, will go down as the bleakest day in
the recent history of our state of West Virginia.'" Ken Ward Jr., Groups.- Ban Affects New
Permits-Judge's Ruling Should Not Stop Mining Allowed Under Current Permits,
EnvironmentalistsSay, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Oct. 23, 1999, at Al (quoting statement of Gov.
Cecil Underwood (R-W. Va.)), availableat 1999 WL 6752303.
285 Ken Ward Jr., Valley Flfl Aing Outlawed LandmarkRu ig ProhibitsMountaintop Coal
Opemtois from Burymg State Streamrs, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Oct. 21, 1999, at Al, available at
1999 WL 6751888.
286 Ken Ward Jr., More Mine Closures on Way, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 29, 1999, at Al,
availableat 1999 WL 6753444.
287 See Environmental Sneak Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at A22. ("The Byrd
amendment would in effect overturn a decision by a federal judge in West Virginia that found
the state's mining companies, with the complicity of the federal government, had for years
violated clean water and surface mining laws by dumping rock waste into valleys and
streams.").
288 One UMWA advertisement said:
The judge's decision has far-reaching effects. As a result, enormous concern over the
future of coal mining in the eastern coalfields has quickly spread. Both surface and
underground mining would be affected by the decision, as well as the entire economies
of the coal-producing communities and states themselves.
The judge's broad decision itself was uncompromising . . . ruling that most
mountaintop mining broke the law and must stop.
UMWA, An American Way of Life, DOMINION POST (Morgantown, W. Va.), Nov. 10, 1999, at 8-C
(second ellipsis original) (paid advertisement) (on file with author). A flyer circulated by the
UMWA proclaimed:
We're not the enemy. Yet we-and those we love-have become the casualties in a battle
we didn't even start.
Because of a recent court decision, 400 of us are about to lose our jobs. Four
hundred of us will have to tell our wives and husbands we can't afford groceries ... the
car payment ... clothes for the kids. Four hundred of us will have to try to erase the
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DEP and the coal companies predicted that the irunction would cause
serious economic harm. The district court replied that it was "in no
position... to take an informed measure of the harms predicted," and that
these predictions were based on "invective" and "irrational fears," observing
that:
[A] firestorm of reaction has come forth from Defendants and state government
officials, predicting that the Court's injunction will cause unprecedented
economic and social dislocation throughout West Virginia. These opinions are
echoed in the affidavits filed by Defendants supplementing their motions to
stay. The dire predictions are further bolstered by third party statements of
what the Court's Opinion holds. As noted, those "opinions" not originating with
the Court reflect, at best, misunderstandings and, at worst, egregious
misrepresentations, of significant portions of the ruling. Additionally, many
coal workers have been laid off . . . and the Governor has ordered State

budget-cut to accommodate a ten percent decrease in expected
government to
28 9
tax revenues.

Although it rejected industry and DEP assertions, the district court granted a
stay of the injunction pending appeal of its decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.29 ° In the spring of 2001, the Fourth

devastating fear of our children. Four hundred of us will no longer pay taxes... will no
longer have the spirit to support our community the way we do now.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA ET AL., WE'RE NOT THE ENEMY, WE'RE YouR NEIGHBORS
(ellipses original) (flyer on file with author). An Arch Coal, Inc. advertisement stated:
Mountaintop mines are vital to West Virginia... In some areas of West Virginia, the only
economical way to recover coal is from mountaintop mining. This method represents
2096 of the industry's current employment. The cold fact is that eliminatingor placinga

moratoriumon mountaintopmlning would resultin loss ofJobs andshuttingdown mines
and would be devastatingto many communities.
Arch Coal, Inc., To Most People, Coal Means Affordable Enery. But for 43,000 West Virginians,
It Means a Way of Life, DOMINION POST (Morgantown, W. Va), Sept. 23, 1998, at 3-B (emphasis
original) (paid advertisement) (on file with author).
289 Bragg v. Robertson, 190 F.R.D. 194,196 (S.D.W. Va 1999).
290 Id The court's terse opinion also observed that:
This Court is in no position to examine adequately the factual basis of these reactions so
as to take an informed measure of the harms predicted and weigh them in the balance of
equities required to adequately address the justice of issuing a stay at this time. The
Court, however, is able to understand that the shrill atmosphere of discord must subside
so that our Court of Appeals and this Court are able to address the crucially important
legal issues that formed the basis of the October 20 ruling and that shape the remainder
of the case calling for district court action.
In short, the Court believes it preferable to attempt to defuse invective and diminish
irrational fears so that reasoned decisions can be made with all deliberate speed, but
with distractions minimized.
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Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution barred the suit against the state.2 9'
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's reversal, evidence uncovered in
Bragg added to the accumulation of facts showing that coal industry
lobbyists, politicians, and government regulators had perverted SMCRA to
avoid meeting the economic development requirements attendant
mountaintop removal mining. Often working in concert, these forces
deprived coalfield communities of the economic development opportunities
promised by SMCRA, even as they continued to spew propaganda about the
need for flat land as a panacea that promised a new era of coalfield
economic prosperity.
From its inception, the story of SMCRA's administration and
enforcement is a tale of top federal and state officials ignoring their duty to
protect the coalfield environment and the rights of coalfield citizens from
coal operator excesses. Instead of embracing these duties, they chose to
manipulate the interpretation of the law to curry favor with those whom
they are required to regulate. In the process, decisions of OSM and state
regulators allowed coal companies to greatly expand the use of mountaintop
removal while avoiding the costs of compliance with SMCRA's strict
mountaintop removal requirements.292
V. COALFIELD ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE TAKES A NEW FORM
The inability or unwillingness of federal and state regulators to
interpret and enforce SMCRA to effectuate the Act's promise to protect
coalfield citizens and their property is not surprising. Indeed, as noted
above, Congress expected regulatory failure to occur when it emphasized
the historic tendencies of state governments to give short shrift to the
interests of coalfield citizens while protecting local coal industry interests.293
In light of this history, SMCRA contained two major components intended to
neutralize states' natural tendency to favor coal companies over
environmental protection and the rights of coalfield communities: 1) federal
oversight of state mining regulatory programs, and 2) citizen rights to
participate in the administration and enforcement of the Act. As discussed
above, OSM has proved to be woefully ineffective in policing state regulatory
programs, siding with the coal industry on many major issues.
The combined impacts of state and regulatory malfeasance and
misfeasance and coal industry chutzpah has left coalfield citizens alone to
fend off the incursions of property rights and environmental harm caused by
Bragg v. Robertson, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001).
292 This Essay focuses on the impacts of strip mining on the people and communities of the
central Appalachian coalfields. However, the failure of OSM and state regulatory agencies to
enforce SMCRA's mandate to limit the extensive damage caused by modem underground
longwall mining provides a corollary tale of betrayal of the law's promise to protect coalfield
communities and citizens. That story will be left to another day.
293 H.R. REP. No. 95-218, at 88-92 (noting the importance of citizen participation and that
environmental concerns often receive "short shrift" as compared to the economic interests of
the mining industry), reprintedin1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 539, 625-27.
291
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modem, high-extraction mining techniques such as mountaintop removal.
Thus, throughout the coalfields, citizens have organized at the grassroots
level in an effort to protect their own interests.294 Such organization would
appear to be essential if the coal industry juggernaut, aided by politicians
and regulators, is to be restrained from literally wiping out whole coalfield
communities.
At first blush, the specter of wholesale destruction of entire
communities might appear to some to be a gross exaggeration. It is not. The
very existence of some former coal camps presents an obstacle to corporate
plans to maximize the recovery of coal reserves and profits derived
therefrom. Such communities are quite literally "targeted" for elimination. As
discussed below, the evidence of such corporate plans and agency
acquiescence is well documented.
Equally well documented is the approach of many coal companies to
communities where elimination is not achievable-they simply carry on
mining-related activities as if their coalfield neighbors do not exist. Thus, the
corporate expectation, or at least the hope, is that communities will suffer in
silence the infringements of private property rights that would never be
tolerated in the upscale suburbs where most politicians, regulators, and coal
company managers live. Among the tools available to coalfield communities
for use in resisting the new wave of coal mining externalities are statutory
citizen suits and time-tested common law remedies.
Three themes run throughout this Section: 1) the paradox of a jobless
coal boom at the close of the twentieth century and the continued
joblessness and poverty of coalfield communities; 2) the impacts of coal
industry abuses and regulatory agency failures in the face of the highly
disruptive forms of modern, full-extraction mining operations; and 3) the
statutory and common law rights and remedies that hold out the promise of
bringing at least a small modicum of environmental justice to coalfield
citizens.

294 Throughout the nation's coal producing regions, grassroots citizen groups have
organized. The Citizens Coal Council (CCC) is an umbrella organization which assists coalfield
residents in communicating with each other and in pooling resources to address national
mining issues. In West Virginia, these include such grassroots organizations as Coal River
Mountain Watch, the West Virginia Organizing Project, and the Ohio Valley Environmental

Coalition. See generaly CITIZENS

COAL COUNCIL, WELCOME TO THE CITIZENS COAL COUNCIL, at

http://www.citizenscoalcouncil.org (last visited Feb. 22 2004). A perusal of CCC's member
organizations gives an indication of the scope of coalfield citizen activism. CITIZEN'S COAL
COUNCIL, CITIZEN'S COAL COUNCIL MEMBER GROUPS, at

http://www.citizenscoalcouncil.org/members.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004). CCC's member
organizations include many, but not all, of the grassroots groups that have been created at the
local level to deal with coal mining excesses and regulatory agency failures. Other statewide
citizen organizations like Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Save Our Cumberland Mountains
in Tennessee, and the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy have fought for coalfield
environmental, social, and econominc justice for decades.
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A. Paradoxin the Coalfields: CoalProductionBooms Wile New
Mining TechnologyAlters the Enironmentand the Economy Stagnates
The following discussion shifts the attention of this Essay to an
examination of the paradox of record coal production attendant expansion
of mountaintop removal mining operations and the reality of life in
Appalachian coalfield communities where that coal is being produced.295
Nowhere does the now century-old struggle of coalfield citizens for
environmental, economic, and social justice come into clearer focus than in
the former coal camp communities of southern West Virginia.
In an insightful op-ed piece, Dan Radmacher, former Charleston Gazette
editorial page editor, observed that coal-producing counties in West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Virginia are much poorer than coal-producing counties in
western states.2 96 Radmacher noted that in Mingo County, the heart of the
so-called "Billion Dollar Coalfields," the median household income is $12,000
less than the national average. 297 "Those left in McDowell County[, West
Virginia,]" Radmacher reported, "are surrounded by empty houses and
businesses, which has to be a psychological burden as well as a barrier to
298
economic development."
A recent "regional profile" published by a West Virginia business think
tank asked: "Are West Virginia's 'billion dollar coalfields' on the cusp of
change and economic development?" 299 The profile observes that "Today, a
large percentage of the coal mined in West Virginia is from strip [mining],
requiring fewer people. This means fewer jobs, lack of a well-planned
infrastructure for communities and an educational system that suffers from
all of these factors.""
The profile's author candidly admits what is obvious to the most casual
observer: "One of the most important things in courting corporations is to
have a strong infrastructure, including roads, sanitary systems, water,
airports and broadband cable, many are lacking here .... 3 1 On this point
R.W. Wilkinson, president of a coalfield bank, makes the point that "'every
business that looks to locate in any community expects that area to have
basic services available. This has been ignored for many years and is today
very expensive to develop.'" 302

295 While the expanded use of mountaintop removal mining has made a substantial
contribution to increased coal production, the other new technology-underground longwall
mining-is equally responsible for the jobless coal boom experienced in central Appalachia.
296 Dan Radmacher, The Curse of Coalk Out West, Counties Fare Better, SUNDAY GAZEIrEMAIL (Charleston, W. Va), June 10, 2001, at 1C, avalableat2001 WL 6672917.
297 Id
298 Id
299

Coalfield Conties Rich in Potential. Bank President Says Tourism Vital to Growth,

THE REAL WEST VIRGINIA FOUND., SUMMER 2002, at 6, available at
http://www.drwvfoundation.org/pdf/DiscoverSuminmer02.pdf.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 7.
302 Id at 7 (quoting R.W. Wilkinson, President, First Century Bank, Bluefield, W. Va.).
DISCOVER:
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While billions of dollars of coal have been extracted from West
Virginia's mountains, the coal industry's power has enabled it to funnel
much of the wealth generated by mining to out-of-state interests, leaving
little for the people whose labors produced that wealth. Historian John
Alexander Williams finds the paradox to be a theme of West Virginia
history.3 13 "In its repetitive cycle of boom and bust, its savage exploitation of
men and nature, in its seemingly endless series of disasters, the coal industry
has brought grief and hardship to all but a small proportion of the people
30 4
whose lives it has touched."
As West Virginia enters the twenty-first century, one might ask where
the money will come from to pay to catapult the coalfield infrastructure into
the new century and fund woefully under-funded school systems? Coal is the
only game in town, so to speak, and it is not hiring. Nor is it paying sufficient
taxes to support modernization of coalfield infrastructure or the dire need
for educational system improvements.
As Professor Williams observes, "Much of West Virginia's history has
revolved around a struggle for the state's resources" including "struggles
over the regulation and taxation of extractive industries" and challenges to
the control of natural resources by absentee corporate owners.3 °5 "The
enduring issue," he cogently argues, "is the extent to which the use of West
Virginia resources will be governed by considerations of local benefits and
needs. 3 6 As the following discussion reveals, politicians, the local elites, and
the coal industry continue to give short shrift to considerations of local
needs. Environmental, economic, and social justice in the coalfields remain
goals yet to be achieved.
B. TargetingCoafield Communities for Destruction
As mentioned above, some coal companies targeted for destruction
communities located near their mountaintop removal mines. The facts are
irrefutable, such corporate plans are not apocryphal-they exist and have
already been successful in eliminating some communities. Such plans find
their origin in a century of time-honored disdain many coal industry
managers have exhibited for miners, their families, and coalfield
communities.
Of course such plans are not publicized and are camouflaged by
corporate public relations specialists. The industry "PR" spin always seems
to revolve around the threat of job losses if a company is held to account for
operations which create nuisance conditions no middle-class community
303 WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY, supranote 103, at 200-03.

304 Id at 201. Williams identifies those few who have profited from coal: "There has been, of
course, a tiny elite of smaller producers and middlemen who grew rich from coal exploitation
although not as rich as the nonresident owners in whose shadow the local elite worked." Id
305 Id at 202. Absentee corporate ownership continues in West Virginia; one study reported
that at least two thirds of privately held land in the state, including most of the coal, is owned by
such entities. Id. at 202-03 (citing Tom D. Miller, Who Owns West Vrginia HUNTINGTON
HERALD-ADVERTISER & HERALD-DISPATCH, 1974, at 2).
306 Id at 202.
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would long endure. Nonetheless, evidence of such plans and tactics is not
difficult to find.
Michael Janofsky of the New York Times visited West Virginia in 1998
to investigate and in a front page article reported:
Dynamite explosions that cause flying rocks as well as cracks in walls and
ceilings far from the blast site are a constant problem for people living nearby.
They have caused many residents to accept buyouts from the coal companies,
who offer $100,000 and more for some homes. While the price may seem
generous, many residents say it barely compensates for the cost of moving to
new communities, finding new jobs and buying other homes.
But the difficult choice of enduring months of noise, dust and rocks or
is beyond
abandoning towns where relatives have lived for generations
30 7
reasonable for many residents of southern West Virginia.
Patricia Bragg lived in a former coal camp at Pigeon Creek in Mingo
County, West Virginia. Bragg told Janofsky that "'The bottom line, whether
they offer you a fair price or not, is why do I have to move?... As an
American, I can choose where I want to live. If I choose to live in a hollow,
call me a hick or a hillbilly, but that's where I want to live.' 3 8 At the time of
Janofsky's visit, 84-year-old Sylvia Weekley and her son James lived in
Pigeon Roost Hollow near Blair Mountain in Logan County." Janofsky
found that "for the Weekleys [a buyout was] no longer an issue. Unlike
dozens of their neighbors, they... refused all offers from Arch [Coal]. Even
in the face of thunderous blasting and a reconstructed valley that could
come within 300 feet of where they live, they have vowed to stick it out."3 1
James Weekley told the reporter, "'I'm not leaving[.] ... This is my home,
and they are destroying what God created. I'm beginning to know how the
they'll push
Indians felt, and I've told the coal companies that the only way
311
me out is with a bulldozer. I'm too old to change my life style.'"

307 Michael Janofsky, As Hits Fill Hollows, Some West Virginia Residents Are FightingKng

Coal,N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A24. The $100,000 buyout figure Janofsky reports is most likely
the amount offered to residents of former coal camps who have sued coal companies for
damages. As discussed below, companies typically make no offer to residents whose lives and
property is adversely impacted by mining activities, preferring to wait until residents come to
the company indicating that they cannot endure the conditions and would like to leave. The
usual scenario is a take it or leave it approach in which the resident has no bargaining power.
Moreover, because the conditions created by the mining are so bad, there is no market for a
home except to sell to the company at its nonnegotiable price. An example of this was the
purchase offer made to Monclo resident Maxine Bella by operators of the huge Dal-Tex
complex in Logan County, West Virginia An article by Charleston Gazette Reporter Robert J.
Byers reported that "Dal-Tex offered the Belias $20,000 for their house. After a letter appeared
in a local newspaper telling of the hardships that Monclo residents face, Mrs. Bella said the
company offered $57,500." Robert J. Byers, Dust Bad Now, Residents Say, Without New Mine,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 20, 1991, at C1.

" Janofsky, supranote 307 (quoting Patricia Bragg).
309 Id
310 Id.

311 Id (quoting Pigeon Roost resident James Weekley).
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In a public forum series held at the University of Charleston (West
Virginia) in the fall of 2003, Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship saw the
situation differently. "'If you do away with any mining method... you take
away jobs and the use of private property[.] ... without coal, communities
are devastated,"' Blankenship argued.3 12 The comments of coalfield activist
Julia Bonds of Coal River Mountain Watch put Blankenship's arguments into
perspective.313 Bonds and nine generations of her family had lived in Marfork
Hollow fifty miles from Charleston.3 14 Bond's family was the last to sell its
Marfork home to Massey Energy. 315 No one else remains but Massey and its
mining operation. Bonds related her experience with Massey:
Massey Coal [Company] moved in there around 1994. Now, I'm used to coal
mining-I'm from a coal mining family-but I was not prepared for what
Massey brought down on our heads in Marfork. The reserves they're mining
now are not the clean reserves they were mining in the '40s, '50s, and '60s.
These reserves create more waste than coal. The air pollution, the coal dust, is
unbearable in that little community. My grandson now has
asthma, and my
3 16
home and my neighbors homes were damaged by coal dust.
Bonds also told of the fish kills caused by Massey's mining in the stream
near the hollow: "'My family, for generations, has enjoyed that stream, but
we never went back in the river again. We also witnessed several black
water spills [of coal waste]. Those are so thick they're like pea soup, with big
chunks in it.'" 317 Summarizing her feelings, Bonds told an interviewer, "'That
was my home. Living in a hollow in West Virginia is unique. You feel so
protected, its so peaceful and quiet-until a mining company moves in, of
318
course. They were completely indifferent to the people that lived there.'"
Finally, after every other family in Marfork had moved, Bonds retained a
3 19
lawyer and negotiated the sale of her home to Massey.
Another example of a coal company carrying out plans to eliminate old
coal camp communities is Yolyn, located in Logan County, West Virginia,
312 Enviromuentalist, Massey

Exec Debate Mountaintop Removal,

DOMINION

POST

(Morgantown, W. Va), Oct. 29, 2003 (quoting Don Blankenship, CEO, Massey Energy), available
athttp://www.dominionpost.com/a/news/2003/10/29/an.
313 Julia Bonds was a 2003 recipient of the Goldman Prize, the world's premier award for
environmental activism. Michelle Nihuis, Coal Miner's Slaughter West Virginia ActIvist Julia
Bonds Takes On Mountaintop Removal Mining

GRIST, Apr.

14, 2003,

available at

http://gristmagazine.com/grist/maindish/bonds041403.asp.
314 Id.
315 Id

316 Id (quoting Julia Bonds) (modification in original).
317 Id (quoting Julia Bonds) (modification in original).
318 Id

319 Id Bonds's encounters with Massey Coal turned her into a community activist. She
articulates the feelings of many disempowered former coal camp residents who are faced with
the impacts of modem large-scale mining operations: "'Unless you live in the coalfield counties,
you don't understand the oppression people live under. This a mono-economy.., so we've had
to rely on it. If it blasts, oozes, or gushes, its done near poor, oppressed, rural communities or
minority communities. This is the dirty little secret that people are now speaking about.'" Id
(quoting Julia Bonds).
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about 12 miles from the town of Logan, the county seat. In summer of 1997,
Yolyn existed; by November of that year it was gone.3 2° Residents attribute
the destruction of their community to a nearby large mountaintop mine
operated by Arch Coal. 2' An account of what happened to Yolyn is posted
on a website dedicated to coalfield communities and their struggle for
environmental justice:
The demise of Yolyn seems to have begun at the end of June when a hard rain
fell in the area. Part of a valley fill about a mile beyond Yolyn collapsed into the
road. So much earth and rocks filled the road that state highway equipment
couldn't move it. The mine had to bring in its own larger shovels and trucks.
the slide.
The state Division of Environmental Protection issued a violation for
322
Several of the residents filed complaints. Lawsuits were threatened.
Shortly thereafter, the owner of the former company town began evicting its
residents.32 3 Many residents of Yolyn hold roots there extending back many
decades.
Yolyn was a community containing a mixture of old coal camp houses
and mobile homes.3 24 The land upon which the village was located was
owned by Dingess-Rum Land Co., one of the large landholding companies
325
that own thousands of acres of surface and coal in southern West Virginia.
Dingess-Rum owned many of the old camp houses. 326 "According to one
resident of nearby Chambers, the people who lived on Dingess-Rum
property had been promised they could stay there by the former manager of
the company."327 Yolyn residents relied on the promises of328 the former
manager, believing that they would always be able to live there.
Many Yolyn residents received some monetary compensation from the
land company, but many had difficulty finding affordable housing
elsewhere. 32 9 "After the residents moved out, the houses were burnt in

320 PENNY LOEB, YOLYN, at http://www.wvcoalfield.com/images/yolyn.htm (last visited Feb.
22, 2004). The www.wvcoalfield.com site contains information concerning the struggles of
many West Virginia coalfield residents and their attempts to deal with the impacts of large-scale
mountaintop removal and longwall mining operations in their midst. The site is updated
periodically. Included are postings relating to the following coalfield communities: Beech
Creek, Belva, Big Ugly, Blair, Buffalo Creek, Chambers, Clear Creek, Cowen, Cyclone,
Delbarton, Dingess, Duncan Fork, Erbacon, Foster, Francis Creek, Holden, Kayford Mountain,
Laurel Creek, Lick Creek, McGraws, Mate Creek, Marrowbone, Mud River, Pigeon Creek,
Ragland, Rawl, Riffe Brance, Seng Creek, Superior Bottom, Sylvester, 22 Mine Road, Varney,
Thacker, Wharncliffe, White Oak, and Yolyn. PENNY LOEB, THE COALFIELD COMMUNITIES OF
SOUTHERN WEST VIRGINIA, at http://www.wvcoalfields.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
321 LOEB, YOLYN, supra note 320.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id
325 Id
326 Id
327 Id
328 Id

Id. Dingess-Rum manager Greg Wooten claimed, "In Dehue Hollow alone, Dingess-Rum
spent over $200,000 assisting 84 families to relocate to the Rum Creek area. They spent another
329
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suspected arson fires."33 About every three nights during the early fall, fire
331
trucks would roar into the community.
In a January 11, 1998 letter to the editor of The Logan Banner, Jane
Dalrymple wrote about her experience of being evicted from her home in
Yolyn:
I am one of the many people who rented a home from Dingess-Rum properties
at Yolyn, that was forced to leave my home. [My] family has lived on Rum
Creek for as long as I can remember and has attended Bethel Chapel for over
50 years. [R]um Creek has always been a family-oriented community, where
our children were safe and happy.
The house we were renting was not falling down. My husband and I moved
into the house, laid rugs, and put in ceiling fans. The house we left was in better
shape than most of the houses we looked at to buy since our eviction notice.
We were not paid any money to help remodel the house when we moved
in, nor
332
were we paid for these renovations when we were forced to leave.
Dalrymple wrote emotionally of the impact of being forced from her home
and community:
These communities hold so many memories for us. Now [when] you drive up
Yolyn, you cannot even see where our homes had once been. [T]hese homes
were torn down as soon as we moved out. [S]ome were torn down before we
got all our personal belongings out.
The saddest part is that Dehue Church, Slagle Church, and our Bethel
Chapel are gone or will be destroyed. The only
thing left in this community are
333
a few lonely trailers waiting for a place to go.
The coal industry has long used the "jobs card" to frighten coalfield
communities. Whether it has been fighting UMWA organizing, fair taxation
of coal reserves, limitation on the weight of overloaded coal trucks, black
lung legislation, or mine safety and environmental regulation, this tactic has
resonated among a populace desperate for decent jobs at a living wage.
Thus, the industry and those who carry its water have achieved considerable
success in portraying the public policy choice as a stark one between jobs
and whatever measure has been proposed to advance broader public
interests.
$120,000 to assist 54 families." Letter from Greg Wooten, Dingess-Rum Land Company, to the
Editor of the Logan Banner [hereinafter Wooten Letter], available at LOEB, YOLYN, supra note
320.
330 LOEB, YOLYN, supra note 320.
331

Id

332 Letter from Jane Dalrymple, Monaville, W.Va., to the Editor of the Logan Banner(Jan. 18,
1998) [hereinafter Dalrymple Letter], availableatLOEB, YOLYN, supranote 320.
333

Id

See, e.g., Ken Ward Jr., Miners Pack Hearing To Support Strip Permit: Area Needs the
Jobs, UMW Member Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 6, 1998, at 1A (noting that the coal
334

company applying for a permit placed notices in employees' pay envelopes which read: "There
will be people [at an upcoming hearing] that don't want this permit issued[.]... They don't care
about your job. Please attend this hearing to show you support the future of our jobs here[.] ...
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Jane Dalrymple's letter to the editor reflects community peer pressures
grounded in the ever present fear of losing existing jobs. Like most coalfield
residents adversely impacted by coal company decisions, Dalrymple took
pains to make clear that she was a friend of coal; but, she concluded, "My
opinion of coal mining is changing."33 5
Dingess-Rum manager Greg Wooten responded to Dalrymple and other
critical letters that appeared in The Logan Banner, explaining that 'Just
because there were a few letters to the editor I really don't feel they
represent the majority. You are always going to have those that complain
when you are running a business."336 Wooten went on to explain that his
company had the legal right to evict families from the company houses: "By
allowing people to rent a house, in no way obligates this company to provide
them with housing forever."3 7 Wooten placed the blame squarely on the
people of the community: "It is true that some have lived on our properties
for many years, but that was their decision."'3
Marfork Hollow, Dehue, and Yolyn are but examples of the respect coal
company managers have for families still occupying old coal camp houses as
month-to-month tenants.33 9 As Greg Wooten argued, coal companies are well
within their legal rights to evict long-time residents and demolish
communities that have existed for a century. No question about it. 34 0
But, Yolyn and Dehue fall within the category of old coal camps where
the company houses were not sold to their occupants in the 1950s and 1960s,
but were retained and rented to the occupants. Because residents of such
communities pay rent and are essentially tenants at will, there are no legal
impediments and corporate owners may destroy these communities with
Encourage your family and friends to join you. Arrive early and get your 'I'm proud to work at
Dal-Tex' T-shirts while supplies last."), availableat 1998 WL 5949401.
335 Dalrymple Letter, supranote 332.
336 Wooten Letter, supra note 329.
337
338

Id.

Id.

339 See, e.g, Scope ofMassey Expansion Unclear,supra note 73 (describing the treatment of
month-to-month lease holders in Coon Hollow, W. Va.); LOEB, THE COALFIELD COMMUNITIES OF
SOUTHERN WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 320 (describing the plight of residents of 36 coalfield
communities).
340 However, just because a coal company has the legal right to destroy entire communities
in pursuit of maximization of profit does not mean that corporate managers have no choice in
the matter. No one held a gun on Dingess-Run's executives and ordered them to destroy Yolyn.
Although Dingess-Rum and its corporate parent, Massey Energy, control thousands of acres of
surface land and coal reserves near Yolyn and Dehue, no thought was likely given to simply
leaving some coal unmined in a buffer zone to protect those communities. Such an approach
would have meant slightly less profits-but no out of pocket expenses. Of course, to absentee
executives and corporate shareholders, those communities are simply obstacles to maximizing
profits and dividends. To them, human beings and communities are just as fungible as coal.
Moreover, if a corporate decision had been made to let these two small communities survive,
would not others similarly situated throughout the coalfields demand the same treatment? As
Massey Energy CEO Don Blackenship suggests, it is the coal industry's patriotic duty to mine
every ton of coal it can profitably reach. See Ken Ward Jr., Executive, Activist Debate Merits of
Coal, CHARLESTON GAzETTE, Oct. 29, 2003, at 11A (noting that Blankenship's favorite argument
is "that a healthy coal industry could keep the United States from fighting wars in the middle
east" and that coal "is the key to homeland security").
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impunity. But what of the houses no longer owned by "the company"-the
homes that had been purchased by miners? Surely, the uninitiated might say,
modem coal company managers will respect the rights of citizens who still
live in those communities.
Arch Coal, one of the nation's top coal producers, operates several huge
dragline mountaintop removal operations in the "billion dollar coalfields" of
southern West Virginia." When allegations were made that Arch's mining
operations had devastated former coal camp communities near one of its
largest mountaintop removal operations in Logan County, West Virginia the
company flatly denied the charges.
Arch spokesman David Todd assured a Washington Post reporter that
Arch was "'committed to protecting the environment and respecting West
Virginia's mountain heritage.' 34 2 Interviewed on the nationally televised ABC
News Nightline program, Todd told viewers that Arch Coal "continue[s] to
try to work with that community and to find ways to minimize our
However, Todd's statements were
temporary presence there."34
demonstrably at odds with reality. The following discussion reviews the
history of the conflict between the coal companies operating a huge
mountaintop removal complex near Blair Mountain in Logan County, West
Virginia and home owners residing in former coal camps located in the midst
of Arch's Dal-Tex operations.
C. MountaintopRemoval at BlairMountain:A Case Study of Environmental
Injustieein the Coatields34
1. The Dal-Tex Mountaintop Removal Complex andNeighboing
Communities
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, vast, strippable coal reserves were
purchased in the heart of the billion dollar coalfields of southern West
Virginia, and strip mining of these coal seams began in earnest. The people
of the old coal camps located near these mines began to feel the negative
effects of coal mining-without the benefits. The loss of thousands of coal
mining jobs during the previous three decades of industry decline was not
reversed. Rather, as coal production began to rise to record levels, mining

341 See ARCH COAL, INC., ABOUT Us: ARCH COAL OF WEST VIRGINIA (describing Arch Coal's
operations in West Virginia), at http://www.archcoal.com/aboutus/archofwestvirginia.asp (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
342 Joby Warrick, "MountaintopRemoval"Shakes Coal State: Cost ofProspezritylits Close to
Home, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1998, at Al (quoting David Todd, Vice President, Arch Coal, Inc.),
availableat 1998 WL 16552987.
343 Nightline: DiggingDeep, The Cost of Cheap Energy Removing Mountaintops to Mine for
Coal (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Nightline] (transcript on file with

author).
344 The Author represented several plaintiffs in litigation stemming from mining activities
around Blair Mountain. The settlement agreements to that litigation included confidentiality
agreements. Thus, the authority for this Section primarily comes from media accounts of the
events at Blair.
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jobs continued to be lost to a new era of mechanization in underground and
strip mining.
Communities located near these new, highly mechanized mines
experienced increased adverse impacts from larger and larger mines that
invaded the peace and solitude that they had begun to enjoy. Coal camp
residents struggled to maintain some semblance of normality as small
communities were engulfed in blasting vibrations, dust, noise, and flooding
emanating from mine operations."
In 1992, Ashland Coal, Inc. purchased Dal-Tex Coal Corp. and 22,000
acres of property near historic Blair Mountain, the site of the last battle of
the mine wars. 46 In the deal, Ashland paid $242 million for 220 million tons
of low-sulfur coal.4 Ashland Coal and Arch Mineral Corp. merged in 34July
8
1997, forming Arch Coal, Inc., one of the nation's biggest coal producers.
At the time of its 1992 purchase, Ashland Coal executives had big plans
for the Dal-Tex complex. Using high explosives and enormous equipment,
including giant, twenty-story-high crane-like draglines, huge rock trucks, and
gigantic bulldozers, these mines would apply state-of-the-art mountaintop
removal mining techniques to turn the huge tract into what would be one of
the largest contiguous mountaintop removal mines in Appalachian history.
First, as many as twenty coal seams underlying high mountain ridges
would be peeled off. Preceding the extraction of each seam, miners would
drill into underlying rock layers and insert explosives and then blast this
"overburden" apart.34 9 The fractured rock overburden, or "spoil," would then
be scraped off by the dragline bucket and dumped into the narrow valleys
running out from the main ridges. This process would be repeated as the
overburden of each coal seam was blasted apart, coal extracted, and spoil
dumped into valleys containing headwater streams. The extracted coal
would be hauled to coal stockpile areas and eventually loaded onto 120-car
coal trains on a track that ran through the small former coal camp of
Monclo.
As is typical in such large corporate acquisitions, before inking the DalTex acquisition, Ashland performed a "due diligence" evaluation to
345 See generallyLoeb,supra note 199.
346 Ken Ward Jr., Buying Blai, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Nov. 22, 1998

(heenafter ByingBlair] awailableat
http://www.wvgazette.com/static/series/mining/MNE1122.htrnl.
347 Id Included in the purchase were the vast coal reserves and several active Dal-Tex strip
and underground mines. The reserves and Dal-Tex mines were located in close proximity to a
number of small communities that had once been company towns. Blair, Sharples, Five-Block,
Monclo, and a dozen others were located up hollows adjacent to the acquired reserves and
along the narrow valley bottom through which West Virginia Route 17 runs from Madison, in
Boone County, to Logan, the county seat of Logan County-the same path taken by the army of
union miners as they marched toward Blair Mountain and the biggest of the West Virginia Mine
War battles. Id
348 Id.

349 Penny Loeb's U.S.News & World Reportarticle discussed the enormous blasts detonated
by mines located near former coal camps. "Blasts are made with the same mixture... used in
the bomb that killed 168 people in Oklahoma City [in 1995], but the mining explosions are 10 to
100 times stronger." Loeb, supranote 199, at 32.
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determine potential risks and costs attendant the property to be acquired.
Like the astute businessmen they were, Ashland executives had done their
homework. They knew that Dal-Tex's enlarged stripping operations had not
been well received by the residents of nearby former coal camps like
Monclo. Some families in Monclo had even filed lawsuits alleging that
mining operations had disrupted their lives.35
In 1991, Monclo residents had protested "choking" dust blowing from
the Dal-Tex mine complex into nearby communities.35' "Blasting, heavy
equipment operation and coal trucks leave a film of dust on the area that
reappears after every cleaning. Cases of asthma, allergies and bronchitis are
reported," said a newspaper article. 52 At the time, Dal-Tex's mine manager
attempted to minimize residents' complaints, asserting that "'At any facility
such as this one, dust and coal traffic are going to be issues[.] ... We work
around the clock to try to alleviate any of the problems that come up
concerning dust or trucks or any other community complaints.'"3 53
After their purchase, Ashland Coal officials immediately began to
expand the mine, according to United States Securities and Exchange
Commission financial disclosure statements. 354 The company spent millions
on bigger earth-moving equipment.3 55 To increase production in 1993, the
company began6 round the clock operations every day of the year at the Dal35
Tex complex.
2. Mountaintop Removal MiningImpacts Stir Community Resistance

People who lived near Dal-Tex felt the full impact of the transformation
of their quiet rural communities into the epicenter of a major industrial
complex. 35 7 Blair resident Tommy Moore described the dust as "'a constant
haze all the time.""' In a sworn statement, Moore said, "'I've seen times
350 BuyingBlai, supranote 346.
351 Byers, supranote 307.
352 Id

353 Id. (quoting Allen Workman, President, ACR Service Corp., the entity contracted by DalTex to manage the mine). However, one 62-year-old woman who had lived in Monclo for 26
years disagreed, telling the reporter that "'nobody will listen. Nobody will come and talk to you
about it.'" Id (quoting coal camp resident Reva Podunavacs). Mrs. Podunavacs told the reporter
they were fed up with the 24-hour a day coal truck traffic: "'I have grandkids, and I'd like to see
them married, not smashed on the road.'" Id (quoting Reva Podunavacs).
354 Buyng Blai, supranote 346.
355 Id
356 Id This schedule allowed Ashland to mine an additional one million tons of coal annually.
Id
357 In the early 1980s, before the Dal-Tex complex began to evolve, the small former coal
camp communities in the area were quiet and isolated, surrounded by a dense second growth
deciduous hardwood forest. One resident recalled what it had been like in Monclo before the
transformation: "'This was a beautiful hollow when we came here twenty years ago[.]... There
was just one small tipple down there [at the bottom of the hollow] and the railroad, which had
trains running through a couple of times a week.'" Byers, supra note 307 (quoting Lorean
Stollings, resident of Monclo, W. Va).
358 Ken Ward Jr., State, Firms Slow to Correct Dust, Blasting Problems, Records Show,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1998, at IA [hereinafter State, Firms Slow to Correct Dust,
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where vehicles driving down the road would have to turn on headlights
during the day.'"359 Brenda Rollins told a state administrative board that:
Every day it's blast and it's blast it's blast and it's dust and it's dust.... I'm a
nurse. I see people with... asthma. [Victoria Moore's] son has allergies. I see

people come in with these. And I know by looking in the community that this
dust is affecting everybody in the community.... The elderly, we have lots36of
0
elderly people that live in our community, and it is affecting them drastically.
Those affected by the blasting and dust did not find speedy help from
either the state or the coal company.36 ' Five Block resident Victoria Moore
explained the "runaround" she received from State regulators on a day when
she sought to report heavy dust coming off the mine:
I called the air quality people and they put me in touch with Jeff Hancock. And
he couldn't tell me nothing, so he told me to call abandoned mines and
reclamation. Well, I couldn't get nothing done there, so I called back at fourforty-five and they told me to talk to James Robertson. And he took my
complaint and they said that they would get in touch with the DEP in Logan
and, you know, find out more about it. I've never heard nothing from the air
control people. And what [DEP officials] told me is... there is no law about
how much [dust] can come down into a community from blasting from a
362
mine.
DEP officials bemoaned the fact that agency inspectors could never seem to
be able to get to the Blair area in time to observe the dust coming off the
mine. Without actually seeing the dust blowing from the mine, DEP claimed
an inability. to take enforcement action.36 For its part, the company
repeatedly pointed to steps it was taking to protect Blair residents from
mine blasting.3 64
Residents of the former coal camps near the Dal-Tex complex rejected
mine manager excuses. State regulators' repeated refusals to take
enforcement action to curtail the impact of mining operations on their
communities were rendered untenable by the outraged residents who
effectively used home video equipment to document what they were
Blasting Problems] (quoting Tommy Moore, resident of Blair, W. Va.), availableat 1998 WL
5982779.
359 Id. (quoting Deposition of Tommy Moore in his lawsuit against Arch Coal, Inc. for
nuisance).
360 Transcript of Proceedings at 66-67, Dal-Tex Coal Co. v. Div. Envtl. Prot., Appeal No. 96-6SMB (W. Va Surface Mine Bd. April 4, 1996). At the same Surface Mine Board hearing, Victoria
Moore testified about the dust: "You can feel it on your skin. You can feel it in your eyes.... If
you go out and stand in the yard it's falling, you can feel [it] becoming hard[er] to breathe. It's
on your cars. You can see it on your porch." Id at 22.
361 State, FkirsSlow to CorrectDus4 BlastingProblems,supranote 358.
362 Transcript of Proceedings at 12-13, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB).
363 See id at 27 ("[Wle can't be there all the time.... They shoot probably four blasts every
day.") (statement of Darcy White, DEP Environmental Supervisor before the West Virginia
Surface Mine Board).
364 State, FlrmsSlow to CorrectDus4 BlastingProblems,supranote 358.
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with irrefutable video evidence, local residents
experiencing. 365 Armed
366
demanded action.
Finally responding to unrelenting pressure from local residents, state
inspectors issued four notices of violation (NOVs) to the company for its
fugitive dust emissions.367 The company appealed the NOVs to the state's
Surface Mine Board (SMB).366 The coal company's defense was that "DEP
inspectors could not prove that Dal-Tex violated any legal dust limits." 360 But

before SMB could reach the merits, the company and DEP secretly
negotiated a consent settlement agreement. The settlement required the
coal company to pay a $2,000 fine every time company-installed dust
monitors detected dust in excess of specified limits.3 7'
A hearing was held for purposes of submitting the agreement to SMB
for its approval. Appearing without counsel in front of SMB, citizen
intervenors picked apart the agreement, raising numerous questions about
the limits it placed on dust emissions and how its terms would be
implemented by DEP.3 72 The citizens zeroed in on the provision of the
agreement that seemed to tie DEP's hands and prevent it from taking
alternate enforcement action in the event the company failed to achieve
3 73
abatement.

365 Parts of videotapes taken by Blair residents were shown on ABC's Nightlineon April 22,
1998. The video clips confirmed Moore's statement, showing vehicles moving slowly through air
thick with dust along West Virginia Highway 17. The video also showed that the dust permeated
the air to such a degree that a man standing on his front porch could not see a neighbor's home
located only a few hundred feet away.
366 In a two-year period, Blair residents filed 200 complaints with DEP about dust and
blasting problems at the mine. State, Firms Slow to CorrectDust,Blasting Problems,supra note
358. Victoria Moore testified at a state Surface Mine Board hearing that the dust was not "a one
time thing. This is every day. We can take videos for them and show them .... But [DEP
inspectors are] saying it ain't doing this, you know, we can't look at them. We can show them it
is every day. If it's not in the afternoon, it will be in the evening." Transcript of Proceedings at
33, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB). Interestingly, the residents' videotapes recorded
dust falling on their homes at all hours of the day and night. Much of the dust could be seen on
the videos coming from the dragline, huge trucks, shovels, and loaders used as part of the
mine's mountaintop removal operation. Thus, the heavy dust failing on adjacent communities
had many sources in addition to blasting. The audio portion of the videos also documented the
constant, loud noises of the mine's giant machinery and bright lights from the dragline flooding
nearby residences throughout the night. Copies of the videotapes are on file with the author.
367 Transcript of Proceedings at 26, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB).
368 SMB is an administrative body created to hear appeals from final decisions of DEP. SMB
conducts formal adjudication and the scope of its review is de novo. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §
22B-1-7 (Michie 2002) (setting forth procedures for appeal to the SMB).
369 State, Fins

Slow to CorrectDus4 BlastingProblems,supranote 358.

370 Once the agency and the company agreed on the basic terms of the agreement, the draft
document was released to the citizen intervenors. The intervenors were permitted to comment
on the agreement at the time it was presented to SMB for approval. Transcript of Proceedings at
4, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB).
371 State,Firms Slow to CorrectDust, BlastingProblems,supranote 358.
372 Transcript of Proceedings at 7-8,10-12, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB).
373 Id at 56. See dfha note 379 for a discussion of alternative enforcement actions to civil
penalties under West Virginia law.
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One SMB member echoed the citizens' concerns, asking, "Why does the
State agree that [the company] can willfully exceed the dust emission
limits?"374 After receiving unsatisfactory responses from DEP and company
representatives, he expressed the concern that the company might conduct a
cost-benefit analysis and conclude that the benefits of unchecked blasting
375
might outweigh the costs of any future fines.
Dismissing this concern, SMB approved the settlement over the
objection of the citizen intervenors.3 6 Subsequently, the company's dust
monitors repeatedly identified violations of the agreement's numerical
emission limits.3 77 The company was obliged to pay fines totaling tens of
thousands of dollars.378 DEP took no alternative enforcement action despite
379
these repeated violations.

374 Transcript of Proceedings at 57, Dal-Tex Coal Co. (Appeal No. 96-6-SMB) (statement of
SMB Member Thomas Michael). At that point an interesting colloquy occurred between SMB
Member Thomas Michael, DEP Attorney Jay Lazell, and DEP Environmental Supervisor Darcy
White:
MS. WHITE:
MR. LAZELL:
MR. MICHAEL:
MS. WHITE:

MR. MICHAEL:

They can't willfully exceed the dust emission limits.
No, they can't.
Well, they can too. They'll get an NOV for it and pay two-thousand
dollars, but that's the end of it.
This paragraph is written, I believe, to say that so long as [the
company] continues the practices of working with the DEP and
trying new techniques and monitoring the dust and analyzing the
data and working in conjunction with our inspectors, if they
continue to try those new practices in blasting shots, then we
agree that their negligence is not ...willful or unwarranted.
Well, that sounds good, but that's not what it says.
What it says is they can violate the standard and pay two-thousand
dollars and get an NOV and it will never be considered willful.

Id
375 Id at 61.
376 Id.at 85-86.
377 See State, Fims Slow to Correct Dust BlastingProblems, supra note 358 ("In 1996 and

1997... DEP inspectors cited the mine 56 times for violating the settlement agreement.").
378 In 1998, an engineer at the mine asserted "that he believed the citizen's complaints were,
a method to maneuver the regulatory agencies into putting leverage on the companies. Well,
the regulatory agencies are sensitive, and I think a political body, and they are subject to
outside pressure ....
'"Id (quoting John McDaniel, Chief Engineer for Hobet Mining). Copies of
the notices of violation are on file with the author.
379 Under SMCRA and its state counterpart, the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and
Reclamation Act, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to 22-3-32 (Michie 2002) (WVSCMRA), regulatory
agencies possess a variety of enforcement tools in addition to the civil penalty remedy
exclusively used by DEP against the Dal-Tex mine. When monetary fines proved ineffective in
persuading the company to utilize effective dust abatement measures, DEP could have sought
injunctive relief, id § 22-3-17(j), suspended the applicable mining permits, id § 22-3-17(b), or
even filed criminal charges against the company and company managers responsible for
insuring compliance with the WVSCMRA. Id § 22-3-17(g). DEP's failure to utilize such
alternatives is not unusual. These available law enforcement techniques are seldom used by
OSM or the state regulatory agencies in the Appalachian coal fields.
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Company officials were not happy with this turn of events. In 1997, the
company appealed the penalties to SMB.38 0 Company lawyers from the
largest and most influential defense firm in West Virginia admitted that the
company's own monitoring data had documented large amounts of airborne
matter.38 1 But, they argued, the detected material did not come from the
company's mining operations.8 2
Terah Burdette, who ran the coal company's monitoring program,
testified before SMB that "the company monitored all materials in the air,
not just dust from the mine."' She told the panel that the bulk of what the
company's monitors had detected was actually naturally occurring
material. 38 She testified that the company had run highly sophisticated
electron spectrographic analyses. Those analyses had detected
'carbonaceous materials," which she said were simply pollen and mold
spores. 385 According to Burdette, when this biological material was deducted
from the total dust reading, the dust levels were in compliance with the
limits set in the settlement agreement. 36 Thus, Arch Coal's lawyer argued,
there had been no violations of the settlement agreement and no fines
should have been imposed. 37
However, once again SMB never ruled on the merits. Without
explanation, the coal company dropped the appeal. 38
3. NationalAttention Is Drawn to MountaintopRemoval Mining atBlair
Mountain
While residents of Blair were fighting DEP and the operator of the DalTex complex in SMB proceedings in 1996 and 1997, the operators of the DalTex complex were carrying out a surreptitious plan. Throughout the period
from 1992 to 1997, Ashland and its successor were buying the homes of Blair
residents.
Sales of Blair homes to the Dal-Tex operators drew significant national
media attention.38 9 In a September 1997 article in U.S. News and World
Report, journalist Penny Loeb wrote, "The mining operation has bombarded
the houses below with dust, noise, and occasional rocks."39 0 Loeb reported
380 State, FirmsSlow to CorrectDus4 BlastingProblems. supra note 358.
381 Id
382 Id.

383 Id
384 Id. In an interview in late 1998, Arch Coal Vice President David Todd admitted, "'We had

some dust problems, absolutely[.] ... We've tried damned hard to fix them.'" Id (quoting David
Todd, Vice President of Arch Coal). However, in a deposition earlier that year, the blasting
supervisor at the mine confessed that management never let him know when they were cited
for problems, and thus he was unable to make adjustments in his blasting methods. Id.
385 Id.
386 Id

387 Id.
388 Id

389 See, e.g., Loeb, supm note 199, at 26-36 (reporting on the events in Blair in a national
news magazine).
390 Id at 28.
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that "rather than fight constant complaints from homeowners, Arch Coal
Inc., the mine's owner, had bought more than half of the 231 houses in
Blair."39' The houses were "[v]acated and quickly stripped" and more than 24
homes were burned.392
Loeb's article was critical of both coal operators and the regulatory
agencies. Arch Coal and industry lobbyists responded quickly and furiously.
Arch Coal President and CEO Steven F. Leer wrote to Loeb's editors
asserting that Loeb had
"strung together a handful of isolated incidents and portrayed them as a pattern
of abuse.... The reality is this: Coal mining is carried out in close proximity to
hundreds of communities in Central Appalachia.... With few exceptions this
mining is conducted in a careful, safe and responsible manner, and with the full
393
support of the communities in which it is carried out."
National Mining Association President Richard Lawson joined a chorus
of industry criticism of Loeb's reporting, declaring it "'an insult to the mining
industry and the hundreds of dedicated federal and state mine
inspectors.' 394 Lawson continued, "'By drawing upon a handful of isolated
incidents, you reach several very general and incorrect conclusions .... After
mining, the law requires land restoration to either premining or better uses,
which the industry and its highly skilled workforce have accomplished with
39
the reclamation of millions of acres.'" 1
4. FactsEmerge About the Coal Company's Planfor "Working with the
Community to Minimize Its TemporaryPresence There" When Citizens
Seek Relief in Court
Victoria and Tommy Moore and their two young children, aged four and
nine, lived in a mobile home located next to West Virginia Route 17 in Five
Block, a small former coal camp close to Blair and the center of Arch Coal's
Dal-Tex complex in Monclo.39' In 1994, they began to feel the impacts of the
enlarged mountaintop removal mining operation at the nearby Dal-Tex
complex. In 1996, Arch Coal's twenty-story-tall dragline appeared on a
nearby ridgeline towering above their small home. The mining operations
391 Id.
392 Id
393 Strip-MiningBattle Resurfaces, supra note 204 (quoting Steven F. Leer, President and
CEO of Arch Coal, Inc.).
394 Id. (quoting Richard Lawson, President of the National Mining Association).
395 Id (quoting Richard Lawson, President of the National Mining Association). Interviewed
a month after Loeb's controversial article appeared, then-Governor Cecil Underwood (R-W. Va.)
told the Gazette's Ken Ward Jr., that he had not had time to read the article. Id. Underwood did
offer his general opinion of strip mining, returning to the same two decades old theme that coal
industry cheerleaders continue to rely upon: "My view of mountaintop removal is it creates a lot
of artificially flat land in places we don't have flat land.'" Id. (quoting then-Governor Cecil
Underwood (R-W. Va.)).
396 The author was part of the legal team representing the Moores in their legal struggles
with the Dal-Tex mine operators.
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moved down the ridge blasting it apart. For several years the Moore's home
was constantly inundated with thick layers of dust blown down from the
Dal-Tex complex.
The Moores were outraged by the nearby blasts that rattled their
windows and rocked their home. 39 7 The Moores' nine-year-old son, Justin,
suffered from asthma and was being treated by a respiratory specialist. They
saw their son's asthma grow worse in the pervasive dust.398 In a deposition
in 1998, Victoria Moore said, "'If you were inside, it interrupted your life. If
you were outside, it interrupted your life.'" 399 "'I couldn't sit on my porch
without getting dust on me.... I couldn't even walk in my grass. I couldn't
get in my car. I couldn't even let my kids go out and play without the
400
dust.'
All around their home and up and down West Virginia Route 17 there
were vacant houses of neighbors, most of whom had sold their property to
the coal company. Investigative journalist Ken Ward Jr. researched the
county real estate records in Logan County and discovered that in the fiveyear period between 1993 and 1998, affiliates of the operator of the Dal-Tex
mine had purchased more than 200 properties in that county.40 ' In the Blair
area alone, Ward discovered that the coal operator had spent at least $6
42
million to acquire properties. 1
As Penny Loeb reported, many of the homes near the Moores had been
purchased by the company and had mysteriously been burned to the
ground.403 Many who remained in the community suspected that Arch had
arranged to have their own buildings torched. Arch Coal blamed arsonists
for torching the homes, disclaiming any knowledge of the responsible
parties. 0 Whether or not the coal company was behind the burnings, it did
little to clean up the charred remains. The communities located along Route
17 and up the hollows radiating from the main highway were littered with
dozens of the burned hulks of what once were part of former thriving coal
camp communities. It was not until Loeb's article appeared that Arch made
any real effort to begin removing the mess left in the community by the
fires.

405

397 BuyingBlai supranote 346.
398 Id.

399 Id.(quoting deposition of Victoria Moore).
400 Id.(quoting deposition of Victoria Moore).
401 Id
402 Id.

403 Loeb, supranote 199, at 28.
404 While visiting the nearby town of Monclo, West Virginia, in 1992, the author interviewed
agents of Arch Coal's predecessor, Dal-Tex, Inc., who were burning homes the company had
purchased there from local residents. Curiously, although Arch Coal's Arc Land Company
subsidiary had paid a substantial amount of money for the Blair homes, company officials
admitted that it made no attempt to protect the homes from the "arsonists"-choosing to simply
lock the doors as the only security measure. The company never assigned any of the full-time
security guards who worked at the mine to monitor the purchased homes, although the homes
were no more than a few minutes drive away from the company's offices.
405 The charred remains of the home of the Moores' nearest neighbor, located less than fifty
feet away, were left there by the company for four years and still had not been removed more
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In April 1998, ABC News's Nightline prominently displayed the burned
ruble of what remained of the homes Arch had purchased in the
communities near Dal-Tex. 40 6 David Todd, Arch Coal's Vice President for
external relations, assured the Nightline audience that his company knew
nothing of the cause of the fires and was "work[ing] with [that] community
4 7
... to minimize [its] temporary presence" at its Dal Tex complex. "
Arch Coal land agents offered what the Moores believed was an
inadequate amount to purchase their property. They viewed Arch's offer as
little short of extortion. Unwilling to accept Arch's offer, the Moores filed
suit against the mine operator, disputing its claims of community
cooperation. 4 8 The complaint set forth allegations of what the Moore family
had experienced while living within several hundred yards of Arch's
mammoth mountaintop removal mining operation. The Moores sought
injunctive relief and compensatory damages for harm caused by the huge
mountaintop removal operation located close to their home. 4 9 In the course
of four short months of discovery in the case, Arch Coal's public relations
veneer was peeled away and a quite different picture emerged from the
mouths of Arch's own executives and employees.
5. A Planfor "Working with the Community"Is Developed at the Beginning
Before its 1992 acquisition of the Dal-Tex complex and its vast coal
reserves, Arch Coal predecessor Ashland Coal ordered its land agents to
study the mine and the residential communities upon which it would have an
impact.410 In his deposition, Terrence Irons, a land agent for an Arch Coal
subsidiary, said, "'When we look at a corporation, we look at their mining
operations, we look to see how many properties we think we may need in
our mining operation, and also homes that could be impacted by those
mining operations.'"4 '
Ashland managers knew that Dal-Tex had already turned nearby
Monclo into a huge industrial mining, trucking, and railroad complex. In the
process, Dal-Tex had created conditions so bad that most Monclo families

than a year after Loeb's article appeared in US.News & WorldReport
406 Nilhtline,supranote 343.
407 Id. Hewing to the same theme, in 1998 Arch Coal conducted "a massive public relations
campaign to promote itself as a good corporate neighbor to the communities where it operates."
Buying Blair, supranote 346. That campaign purchased expensive full-page ads in many of the
state's newspapers, proclaiming: "'Responsible mountaintop mining: It's good for West Virginia,
and it's the right thing to do.'" Id (quoting Arch Coal newspaper ads).
408 First Amended Complaint, Moore v. Hobet Mining, Inc., No. 97-C-266-0 (Cir. Ct. Logan
County, W.Va- July 1998) (on file with author).
409 Id. at 18-19. In addition to claims under the WVSCMRA's citizen suit provision, the
complaint contained common law trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability counts. Id
at 10-14. The author of this Essay was one of three lawyers representing the Moores in the
action. He took more than a dozen depositions of Arch Coal executives and employees in the
discovery phase of the case.
410 BuyingfBlair,supra note 346.
411 Id (quoting Terrence Irons, land agent with Arc Land Company).
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had left-voluntarily or involuntarily.4 12 When Ashland bought Dal-Tex in
1992, the little village was well on its way to extinction. By the time of the
merger of Ashland Coal and Arch Mineral several years later, Monclo ceased
to exist; most of the homes had been burned and bulldozed. The few homes
left standing had been purchased by and were being used by Dal-Tex or its
413
employees.
Ashland Coal executives developed a plan to deal with the former coal
camp communities and those who lived there: "buy out nearby residents so
4 14
there would be no one left to complain about blasting, dust and flyrock."
Company land agent Irons stated in his deposition, "'When we were
purchasing Dal-Tex, there was some concern expressed that there were
homes that would be close to the mining and that there was potential for
dust problems and there probably would be blasting complaints.'" ' Because
under both SMCRA and the corresponding state law, coal companies are
prohibited from mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling without a
waiver,4 16 Ashland decided to buy all of the homes within 300 feet of any
417
active or future mining site.
In his deposition, Irons stated that the company was concerned about
homes located beyond the 300 foot limit. 418 Thus, on September 18, 1992,
company officials sat down with a topographical map they titled "Target
Acquisition Areas" and drew circles around homes the company needed to
purchase to make way for mining.419 Irons described these homes as
belonging to "'people living within proximity of the mining area who might
420
not like living close to a mining operation."
Company executives, after reading Irons's report, directed land agents
to buyout the residents. 42 1 But what was odd about the company's plan was
that land agents were not sent out into the nearby communities with offers
to buy homes and land (except to those within the 300 foot limit). Instead,
the company ratcheted up the intensity of its strip mining operations.
Typically, at Dal-Tex no offer was made to buy residents whose lives and
property had been adversely impacted by mining activities. Company

412 See Byers, supra note 307 (describing the mine's impacts on Monclo and the mining
company's purchase, and subsequent destruction, of Monclo homes). In conversations in 1992
with Monclo residents including Willie and Lorean Stollings, the author was told that some
homeowners had sold their properties to Dal-Tex; others, especially elderly people, simply
moved in with relatives who lived elsewhere, leaving their homes vacant. In any event, anyone

looking at residential property in Monclo in the early 1990s would have quickly discerned that
because Dal-Tex had constructed a huge industrial mining complex within and surrounding the
town, there would be no buyers for the homes other than the coal company.
413 Personal observations of the author.
414 BuyngBla,; supranote 346.
415 Id (quoting deposition of Terrence Irons).
416 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-22(d)(4) (Michie 2002).
417 BuyingBlai, supra note 346.
418 Id
419 Id.

420 Id (quoting deposition of Terrence Irons).
421 Id.
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managers preferred to wait until residents came to the company indicating
that they could not endure the conditions and would like to leave.
6. Option to PurchaseAgreements
When homeowners like the Moores got fed up with the conditions
created by mining operations, some would approach the company asking to
be bought out.4 22 Such visits set the stage for the company to execute the

next step in its target acquisition plan. Company land agents would respond,
telling the anxious home owners that the company would pay them the "fair
market value" of their property based on an appraisal. The promise of a
buyout at fair market value was, however, illusory because the conditions
created by the mining were inimical to residential living-there was no
market for the homes except to sell to the company.42 In most cases, neither
the price nor the terms of such deals were negotiable.
Company land agent James Stephens testified in his deposition that the
company required sellers to sign a five-page "Option to Purchase"
agreement. 42 4 The terms of that agreement clearly reveal the "end game" of
the company's target acquisition plan. In return for the sale of a home and
surrounding property, families were required to promise to leave their
homeplaces-former coal camps in hollows that had been home to some for
generations.

425

The agreement identified eleven communities and eleven hollows from
the crest of Blair Mountain to the boundary between Boone and Logan
Counties at Clothier that would be off-limits to the sellers for the rest of
their lives. 426 According to the proffered agreement, they could neither live
in nor purchase property anywhere within the designated area that bordered
the company's vast 22,000 acre coal reserve. 42 7 In his deposition, company
land agent Ron Vermillion said, "'If we buy somebody in Blair, obviously we
don't want them moving back to Blair[.] ...We wouldn't buy them in the
first place if they were going to move right back to Blair. '"428 His colleague,

422 Id. (citing deposition of Terrence Irons). Some people, more often than not elderly
residents that had lived their whole lives in a particular hollow, did not have the energy or the
courage to seek out company managers to ask for the favor of a buyout. For many coalfield
residents who have known the power of "King Coal" their whole lives, a visit to coal company

offices to ask a "favor" of the company is a daunting, even frightening task. If there is one
expression that characterizes the attitude of elderly coalfield residents who have lived the
history of the coal camps it is that "you can't fight the coal company." Thus, of those who did
not approach the company seeking a buyout, most were elderly or infirm.
423 See i. ("'Anyone would have to say that market is controlled by the desirability of living
in the neighborhood, and the desirability [of the Blair neighborhood] has been diminished [by
the proximity to the mine.]'" (quoting deposition of mining company land appraiser Ronna

Hatfield)).
Id (citing deposition of James Stephens).
425 Id
424

426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id (quoting

deposition of land agent Ron Vermillion). The seller paid no additional
consideration to the buyer for the seller's promise to adhere to the ban.
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James Stephens, testified, "'The problem is you relocate one person and he
moves right back in... eventually you end up buying them twice.'"429
The lifetime ban on living near the mine was not the only nonnegotiable
condition the company placed on the purchase of a resident's home. Sellers
also had to agree to give up their right to speak out against strip mining and
take back prior protests.43 The Option to Purchase agreement stated that
the seller "'will withdraw any permit protests or citizen complaints which
they may have filed related to the mining permits or applications for such
permits of Dal-Tex Coal Corporation... and that they will not file any
further permit protests or citizen complaints in the future. "431
To effectuate this goal, Stephens and other company land agents
provided the sellers with a form letter to send to DEP.43 2 The letter put DEP
on notice that the person whose signature appeared at the bottom desired to
drop all complaints he or she had filed. a In his deposition, land agent
Terrence Irons explained that the relocation ban and the protest-revocation
requirement worked hand in hand: "'That's the primary reason that we don't
want anybody back in there, is because citizens have the right to protest
mining permits. Some citizens protest whether they are impacted or not.'"'
Interviews with numerous residents who signed the Option to Purchase
agreements revealed that they felt honor-bound by its terms, which they
naively believed were legally enforceable. Those knowledgeable about real
estate and the law know better. In July 1998, the Moores' attorneys deposed
Donald Mueller.' Mueller had been hired by Arch Coal to testify as a
company expert witness on the value of the Moores' land and home.43 6 When
asked if he had ever seen a contract for the sale of a single family residence
similar to the coal company's Option to Purchase agreement, he testified
that he had not and he did not believe it would be enforceable in a court of
law.43 7 Moreover, he admitted that as a licensed professional real estate
broker, "he would have ethical problems asking anyone to sign such an
agreement."

43

8

Finally, as he sat staring at the agreement-which the company's
lawyers apparently had not revealed to him prior to the deposition-Mueller
blurted out:
I have seen some funky deed provisions at times, but never something ina
contract like that[.] ...I don't think it does prohibit anyone from purchasing
property in that area. I don't think you can take that right away from someone.

429 Id (quoting
430 Id
431 Id (quoting
432 Id.
433 Id
434 Id
435 Id
436 Id
437 Id
438 Id

deposition of land agent James Stephens) (modification in original).
Option to Purchase agreement) (modification in original).

(quoting deposition of Terrence Irons).

(citing deposition of Donald Mueller).
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It's like putting in a deed
restriction that if you are black, you can't live in this
43 9
property, or whatever.
In addition to proof that Arch Coal and related companies had drawn
up secret plans designed to cause the wholesale exodus of families from the
communities located near the Dal-Tex complex, discovery in the Moores'
case revealed another equally surprising set of facts. These revelations draw
into question statements Arch Coal CEO Steven Leer made in the mass
mailings that were part of the company's 1998 public relations campaign to
offset criticism of its mountaintop removal mining activities. In a pamphlet
Arch mailed to thousands of coalfield residents, Leer asserted, "'We are
constantly seeking new ways to lessen any adverse impacts our operations
might have on surrounding communities.'"" One way that Arch had claimed
to lessen these adverse impacts was the dust monitoring program that it had
agreed to implement as part of the state Surface Mine Board consent
agreement discussed above."
7 Bogus DustMonitoringProgram
As mentioned above, one claim in the Moores' complaint was that mine
activities had caused their home and the community to be constantly
inundated with heavy and pervasive dust.4 2 When the Moores' counsel
reviewed the transcripts of SMB hearings on DEP notices of violations, it
became evident that Arch Coal would claim, as it had before the SMB, that
the dust picked up by the company's dust monitors had not come from
mining operations. Rather, as Arch's expert Terah Burdette had testified
before SMB, the company would likely argue that the source of the high dust
levels recorded on the monitor had been caused by pollen and mold spores,
not mining activities."44
The Moores' attorneys deposed Terah Burdette regarding the
company's dust monitoring.' She testified that she had no real expertise in
air pollution monitoring and that her educational background was limited to
a two-year associate's degree in a mining-related discipline. She was
competent to run the coal company's dust monitoring program, she asserted,
because a manufacturer's representative of the monitor manufacturer had
instructed her on proper procedures.
Ms. Burdette's deposition was not completed but adjourned to be
resumed several weeks later. In the interim, the Moores' counsel consulted
with an expert on air pollution monitoring asking him to review the

439 Id (quoting deposition of Donald Mueller).
440 Id (quoting Arch Coal mass mailing).
441 See supranotes 367-71 and accompanying text.
442 State, Frins Slow to CorrectDus BlastingProblems,supranote 358.
443 Id.The Moores and their neighbors used video cameras to document numerous days of
the pervasive dust that was the subject of the allegations in their complaint. An expert, hired by
the plaintiffs, reviewed those video tapes and found the assertion that what was shown was
pollen and mold spores to be bizarre at best.
444 Id
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transcript of Burdette's first day of deposition. The plaintiffs' expert
concluded, after reading the transcript and the dust monitoring data filed
with DEP, that it was impossible Ms. Burdette was operating the equipment
properly.
The monitors placed by Arch Coal in communities adjacent to the DalTex complex are highly sensitive and they must be calibrated frequently and
carefully. The plaintiffs' expert told the Moores' attorneys that the
monitoring data showed that such calibration could not have been
performed. He pointed out that on some days the monitor readings showed
such low levels of dust that the air near the Dal-Tex complex would have
been more pristine than the air at West Virginia's Dolly Sods Federal
Wilderness Area-an absolute impossibility. Moreover, the expert found that
the reports Burdette sent to the Surface Mine Board contained a major
mathematical miscalculation-they grossly underestimated the amount of
dust because Burdette had converted dust concentrations from milligrams to
micrograms by multiplying by 100, instead of by the proper conversion
factor of 1,000.44
When Burdette's deposition resumed, the Moores' counsel went armed
with the instruction manual for the dust monitors with which Burdette had
been working. Prompted by a suggestion from the plaintiffs' expert, Burdette
was asked how she had calibrated the monitors. Not only did she have no
idea how to perform the crucial calibration, she could not even understand
basic terms used in the instruction manual. Contradicting her sworn
testimony before the West Virginia Surface Mine Board two years earlier,
Burdette proceeded to acknowledge in the deposition that the company's
monitoring data "did not prove the dust was mostly pollen and mold spores,
rather than mine dust."" 6
On the basis of what had been uncovered in discovery, the Moores filed
a motion seeking to amend their complaint." 7 The amended complaint
sought to add as defendants the two companies employing the land agents
and to add new causes of action for civil conspiracy and civil fraud. 8 The
amended complaint also sought punitive damages." 9
The Circuit Court of Logan County never had an opportunity to rule on
the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint.4 50 Within days of Mueller's
deposition and the filing of the amended complaint, the defendant offered to
settle the case and the Moores agreed. 451 Although the settlement agreement
required the amount of the settlement to be confidential, the agreement was
placed in a public file by the court clerk's office and the CharlestonGazette's
Ken Ward Jr. wrote a story reporting that the settlement amount was

445 Burdette
446 Id

admitted as much when the deposition resumed. Id.

447 Buying Blai, supra note 346.
448 Id
449 Id
450 Id
451 Id
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the company's land agents had made to the
$225,000, far more than any 45offer
2
Moores prior to the lawsuit.
In October 1998, two months after the Moores settled their case, EPA
held a public hearing on Arch Coal's planned expansion of the Dal-Tex
complex.453 Hundreds of people attended the meeting, most of them
company employees who did not live in Blair or the other small communities
near Dal-Tex.4 The Gazette's Ken Ward Jr. described what happened when
Victoria Moore entered the gymnasium where the hearing was held:
Dal-Tex General Manager Mark White confronted her. White reminded Moore
that, when her family settled their lawsuit against the company, she agreed not
to talk about the settlement or to protest against the [expanded] permit.
When her turn came, Moore got up to speak anyway.
Moore told the crowd that she tried to get DEP or some other agency to
help her family. No one would stop Dal-Tex from blasting rocks and dust into
the community, she said.
do,'"
"Everybody tells us 'you have a problem, but there's nothing we can
" 455
Moore said. "'Go hire yourself a lawyer'-that's what you're leaving us to.
Moore's comment belies the fact that she and a few of her neighbors began
to organize and through their efforts forced a regulatory agency to take
enforcement actions against one of the nation's largest coal producers.
Those citizens' complaints and their effective participation, without benefit
of counsel, in adjudicatory hearings before the state SMB triggered the
generation of a paper trail. With the assistance of lawyers, that paper trail
ultimately revealed the truth.
Arch Coal's CEO Steven Leer told thousands of West Virginians, "'We
are constantly seeking new ways to lessen any adverse impacts our
operations might have on surrounding communities.'"456 Arch Coal's Vice
President David Todd told the national audience of ABC's Nightne, "We
continue to try to work with the community and to find ways to minimize
our temporary presence nearby,"4 57 and later told a Washngton Post
reporter, "'We're committed to protecting the environment and respecting
West Virginia's mountain heritage.'" 4" Unlike the coal barons of a much
earlier time, these modem coal executives can literally move and remove
mountains. But what these modem captains of industry seem unable to

452 Id. The agreement required that the Moores sell their lot and mobile home to the
company. They chose to sell because there was little left of the community they had known and
because they were concerned that if they returned to their home their son would be again
exposed to dust that would aggravate his asthma Unlike the burned refuse of other homes that
had lain for years in the communities surrounding Dal-Tex, the company quickly moved in and
demolished the Moores' home shortly after the settlement agreement was executed.
453 State, FirmsSlow to CorrectDust, BlastingProblems,supranote 358.
454 Id.
455 Id
456 BuylngBlai-, supra note 346 (quoting an Arch Coal mass mailing).
457

9i7ghtline,supra note 343 (quoting David Todd, Vice President, Arch Coal).

45 Warrick, supranote 342 (quoting David Todd, Vice President, Arch Coal).
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grasp is the simple meaning of words like "protect," "respect," and
"minimize."
Their company clearcut and blasted apart thousands of acres
surrounding the small communities adjacent to their vast coal mining
operations. Millions of tons of coal were mined and shipped to market each
year. But the record is clear, Arch Coal and its predecessors at Dal-Tex did
not protect mountain heritage, respect their neighbors, or work with the
communities to lessen the impacts of mining. Rather, they formulated a
specific plan with a target goal of eliminating as many families as possible.
As David Todd told the Gazette, "'Our philosophy is not to impact
people[.] ... And if there are no people to impact, that is consistent with our
459
philosophy.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The introduction to this Essay identifies a paradox. The counties of
southern West Virginia's so-called "billion dollar coalfields" contain
enormously valuable coal reserves. Coal production from huge, highly
efficient mountaintop removal and longwall mines has reached record
levels, a fact that belies the dismal economic reality of the coalfield
communities where coal production is greatest."6 This Essay was intended
to provide insight as one attempts to answer the obvious question: How is it
that so many communities in the "billion dollar coalfields" are still mired in
poverty and stagnant local economies continue to record some of the
highest unemployment rates in the United States?
The Essay places the present condition of the central Appalachian
coalfield communities in historical context. The lessons of that history are
clear. The coalfield struggle pitting communities against the oppressive coal

459 Buying Blai, supra note 346 (quoting David Todd, Vice President, Arch Coal). A drive
down West Virginia Route 17 where Blair, Monclo, Five Block, and other small former coal
camps survived for the better part of a century or more reveals the success of the company's
plan. Little if anything is left of those communities.
460 The following table reveals a startling comparison between coal production and
unemployment in 2002 for seven southern West Virginia counties in the billion dollar coalfields:

County

Tons of Coal Produced, 2002

Unemployment Rate, 2002

Boone County
Mingo County
Logan County
Wyoming County
McDowell County
Clay County
Fayette County

31,817,818
19,995,196
11,676,259
8,196,399
4,514,677
4,174,280
3,955,524

9.7%
10.7%
8.4%
6.5%
10.0%
11.1%
8.6%

WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF MINERS' HEALTH SAFETY & TRAINING, 2002 COAL PRODUCTION BY

COUNTY, at http://www.wvminesafety.org/cnty2002.htm (last updated May 22, 2003); ECONOMIC
RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, COUNTY LEVEL UNEMPLOYMENT AND MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME FOR WEST VIRGINIA, at

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Unemployment/RDList2.asp?ST=WV (last updated Aug. 20, 2003).
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industry forces that began in the coal camps of the nineteenth century
continues today. Historians have documented a century of exploitation of
coalfield communities by an economic and political system which
perpetuated conditions reminiscent of colonial powers treatment of third
world communities. Any objective observer traveling the narrow winding
roads to visit the former coal camps of the "billion dollar coalfields" must
conclude that the coal industry, absentee owners, and middlemen have not
shared the region's wealth equitably.
In his 1976 book, West Virginia A History,Professor John Alexander
Williams used coalfield history to inform his prediction of the state's future:
The managers and stockholders of [out-of-state coal and land holding
companies] have little to gain and much to lose by preservation of West
Virginia's environmental resources, and yet the reverse is true for the
overwhelming majority of residents of the state. Thus the environmental battles
of the future... are likely to pit weak and poorly organized coalitions of local
reformers and interest groups against powerful
and well-disciplined
461
combinations of absentee owners and middlemen.
As Professor Williams predicted, the battles of coalfield citizens for
environmental and economic justice has pitted the powerful against those
whose ability to fight back has historically been limited. Opposition to the
encroachment of modern mountaintop removal operations in communities
like those bordering Arch Coal's Dal-Tex complex have revealed coal
industry motives and regulatory agency misfeasance. But, for the most part,
the former coal camp communities near the Dal-Tex Complex have ceased
to exist, the residents having sold their homes and land to encroaching coal
companies.
Thus, the observation that "the more things change the more they seem
to stay the same," is one that might be made about the future of the
communities of the Central Appalachian coalfields. In addition to the
destruction of coalfield communities, conflicts between union and nonunion
mine operators, poverty, high unemployment, underfunded schools, lack of
community infrastructure, and the fear and intimidation generated by
industry threats to close mines and layoff workers persist in the region.
Federal and state regulatory agencies often show more concern for those
whom they are supposed to regulate than for the coalfield communities and
their environment. As tens of thousands of coal miners' jobs have
evaporated, bundles of campaign contributions maintain King Coal's grip on
state politicians.
But the future of coalfield communities is not as bleak as it may seem.
Modem communication technology, including the internet, allows people
and organizations in remote and isolated coalfield venues to share
information and work together toward the common goal of economic,
environmental, and social justice. Across the coalfields people are coming
together in grassroots organizations. In West Virginia, the West Virginia

461 WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY, supranote 103, at 202-03.
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Organizing Project and Coal River Mountain Watch have made strides in
drawing attention to conflicts between coalfield citizens and coal mining
operations. These and other established and new grass roots organizations
throughout Appalachia continue to seek justice in the coalfields.
Moreover, public interest and plaintiffs' lawyers representing coalfield
families and communities have, for the first time, garnered a considerable
measure of success. 462 No longer do coal companies go to court with the
expectation of favorable treatment by judges and juries. 63 The fact that

462 Lawsuits based on statutory citizen suit and common law claims, such as those utilized in

the Moore case, have found considerable success. For example, in the fall of 2003, a jury
returned a $473,000 verdict against A.T. Massey Energy in a class action suit brought by
residents of Sylvester, West Virginia. Ken Ward Jr., Coal Company Liable for Dust: Sylvester
Residents Awarded $473,000, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2003, at IA, available at 2003 WL
5445017. The suit sought damages and injunctive relief to enjoin the operation of Massey's huge
Elk Run coal preparation plant, which had spewed clouds of dust into the community for years.
Id. In addition to monetary damages, the trial court ordered the company to install air pollution
abatement equipment that cost the company more than $500,000 and awarded the plaintiffs
more than $1.5 million in attorney and expert witness fees. Ken Ward Jr., Massey Orderedto
Pay Sylvester Residents'Lawyers,CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 2003, at 8A, availableat 2003
WL 5494644. In a suit against Arch Coal subsidiary Mingo Logan Coal Co., Mingo Logan agreed
to settle claims related to well-water loss and other damage from longwall mining. Ken Ward Jr.,
Arch Coal Settles in Mingo Well- WaterLoss Suit, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, February 7, 2002, at 7A.,
available at 2002 WL 5181084. As a result of the citizen suit brought by coalfield residents in
Bragg, DEP agreed to correct multiple programmatic violations of SMCRA's mountaintop
removal permitting requirements. These are but a few examples of the successes coalfield
citizens have achieved recently as public interest and plaintiffs' lawyers have begun to utilize
common law and statutory citizen suits in tandem to redress the injuries caused by mining.
463 For most of the last century, coal-camp residents could expect a less than favorable
response to suits filed against a coal company in local courts. An excellent example of what
such plaintiffs faced is a case brought in 1978 in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County, West
Virginia. In that case, an elderly former miner suffering from black lung disease sought
injunctive relief and damages relating to dust generated by heavy coal truck traffic. West v. Nat'l
Mines Corp., 285 S.E.2d 670, 672-74 (W. Va. 1981). The circuit court denied the plaintiffs'
request for injunctive relief and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss; the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. Id at 672, 679. At
trial, the closing argument made by defense counsel is indicative of the job-extortion strategy
commonly used by coal interests throughout the twentieth century:
I would say that [the plaintiffs] have tried to trump up a pretty good case here for a
whole lot of money. I don't think this jury is going to make a decision which will result in
the destruction of the coal industry as it exists today in southern West Virginia.... If
there is no coal dust on the streets of Pineville, there is nobody in the stores.... There is
no money to pay income taxes with, there is no money to pay social security, there is no
money to pay black lung, there is no money to pay Workmen's Compensation, there is no
money to pay unemployment compensation, there is no money to pay truckers to get
their trucks repaired, to buy fuel, there is no money to support the schools, there is no
money to build roads, and that is the truth and you know it, and I am glad to leave this
case in your hands.
West v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 336 S.E.2d 190, 198 (W. Va. 1985) (McGraw, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting National Mines Corp. counsel's closing argument at trial).
The jury found that the plaintiffs had suffered no compensable damages. Id. at 192. In addition,
the circuit court dissolved a preliminary injunction that had required the coal truck operator to
abate the air pollution nuisance. Id at 191. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld
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citizen plaintiffs are achieving success as they challenge the excesses of the
coal industry should encourage a second look by plaintiffs' lawyers
whom in
4 64
the past have shown little interest in taking on such clients.
Coalfield citizen activism and lawsuits, however, will not bring jobs to
the region. Coal is the only game in town, so to speak, and it is not hiring.
Nor is it paying sufficient taxes to support modernization of coalfield
infrastructure "or the dire need for improvements in education. As discussed
above, SMCRA's provisions pertaining to mountaintop removal mining were
intended to promote economic development in those areas where the
technique is permitted.4" For more than a quarter of a century, federal and
state regulators and politicians squandered the economic development
opportunities offered by SMCRA. They chose to ignore SMCRA's mandate in
favor of granting carte blanche to a coal industry whose adoption of new
mountaintop removal and longwall mining technologies was decimating
mining jobs and tax revenues.
Given history, hope is slim that these players will finally take advantage
of SMCRA's mountaintop removal provisions to bring needed industrial,
commercial, and residential development to the region.46 Indeed, there is an
emerging view among "some" business leaders, politicians, and academics
that advances the coal companies' desire to rid themselves of the old coal
camp communities. A recent article written by the senior staff writer of the
State Journal,West Virginia's only business weekly, reported:
Economists say [West Virginia] may have five years before it is totally broke.
Extending infrastructure to every ridge and hollow is simply too expensive.
the jury verdict but remanded, ordering the circuit court to reinstate the injunction. Id.at 192.
464 The necessity of being able to "pay the bills" motivates plaintiffs' counsel to limit their
representation to cases in which there is a substantial likelihood of recovery. In the past, such a
likelihood did not apply to most cases brought against coal companies by coalfield citizens in
local courts. Today, recent successes in citizen suits and property damage cases indicate that
courts are no longer hostile to such claims against coal companies. An additional
encouragement to lawyers to represent coalfield residents in such cases is a unique provision
contained in the citizen suit provision of SMCRA and its state corollaries. The statutes provide a
cause of action for personal injury and property damage resulting from a violation of the act by
a coal operator. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-25(f) (Michie 2002). No
similar provision is found in any other federal environmental regulatory statute. In addition,
SMCRA allows the recovery of attorney and expert witness fees if the-court determines such an
award is appropriate. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2000); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-25(d) (Michie 2002).
465 See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(c)(3) (2000) (setting forth the postmining land uses required to
obtain an exemption from the AOC requirement); id § 1265(c)(3)(B) (requiring specifically that
the mountaintop removal permit applicant give certain assurances to the regulatory agency
regarding the postmining land use).
466 Politicians and the coal industry continue to tout the need for mining-flattened land. In
Mingo County, a plan promoted by the West Virginia School Building Authority is afoot to build
a new high school on a reclaimed mountaintop removal site to replace three county high
schools. Dozens Protest Mingo Conso~ldation, CHARLESTON GAZErE, Feb. 6, 2004, at 12A,
available at 2004 WL 59623861. Questioning the plan which would require students from
coalfield communities to be bussed long distances, Williamson, West Virginia Mayor Charles
West asked, "Why do these communities need to lose their schools so we can build a $23 million
blue goose on top of Red Jacket Mountain with the nearest fire station ten miles away, no police
protection, no sewage and water service, and no highway to get to it?" Id
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But if the state wants to develop some of its more rural and economically
depressed areas, extending infrastructure is essential. Many areas of the state
lack roads, sewer systems or access to county water, let alone internet
businesses to those areas is nearly impossible without
connections. Attracting
467
those basic elements.

The solution to such a dilemma, the article continues, is Darwinian:
Rather than struggle to keep shrinking areas vibrant, some people have
suggested that the state let natural selection play out. Communities that are
viable survive. Those that are not become ghost towns like so many towns of
the Old West. Through policies and careful fiscal selection, the state can
from the remote hills and
encourage people to move to more
468 viable areas
hollows where they currently live.
"Some say" that by moving from their ancestral homeplaces, the residents of
rural West Virginia "would end up saving 46the state money and help
[themselves] improve the[ir] quality of life.... " 9
An economist at one of West Virginia's largest universities places a
patina of expert authority on this proposal. An economist with Marshall
University, Mark Burton said:
"We may need to look at relocation policies to tackle rural sprawl because we
can't continue to provide everything to everyone[.] ... If someone wants to live
on the backside of a mountain, that's fine, but they can't expect the state and
county to come out to them. They can't expect school buses to come pick their
are free to live where they want, but the state doesn't have
children up. People
470
to help them."
The history of Central Appalachia's coalfield conmmunities is replete
with betrayal and injustice. As those communities view the future from the
brink of a new millennium, the lessons of this history suggest their struggle
for environmental, economic, and social justice will continue. The innate
strength and decency of the hardworking people of those communities will
be tested anew as coal companies and other powerful interests pursue
"relocation policies" intended to transform them into Appalachian ghost
towns. Those who would destroy these communities in the name of
eliminating "rural sprawl" or maximizing profits may be surprised at their
resilience. Faced with plans for "hillbilly cleansing" 47' and steeled by a

467 Beth Gorczyca, Energy Can Remain a Key Economic Force,STATE JOURNAL, Jan. 16, 2004,
at 4, available at http://www.statejournal.com/jan2.cfm.
468 Id
469 Id.

470 Id (quoting Mark Burton, Economist at Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia).
471 The phrase "hillbilly cleansing" is used advisedly. "Hillbilly" was first used pejoratively to

describe Appalachian mountain culture and the people who reside in the region. See Phyllis
Rossiter Modeland, He Who Laughs Last: The Truth About Hillbillhes, OZARKS MOUNTAINEER,
available athttp://www.runningriver.com/truth.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) ("Perhaps the first
time [the term] appeared in print was April 23, 1900, when a piece in the New York Journal
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century of oppression, the people of coalfield communities are likely to fight
back.

defined a 'hill-billie' as a free white man 'who lives in the hills, has no means to speak of,
dresses as he can, talks as he please, drinks whiskey when he gets it, and fires off his revolver
as the fancy takes him.'"). Today, although "hillbilly" continues to have negative connotations, it
has also been embraced by many people of the region who take pride in the accomplishments
of the culture and the people. See, e.g., VONDA SHEETS, THE NEW HILLBILLY (2001), at
http://www.yesteryearhollow.comnewhbiUy.htm
("Our ancestors sometimes believed
'hillbilly' was a derogatory term. Most of us don't feel that way. We know the truth behind the
word, and it is only fools that think the stereotype truly exists."); C. BOWLEs, CAN You HEAR ME
Now? WHAT IS AHILLBLLY? (Feb. 6, 2004), at
http://canyouhearmenow.typepad.comindex/2004/02/what-is-a-hillb.html ("I for one am proud
to be an American and a Hillbilly."); WELCOME TO HILLBILLY DAYS 2003!, at
http://www.hillbilldays.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (An annual "Hillbilly Days" festival is held
in Pikeville, Ky., celebrating mountain culture.).
"Hillbilly cleansing" in Appalachia should not be equated with the tragic "ethnic
cleansing" events in such places as Kosovo and Rwanda. The use of murder, torture, and armed
expulsion that accompanied those events certainly is not present in Appalachia- Nonetheless,
the phrase "hillbilly cleansing" is used here to describe the goal of some corporate managers
and others to eliminate old coal camp communities for the sake of profit or to reduce
government costs. Thus, in the context of this Essay, "hillbilly cleansing" is a term that
recognizes that these plans, sometimes accompanied by violations of law acquiesced in by
federal and state regulators, may wipe out not only communities, but an entire culture. In a
democracy, citizens should be able to choose where to live of their own volition. The residents
of coalfield communities, proud of their mountain heritage, should not be viewed as obstacles
to the bottom line of a coal company nor as unfortunate burdens on the state treasury.

